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Abstract 
The field chosen for this study is that of European Union policy on consumer protection. 
Its focus specifically relates to the ability of EU citizens as consumers to exercise their 
economic rights across borders within the Single Market. The study principally 
examines consumer protection policies, but takes account of the role of EU competition 
policy in monitoring and shaping the market framework. The study explores not only the 
legal embodiment of these consumer rights, but the ability of consumers to access them 
in practice; thus the study also focuses on issues related to the enforcement of consumers' 
economic rights and their realisation in practice. 
The purpose of this study is to enquire into the principal reasons for the rise of the 
consumer domain in the EU policy-making frame. It is argued that the Commission has 
become increasingly aware of the disaffection with which many EU citizens view the 
process of integration. It has tried to improve the functioning of EU consumer protection 
policy, with particular reference to the exercise of consumers' economic interests across 
borders, as a way of legitimising the Single Market in the eyes of the consumer. A 
central component of this strategy has been the use of the rhetoric of the 'citizen 
consumer'. The Commission has attempted to compensate for the constraints under 
which it operates with regard to proper enforcement in respect of consumers' economic 
rights by complementing the indirect measures based on competition policy with a 
combined approach of direct measures, based on legislation, soft-law and de-centralised 
initiatives. 
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CHAPTER 1 
INTRODUCTION TO THE STUDY 
Focus and Scope of Study 
The field chosen for this study is that of European Union (EU) policy on consumer 
protection. Its focus specifically relates to the ability of EU citizens as consumers to 
exercise their economic rights across borders within the Single Market. The study 
principally examines consumer protection policies, but takes account of the role of EU 
competition policy in monitoring and shaping the market framework. The study explores 
not only the legal embodiment of these consumer rights, but the ability of consumers to 
access them in practice; thus the study also focuses on issues related to the enforcement 
of consumers' economic rights and their realisation in practice. 
The purpose of this study is to enquire into the principal reasons for the rise of the 
consumer domain in the EU policy-making frame. By means of a case-study approach, 
developed in greater detail below, the study sets out to test this hypothesis that the 
Commission's capacity to oversee the proper enforcement of EU consumer protection is 
constrained by the remit of its actions as proscribed by the treaties. The Commission has 
become increasingly aware of the disaffection with which many EU citizens view the 
process of integration. It has tried to improve the functioning of EU consumer protection 
policy, with particular reference to the exercise of consumers' economic interests across 
borders, as a way of legitimising the Single Market in the eyes of the consumer. A 
central component of this strategy has been the use of the rhetoric of the 'citizen 
consumer'. The Commission has attempted to compensate for the constraints under 
which it operates with regard to proper enforcement in respect of consumers' economic 
rights by complementing the indirect measures based on competition policy with a 
combined approach of direct measures, based on legislation, soft-law and de-centralised 
initiatives. 
This thesis therefore includes the study of the role and behaviour of the European 
Commission as policy actor, supervisor and agent in three different contexts. The first 
context deals with a series of specific Commission initiatives designed to bolster 
consumer protection. The second two contexts represent sectors of the Single Market - 
the market for cross-Channel travel and the market for cars. 
Limitations on the Field of Study 
The protection of the consumers' economic rights, in comparison with foundation policy 
areas of the EU, such as the Common Agricultural Policy or Competition Policy is of 
relatively recent origin. It has developed in parallel to consumer policy on health and 
safety issues and is located within the same Directorate for Health and Consumer 
protection. However, the focus of this study deliberately excludes provisions dealing 
with health and safety. EU health and safety legislation has been seen by policy-makers 
as an absolute right. The protection of consumers' health and safety has therefore been 
dealt with through the public domain, i. e. national public bodies have been principally 
responsible for overseeing the implementation and enforcement of EU health and safety 
legislation. Moreover, since 1986, in particular, much of the work related to consumers' 
health and safety has been dealt with as a result of the standardisation process, a 
necessary step in the creation of a'level playing field' for suppliers and for the completion 
of the Single Market. The protection for consumers' economic rights has developed 
more slowly, though in parallel with consumers' health and safety policy. The essential 
point is that the task of health and safety protection has been taken out of the hands of the 
private EU consumers. Arguably, policy-makers have responded to the field of health 
and safety in this way because of the fear of a backlash from voters in the case of 
problems encountered in this field. However, matters affecting consumers' health and 
safety have very different characteristics compared with matters affecting their economic 
rights. Health and safety problems often potentially affect a substantial population; 
consumers in these cases tend to rally to a common purpose and react as a cohesive group 
- moreover, such issues often excite a high media profile. Matters affecting consumers' 
economic rights, on the other hand, lack the same urgency, the same danger of bad 
publicity and the mobilisation of large and angry sections of the electorate. 
Although some information on the earlier background to the development of consumer 
policy in the EU has been included by way of providing a context, the 1986 Single 
European Act has been taken as the starting point for the study. This date was chosen 
because 1986 represents the renewal of the drive towards the integration of the member 
states' national markets into a Single European Market and, as such is a key date for the 
focus of the study. 
First, the study is limited in its focus to the EU context. Therefore any attempts to 
generalise from it will need to take account of the unique features of the EU political 
framework, especially the particular model of governance adopted by the EU. Second 
the study is set in a particular time-frame, which represents a distinctive stage in the 
development of the European union -a stage involving moves towards both a Single 
Market and a single currency. Any attempt to generalise from the study will need to take 
account of the distinctive circumstances of the EU political system during the period 
covered. Despite these caveats, it is reasonable to claim that some of the findings and the 
methodology of this research might well apply to other policy areas in the EU and to 
other research foci. 
EU Consumer Protection: Definition and Rationale 
Distinction Between Consumer Protection and Competition Policies 
In their more modern form, consumer protection policies developed in most westernised 
mixed economies from the 1950s onwards, mainly in response to the growth in economic 
and technological development, to the increase in product availability and consumer 
choice and to the increase in individual wealth and disposable income (Howlett: 1994). 
The argument as to whether consumer protection policy is necessary at all remains a bone 
of contention for both academics and politicians and continues to colour the rationale 
behind different approaches to consumer protection. One school of thought holds that the 
consumer is adequately protected by market regulation in the form of anti-trust and 
competition legislation. Some argue that consumer protection policy can act to restrict 
the consumer's ability to exercise choice. The counter view holds that, even under 
circumstances where the consumer is protected by market regulation, the consumer may 
still be disadvantaged in a number of ways. Swann (1979) and Duggan (1998) capture 
the essence of these two positions in the following passages. Duggan asks: 
.... what does "protection" mean? One school of thought holds that consumers are 
best protected by laws, which facilitate their freedom of choice. This suggests that 
consumers need protection against fraud and other forms of exploitation in the 
bargaining process, but it also suggests that consumers should bear the 
responsibility for their own mistakes. (Duggan: 1998: 469) 
On the other hand, Swann argues: 
One of the oddities of anti-trust literature is the degree to which it ignores aspects 
of the consumer interest. It is true that policies designed to foster and maintain 
competition have the consumer in mind. Thus, one can see competition as a device 
for keeping prices down to consumers by putting pressure on profit margins and by 
stimulating greater productive efficiency and technological change. On a grander 
scale, one can see it as an ingredient necessary for the achievement of an overall 
optimum allocation of resources. In all these senses, competition does envisage the 
consumer as the ultimate beneficiary. But, where much conventional literature 
seems to be deficient is in its apparent assumption that if the government, through 
the operation of its legal and administrative organs aims to create conditions of 
effective competition, then it is doing all it needs to do. The consumer can be 
safely left to get on with it. (Swann: 1979: 265) 
The view has prevailed in most western mixed economies that a degree of consumer 
protection is needed, alongside market regulation, in order adequately to safeguard the 
consumer and many countries now possess an array of national consumer protection 
measures. 
Rationale UnderninninR the EU Dimension in Consumer Protection 
If consumers are protected already by fairly comprehensive national protection 
frameworks, what then is the rationale for developing an EU consumer protection policy? 
Assuming that EU legislation produced in the consumer domain does not simply replicate 
at a higher level that which already exists at national level, what purpose does it serve? It 
has been suggested that the Commission is always eager to expand its sphere of 
competencies into new policy areas in order to extend its power and influence (Tallberg: 
1999). Whilst this assertion may contain more than a grain of truth, there is an alternative 
view which sets a clear logic for the development of consumer protection at the EU level. 
The advent of the Single Market brought a new urgency to thinking on consumer 
protection. The Single Market presents a range of opportunities for consumers: it 
represents the integration of a multiplicity of markets and, in principle, broadens 
enormously both the scope of consumer choice and the capacity of the consumer to 
access the best deals under the best conditions across national boundaries. This can only 
happen, however, if the consumer is confident of being able both to access those deals 
and conditions, and if the consumer is also confident of being able to obtain legal redress 
in case of dissatisfaction. 
National consumer protection systems are themselves far from perfect and consumers 
continue to experience problems due to a number of factors; for example a lack of 
knowledge as to their rights, imperfections in the institutionalised framework of the 
redress mechanisms or the cost of gaining redress the difficulty in enforcing court 
decisions. The addition of a cross-border element to this equation adds a new dimension 
of complication to the whole issue of consumer protection. As Sauphanor explains, an 
EU consumer protection policy is necessary because market mechanisms at the 
community level are even less capable of protecting consumers than they are at national 
level. He goes on to cite Bourgoignie's analysis of the situation: 
'the difficulties for consumers of one country to be informed as to the offers, 
products or services available abroad, the reinforcement of the diversity of offers, 
the rise in the level of risks from faults and accidents linked to the extension of 
consumers' abilities to use cross-border products and services, the development of 
trans-frontier methods of sale and marketing, the creation of European instruments 
of credit and payment, new barriers to access to justice, uncertainty as to the 
applicable law and the applicable competent jurisdiction in cases of transfrontier 
litigation.... ' (Sauphanor: 2000: 321, citing Bourgoignie: 1992). 
(My translation. ) 
The point of developing an EU consumer protection policy, therefore, is not to replicate 
that which already exists at national level, nor is it a case of the Commission attempting 
to extend the scope of its competencies for the sake of extending its power-hold. An EU 
consumer policy is intended to bolster policy in the member states, to ensure a common 
minimal standard of protection across the Community and to address problems faced by 
consumers of an intrinsically cross-border nature. 
However, this study reveals a second, more recent dimension to this policy, which was 
also conceived by the Commission as a way of legitimising the Single Market project in 
the eyes of EU consumers. 
Having outlined the rationale underpinning EU policy in this field and before setting out 
the substantive research issues to be addressed, it is necessary to clarify the term 
'consumer'. The consumer protection plans issued by the Commission clearly define their 
understanding of the consumer as the non-profit making consumer; i. e. not business. A 
number of documents make this quite clear. For instance, Directive 1999/44/EC of the 
European Parliament and of the Council of 25th May 1999 on Certain Aspects of the Sale 
of Consumer Goods and Associated Guarantees states: " consumer shall mean any natural 
person who, in the contracts covered by this directive, is acting for purposes which are 
not related to his trade, business or profession" (European Parliament and Council: 
1999b: 3). This definition is significant since it defines the consumer explicitly in the 
private capacity of the end-consumer and specifically excludes any element of business 
or professional consumption from the definition. The definition and conceptualisation of 
the consumer in this thesis is directly in line with this official definition. 
Having defined the scope and purpose of the study and having clarified the main foci, it 
is now appropriate to consider the principal research questions to be addressed. 
Research questions 
From this overview, it is possible to formulate four inter-related research questions, 
which shape the direction of this study. These are set out below: 
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First, the study asks whether the Commission's increased attention to the ability of 
citizen-consumers in the EU to exercise their economic rights across borders in the 
Single Market was used as a means of legitimising the Single Market in the eyes of 
the citizen? 
This question focuses on the Commission's motivation in raising the profile of the 
protection of consumers' cross-border economic rights. 
The Commission was impelled by evidence of decreasing support for the process of 
EU integration to find ways of re-invigorating citizen support. The increased 
attention to the economic rights of citizen consumers formed part of this more 
general strategy. 
Second, the study analyses the extent to which, as part of this strategy, the 
Commission used the rhetoric of the 'citizen consumer' as a device to court citizen 
support for the single market project. 
This second question examines the development of the rhetoric of the citizen- 
consumer and explores the Commission's use of this rhetoric. 
Third, given the institutional constraints imposed upon the Commission's capacity 
to supervise proper enforcement at member state level, how has the Commission 
attempted to compensate for these constraints in the domain of consumers' 
economic rights? To what extent has it been successful? 
The third question proposes an analysis and assessment of the enforcement 
strategies adopted by the Commission in this field. 
Finally, in order to draw together the responses to the above three questions, the 
study examines how far it is possible to demonstrate the existence of a connection 
between the issues of enforcement, citizenship and legitimacy, in the context of the 
EU framework, with particular reference to policy in the domain of consumers' 
economic interests. 
11 
The final question invites an exploration of the argument that, in this context, the 
issues of enforcement, citizenship and legitimacy are interdependent and have been 
consciously interwoven by EU policy actors, seeking to re-invigorate citizen 
support for the process of EU integration. 
Research Framework 
In order to address these questions, a research design for the study has been adopted 
comprising both atop-down' and a 'bottom-up' approach. First, the top-down approach 
attempts to evaluate the success of the Commission in overcoming constraints imposed 
upon it by the member-states in terms of its ability to supervise enforcement. The 
bottom-up approach involves examining selected case studies in the light of initiatives 
adopted by the Commission (particularly DG24 and the Internal Market DG) which are 
intended to enable citizen-consumers to exercise their economic rights in the single 
market. The initiatives will be selected from three of the policy categories, already 
identified by DG 24 in their policy documents, as areas intended to "bolster the consumer 
confidence necessary to support the implementation of the Single Market project" (EC: 
1990: 5). These categories, chosen for their particular relevance to the consumer's 
economic interests, are those of information and education, transparency and 
enforcement. 
The'top-down', bottom up' approach is also reflected in the two principal conceptual 
constructs used to support the investigation. The 'top-down' analytical approach is 
represented by the 'Principal-Supervisor-Agent' model, which is used to characterise the 
EU framework of governance. The 'bottom-up' approach is represented by the notion of 
the 'citizen-consumer', which conceptualises the intended beneficiary of consumer 
protection policy. 
The PSA Framework 
The 'top-down' approach highlights the peculiar relationship between the Commission 
and the member-states, which has resulted in an uneven power-sharing arrangement, 
where the member-states delegate certain tasks to the EU institutions on the one hand, 
and yet constrain their capacity to carry out those tasks on the other. 
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An over-arching conceptual framework, relating to relevant aspects of EU policy 
enforcement, suggested by Jonas Tallberg, offers a useful paradigm within which to 
locate the particular investigations suggested by the questions listed earlier. Tallberg 
summarises the basic premise of P-A theory as follows: 
The analytical core of P-A theory is the principal-agent relation, which in its 
simplest version arises whenever one party (principal) delegates certain functions to 
another party (agent). This act of delegation immediately gives rise to a problem, 
however, as the agent might decide to pursue its own interests rather than those of 
the principal -'to shirk' in the P-A vocabulary. The principal may reduce the 
likelihood of such shirking by engaging in monitoring of the agent's actions and by 
threatening to impose sanctions if undesired behaviour is undetected. (Tallberg: 
2000: 106) 
However, Tallberg notes that the simple P-A model, does not adequately capture the 
complexities of the relationship between the EU institutions and the member-states at the 
enforcement stage. He therefore extends the model to incorporate a third actor - the 
supervisor (the P-S-A model). According to Tallberg's version of the P-S-A model, the 
member states (multiple principals) delegate to the Commission and the Court 
(supervisors) a limited supervisory role "enforcing the implementation of and compliance 
with EC law as delegated to the individual member states (multiple agents)" (Tallberg: 
2000: 106). Member-states thus have a dual role as both principals and agents. The 
states first operate collectively to produce decisions in intergovernmental bodies and then 
they act individually to implement and carry out those decisions within their national 
legal and administrative frameworks. The supranational institutions are engaged by the 
states as supervisors in order to monitor the behaviour of the states (as agents) and to 
ensure that they enforce and comply with EC rules and laws. 
This model serves as a'conceptual lens' through which to view the behaviour of key 
policy actors and through which to examine the structural relationships between the 
member states and the Commission. 
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The Citizen-consumer 
The 1990s witnessed an increasing focus on the part of the Commission on matters of 
direct concern to EU citizens as a result of a manifest fall in the level of citizen support 
for EU integration. It is in the context of this general concern to address the problem of 
citizen dissatisfaction that the emphasis on the citizen-consumer should be seen. The 
bottom-up' approach focuses on the individual consumer as citizen and market actor. 
The term 'consumer-citizen' was coined by the Commission and surfaced in EU 
documents during the early 1990s, although the concept can be traced to statements 
issued in earlier periods (for example, as far back as the first consumer programme of 
1975). The term refers to the notion of the collection of rights that citizens should be able 
to exercise generally as consumers in the Single Market. The notion of exercisable rights 
links directly to the field of enforcement. Citizens cannot exercise their rights if they 
cannot find or access the means to enforce them. 
The study intends to concentrate on the citizen-consumer in the cross-border context, 
because the purpose of the Single Market from the point of view of citizen-consumers is 
that they should be able to use it to their full advantage, exercising their rights anywhere 
in the EU. However, as the study will show, the issue of accessing and enforcing 
consumer rights across borders is complex, fragmented and difficult. 
Methodolo 
The study adopts what is essentially a case-study approach, covering a defined aspect of 
EU consumer policy as set out above. It embodies elements of three models proposed by 
Eckstein as valid methodology in this field (Eckstein: 1992). The first is what Eckstein 
defined as a Disciplined-Configurative approach, which involves the use of established or 
provisional theoretical constructs in order to increase opportunities for comparison and 
generalisation. In this study the concept of the citizen consumer and the P-S-A model of 
delegation are the particular theoretical constructs, which support this element of the 
methodology. The second is a Heuristic approach, which can be "deliberately used to 
stimulate the imagination towards discerning important problems and possible theoretical 
solutions" (Eckstein: 2000: 137). Heuristic case-studies may occur in series and so lead 
to a step-by-step, case-by-case, building-block pattern of progress in the development of 
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theoretical constructs. This study has focussed on recent developments in EU consumer 
policy, which have not yet widely attracted the attention of researchers. The study also 
addresses the connections between policy outputs and outcomes, an approach which has 
been somewhat neglected. Eckstein argues that the Disciplined-Configurative and 
Heuristic approaches often combine well together in the same study. This study is 
designed to take advantage of this supportive combination, by using the selected 
theoretical constructs as 'lenses' through which to view the research questions and the 
evidence, whilst seeking to shed light on the practical application of these constructs as 
research tools in this field. The study also incorporates a third element, the Plausibility 
Probe, which, as Eckstein explains, is where a case is used as an instrument with which to 
"probe the plausibility of candidate theories". This is a stage of inquiry, preliminary to 
testing and may be used to help identify promising lines of research, which may justify 
greater future expenditure of resources (Eckstein: 2000: 140). This study examines the 
plausibility of using empirical analyses and case-studies as vehicles through which to 
approach the evaluation of the outcomes of policy strategies and initiatives. The 
inclusion of the two specific cases of the car market and the market for cross-Channel 
travel provides for an element of assessment of outcomes 'on the ground'. This strategy 
helps to probe the utility of the approach of examining policy outputs in the light of 
outcomes. The combination of the three case-study elements is intended to enable the 
study to contribute to the theoretical development of the field in terms of concept 
development, causal explanation and research design. 
The study also includes an element of 'process-tracing', a term proposed by George and 
McKeown (1985) and adopted by Tallberg in his thesis (1999). Process tracing involves 
the attempt to reconstruct actors' definitions of the situation and to trace the influences 
principals, supervisors and agents may exert upon each other. This approach is 
developed with reference to the public statements of key policy actors and the interview 
data arising from investigation of the realisation of the enforcement process. This overall 
approach to the study has been chosen as particularly appropriate to the nature of the 
research questions and to the particular research subject, since it allows for detailed 
scrutiny of a set of closely connected problems within a coherent structure. It promotes 
treatment in depth, tapping into sources at a variety of levels and representing different, 
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but relevant constituencies. An approach involving wider comparison would run the risk 
of according too little of the research effort to an attempt to detect and explain the 
particular relationships, specific motivations and causal factors at work. The literature on 
research methods strongly suggests that a qualitative, case-oriented approach promotes a 
type of exploration, especially suited to teasing out these phenomena. The research 
methodology is reviewed in the concluding chapter (eight). 
Research Instruments Employed 
The study uses a range of contrasting and complementary research instruments and 
materials designed to provide evidence that can be cross-referenced in the light of the 
issues raised in the research questions. Since the key research questions deal with 
matters of motivation, rationale, strategy and outcomes, the instruments adopted are ones 
designed to elicit evidence to illuminate these aspects of political behaviour within a 
particular field of the EU system of governance. The early stages of the research process 
involved a review of academic literature in the relevant field, particularly that related to 
the key research questions. This was a continuing process during the course of the 
research as was the review and analysis of official documents in the field. The review of 
academic literature provides evidence of the conceptual context in which the study is set 
and of the degree of support to be found in the work of other researchers for the analysis 
undertaken in this study. It offers critical insights into the analysis, a proven 'sounding 
board' against which to evaluate data and argument and offers a safeguard against'tunnel 
vision' in the study process. 
As the focus of the study narrowed, it became appropriate to extend the survey of official 
documentation to include the scrutiny of speeches, press releases, debates and public 
statements by key policy actors. The review of official documents and statements of 
policy actors was intended to explore differing perceptions of the issues raised in the 
research questions. It was also designed to highlight the responses of policy actors. 
For the empirical research embodied in Chapters Five, Six and Seven this range of 
research methods was extended to include structured interviews with officials at EU and 
UK national level seeking primary evidence of processes of implementation and 
enforcement of selected EU initiatives designed to protect consumers' economic interests. 
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The interviews were also intended to reveal evidence of the strengths and weaknesses of 
the strategies in use. A number of interviews were undertaken on condition that 
confidentiality should be maintained. Consequently, in order to protect the identity of the 
officials interviewed, the study invokes the principle of anonymity, although, in each 
case, the constituency from which the evidence arises is made clear. Chapters Six and 
Seven, in particular, involved the exploration and analysis of primary case-study material, 
focussing on the implementation and enforcement of EU initiatives in the Single Market 
for durable consumer goods (in this instance cars), and on the market for a service (cross- 
Channel travel). 
Evaluation of Usefulness of Sources 
The research tools were carefully selected to correspond to the appropriate task in hand at 
each stage of the research process. The evaluation of primary material provided both an 
excellent source of detailed and up to date information as well as revealing the concerns, 
intentions and in some circumstances the contradictions of key policy actors. The 
interviews provided an excellent way of obtaining additional otherwise unavailable 
information and insights into the policy process. The interviews also provided a way of 
cross checking the validity and reliability of information already obtained through other 
means. 
Finally, the review of secondary literature provided a starting point for the gathering of 
information. It helped to provide the study with overall analytical and conceptual 
frameworks which gave direction to the study. The secondary literature also provided a 
sounding board against which to review the development of ideas and arguments. 
Because the study involved the review of a variety of literature fields; that of the 
consumer, EU consumer protection policy, enforcement and implementation and 
citizenship and legitimacy, not to mention theoretical and methodological frameworks, it 
was decided that the literature review should be separated out into the appropriate 
relevant chapters, so that each individual review would relate clearly to the arguments 
and subject matter of the specific chapter at hand. On balance, it was felt that the 
alternative strategy of reviewing all of the secondary literature in a separate chapter, `out 
of context', might lead to repetition and potential confusion. 
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Complications arising from the methodoloRy 
The study faces two methodological problems from the outset. The first arises due to the 
fact that the study is contemporary and focuses on a rapidly developing aspect of 
consumer protection policy - that of the enforcement of consumers' economic rights 
across borders. The empirical research on certain aspects of the study depends on the 
pace of development of the initiatives under examination. 
The second complication arses due to the overlap between consumer protection policy 
and competition policy, insofar as this confuses the jurisdictional boundaries of these two 
policy areas thus making it difficult for the researcher in some instances to loicate the 
true source of a given consumer problem. 
Plan of the Study 
In order to realise the aims underpinning this study, in the light of the methods outlined 
above, the thesis is organised into the following main sections. 
The first part, Chapter One has explained the purpose and rationale of the study and has 
outlined the conceptual frameworks and methodology adopted. 
The second part consists of a group of chapters (Two, Three and Four) dealing with the 
contextual background and the conceptual frameworks underpinning the study. In 
Chapter Two the historical background is explored in order to place the focus of the study 
within the framework of the development of EU integration. In Chapter Three the 
peculiar nature of the enforcement procedures in the EU is explored and implications of 
those procedures for this study examined. In Chapter Four the development of EU 
citizenship and citizens' rights are outlined. The relevance of these, along with the issue 
of enforcement and the concept of the citizen-consumer are explored using a combination 
of secondary literature and European Commission documentation. The purpose of 
adopting this approach was to use the materials both as a means of generating 
information and as a way of cross-referencing the Commission's position and perspective 
on relevant issues with analyses provided in the secondary literature. 
The third part is largely empirical and comprises one chapter (Five), which examines 
selected Commission strategies to reinforcing the abilities of consumers to exercise their 
economic rights across borders, and Chapters Six and Seven encapsulating the two 
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specific case studies. The fourth section embodies the conclusions to the study, summing 
up the findings and drawing inferences for future research activities in this field. 
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CHAPTER 2 
THE DEVELOPMENT OF EU POLICY IN THE CONSUMER DOMAIN 
Introduction 
The development of EU policy in the consumer domain has been slow and uneven. 
Whilst some progress was made early on in this field in the areas of health and safety, 
other areas, notably consumers' economic rights, enforcement, access to justice and 
information were much slower to develop. During the first years of the EC's existence 
(1950s and 1960s), consumer policy was largely under-developed even at national level. 
Moreover, the primary concern of both national and Community policy-makers in the 
first instance was to integrate the European market for the supply-side. Harmonising 
health and safety regulations was a key aspect to facilitating this process although, as this 
chapter explains, even here progress was generally retarded by the reluctant attitude of 
the member states. The protection of consumers' economic rights was largely neglected 
until the late 1980s, when evidence from opinion polls (Young: 1997: 216-7) and 
opposition to the Maastricht Treaty (1992) alerted both national and community policy- 
makers to the indifference of many EU citizens towards the process of integration. 
In response to this awareness Community policy-makers set out to enhance common 
policy areas of perceived interest to citizens (for example, social, environmental, food, 
and health and consumer protection policies). The development of consumers' economic 
rights is therefore to be viewed within this context. Community attention to this policy 
area was also designed to improve consumer protection at both national and EU level, in 
order to encourage states with relatively poor records of consumer protection (for 
example, Greece and Portugal), to increase their efforts and to provide EU consumers 
with minimal levels of protection when shopping across borders. During the mid to late 
1990s enforcement of consumer protection and consumer access to redress became the 
main focus of EU policy-makers within the field of consumer protection. Successive 
studies and reports demonstrated the economic losses to the business and employment 
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sectors of poor consumer confidence in their ability to exercise their full rights in the 
internal market. Citizens' access to rights in policy areas of direct relevance to their daily 
lives, also begins to emerge as an important weapon in the Commission's strategy to win 
citizen support for European integration. 
The purpose of this chapter is to contextualise in detail the development of consumer 
protection within the wider framework of EU integration. The analysis below broadly 
follows a chronological sequence, exploring the development of consumer policy in three 
inter-related aspects: the treaty bases, institutional development and the emergence of 
'soft-law' initiatives. The chapter sub-divisions follow the time-span between the major 
treaty revisions, namely 1957-1986,1986-1992,1992-1997,1997-2000 and 2000 to the 
present day. 
It is not possible to understand the pattern of development of EU consumer policy 
without reference to the Treaty provisions. At each stage of the integration process, these 
provisions define the limits of supranational action. These limits particularly affect the 
emergence of EU consumer policy in its own right. 
The institutional developments illustrate the standing of consumer affairs in relation to 
other EU policy areas, giving an indication of the priorities of the policy-makers and of 
stages in the development of this policy area. 
The emergence of soft-law has been integral to the development of policy in the 
consumer domain. In the absence of a separate treaty title for consumer policy, soft-law 
initiatives (action plans, policy programmes) have provided a motor for policy 
development in this field. Thus the body of actions and of legislation built up due to the 
soft-law strategic programmes represent a vital aspect of consumer policy. 
Whilst there is a whole realm of material and literature relating to the role played by the 
European Court of Justice in the consumer aspect of the internal market, this study 
focuses particularly on the Commission's role with regard to consumer protection policy 
and on its relationship with the member states. Much of the work accomplished by the 
ECJ has already been researched and well-documented by a number of authors (e. g. 
Tallberg: 1999, Stone-Sweet, Caporaso: 1998, Tridimas: 1996). For this reason, the work 
of the ECJ is treated selectively in this study. Leading cases, which have a direct bearing 
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on the research questions in Chapter One are reviewed in Chapter Four; therefore they 
have not formed part of the framework of the historical developments reviewed in this 
chapter. 
In line with the definition of the scope of the study adopted in Chapter One, this chapter 
will not explore consumers' health and safety legislation since these do not have a 
significant bearing on the research questions. Instead this chapter focuses on legislation 
and other courses of action taken by the Commission affecting consumers' economic 
rights and their enforcement. Rights to information, education and access to justice are 
also be analysed in some detail, since many of these issues are integrally linked to the 
effective enforcement of their economic rights. 
The chapter focuses on an examination of the historical context through Commission 
texts and documents. This approach has been adopted for a number of reasons. First, 
the secondary literature on EU consumer policy tends to be thin on the ground and often 
gives an account of consumer policy that is broad or that is slanted towards an 
examination of one particular aspect. Second, Commission texts provide a wealth of 
information and are the obvious starting point to give detailed overview. Third, the texts 
also provide the Commission's perspective/version of policy strategies and directions i. e 
they provide a base-line against which to adopt a critique. Also, because the study 
concentrates on the Commission's role in supervising the enforcement of consumer 
policy, these documents are the Commission's record of this process and are therefore 
central to the focus of this study. Fourth, an alternative way of examining consumer 
policy would have been to look at the rulings of the ECJ; but alone this would have 
provided an incomplete and uneven picture. This approach has already been adopted by 
a number of authors; moreover the most important rulings are examined in Chapter Four. 
Development of Consumer Policy 1957-86 
The Treaties of Rome (1957) was concerned with establishing the fundamental criteria 
deemed necessary for the creation of the Common Market. Policy areas, such as 
consumer and environmental policy, were seen as largely superfluous to the achievement 
of this objective. Member states wished to limit the extension of Community 
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competencies and were concerned to safeguard their sovereignty. Moreover the treaty 
was created prior to the popularisation of consumer affairs as a cogent policy area within 
the governmental frameworks of the member states. Consequently, the interests of 
consumers do not appear to have figured prominently in the minds of those who 
originally framed the treaty. Significantly, the development of a coherent consumer 
policy was initially impeded, owing to the absence of an explicit legal basis in the Rome 
Treaty providing for the development of an independent community consumer policy 
(Micklitz & Weatherill : 1993: 291). In accordance with the Treaty, consumer policy 
could only be developed within the context of the overall aim of achieving the Common 
Market (Micklitz & Weatherill: 1993: 285). 
Treaty of Rome 
The Rome Treaty served as the basis for the foundation of the EC and shaped its 
operation for a period of twenty-nine years until the Single European Act (1986). It 
includes only four explicit references to consumers. Conveniently, these fall into two 
distinct categories, one dealing with the Common Agricultural Policy (CAP) and the 
other with abuse of monopoly power. 
Article 39 includes a list of five objectives for the CAP, the fifth of which is `to ensure 
that supplies reach consumers at reasonable prices'. 
Article 40 requires that the common organisation of agricultural markets `shall exclude 
any discrimination between producers or consumers within the community. ' 
Both of these articles are significant because they represent an implicit mandate on the 
part of the EC institutions to act on behalf of the consumer in supporting the latter's direct 
economic interests in the agricultural field. It is interesting that the prices of other 
essential consumer goods, such as fuel, petrol and clothing, were left to the dictates of 
market forces. Perhaps the explanation lies in the unique character of the CAP in setting 
target prices for many agricultural products and in the need to reconcile consumers to its 
high cost. Perversely, the focus on food policy stemmed not from any commitment to 
protect consumers per se, but from the determination of policy-makers to protect 
European farmers from the effects of low-cost imports. Rather, the official justification 
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for this policy argued that it was an essential safeguard against possible future food 
shortages. Insofar as it benefited consumers, this was a secondary consideration. 
Another aspect of the Rome Treaty impinging on consumer protection is the treatment of 
abuse of monopoly powers. Parts of Articles 85 and 86 refer explicitly to the effects on 
consumers of monopolistic practices. For instance, one of the conditions set out in 
Article 85 (3), for exempting an agreement between firms from the prohibition of Article 
85 (1), is the requirement that it allows consumers `a fair share' of the resulting economic 
benefit. Article 86 contains a list of examples of potential abuses by dominant firms, 
including prejudice of consumer interests. 
In addition to these provisions, Young emphasises the importance of Articles 2,100 and 
235 of the Treaty of Rome in developing consumer policy initiatives in the early years of 
the community's existence, although he recognises the lack of specific commitment to 
consumer protection per se and the limitations imposed by such an indirect approach 
(Young: 1997: 209). Article 2 represents a broad-based statement of intent regarding the 
wider purpose of creating the Common Market; it clearly envisages the raising of living 
standards of European citizens as a consequence of the Common Market (Simmonds: 
1977: 62) 
Article 100 sets out the rules governing the Community decision-making process, which 
until revision under the Single European Act in 1986 (introducing qualified majority 
voting - in article 100 a) were adopted on the basis of unanimity, which slowed down the 
decision-making process. In any case, during the economically lean period of the 1970s 
to the mid 1980s, member states with high levels of consumer protection (for example, 
Britain and Germany) had significant vested interests in resisting attempts by the 
Community to develop a coherent and comprehensive Community consumer policy. 
They feared that a common policy in this area would lower their own consumer 
protection standards and would help to introduce unwanted commercial and industrial 
competition. They were thus prepared to use the unanimity principle as a blocking or 
delaying device (Young: 1997: 212). 
Whilst Article 235 creates the possibility for extending the remit of Community 
objectives beyond the letter of the treaties, such an extension would have to be based on a 
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proposal by the Commission and would be subject to a vote by the Council using the 
unanimity procedure. In practice, unsurprisingly, in the field of consumer policy, this 
provision has been used sparingly. 
In sum the EEC treaty, with its emphasis on trade protection, concentrated much more 
directly on the supply side of the market than on the demand side. Given the paucity of 
references to consumer policy in the treaty, it is hardly surprising that this policy area 
remained underdeveloped until the mid to late 1980s. 
Institutional Developments 1957-1986 
The first significant developments to take place in consumer affairs at the European level 
were in the development of European consumer groups. Initially, European consumer 
groups (that is groups from the member states) were brought together to form European 
umbrella associations. As Young notes: "initially, European level co-operation [on 
consumer policy] among family associations and among trade unions was organised by 
the respective international organisations" (Young 1998: 157). He further observes that 
the European groups were not intended simply as forums for exchanging information, but 
had a role in monitoring developments affecting consumers and in seeking "to influence 
legislation on behalf of their members" (Young: 1998: 157). 
In June 1961, during a series of seminars organised by the Commission for Consumer 
Organisations, Commissioner Mansholt (Vice-president of the Commission and 
Commissioner for Agriculture) explicitly recognised the EC's imbalance in the 
representation between producer and consumer interests and called for consumer groups 
to organise themselves at the European level. As a result of the meeting, the BEUC 
(Bureau Europeen de 1'Union des Consommateurs - European Consumers' Association) 
was founded in September 1961 and the Commission's Contact Committee for Consumer 
Questions was created in April 1962. The Contact Committee was composed of 
representatives from the major European consumer groups - BEUC, COFACE 
(Confederation of Family Organisations in the European Community), EURO-COOP 
(European Community of Consumer Co-operatives) and EO/IFCTU. The purpose of the 
Committee was to involve consumers in the policy-making process (Young: 1998). 
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In April 1968, a small Consumer Affairs Unit was established within the Competition 
policy directorate DGIV. According to Young this represented "the first step to 
institutionalise consumer policy at the EC level" (Young: 1997: 210). Locating the 
consumer affairs unit within the Competition directorate was commensurate with the 
view that the best defence of consumer interests was an efficient market model regulated 
by effective competition policy. Moreover, the absence of a separate title for consumer 
policy in the Rome Treaty rendered it both difficult and politically undesirable to afford it 
a separate institutional identity at this time. It is, however, significant, that the 
Commission saw the institutionalisation of consumer policy as a desirable step reflecting 
pressure exerted by the European Parliament. 
In 1972 at the Paris summit, the member states' leaders approved the adoption of an EC 
consumer protection policy. During the course of the meeting, the leaders expressed the 
desire to broaden the focus of the founding treaties to include policy areas with a more 
popular appeal, such as social, environmental and consumer policy. The accession of 
Denmark, Ireland and Britain in 1973 brought renewed impetus to the development of a 
common consumer policy, due to the strength of their own domestic consumer 
movements and the significantly higher levels of protection in Denmark and the U. K. It 
was hoped that this measure, along with improved environmental and social policies 
would make the EC seem more relevant and acceptable to the peoples of Europe (Young: 
1997). The Environment and Consumer Protection Service was also created in that year, 
although Young, critical of the effectiveness of this body, notes that the service lacked 
adequate resources (Young: 1997). Young suggests that the reason for this lies in the fact 
that many member states viewed consumer policy as belonging to the realm of domestic 
policy and did not favour its development at EC level. This was particularly true of 
provisions relating to consumers' economic or legal interests (Young: 1997: 212). The 
Contact Committee for Consumer Questions was also re-formed in 1973 as the 
Consumers' Consultative Committee (CCC). Once again composed of representatives 
from the four main European consumer groups, its task was to give advice to the 
Commission in consumer affairs, especially concerning legislative measures (Maier: 
1993: 362-3). Because the CCC was established on the basis of a Commission decision 
it was intended as an advisory body to the Commission alone; its opinions were not to be 
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addressed either to the Parliament or to the Economic and Social Committee (ECOSOC). 
Although the CCC lasted in this form until 1989, Maier suggests that its work was largely 
ineffective, because its members were not sufficiently active in defending its opinions 
and because the Commission did not publish CCC opinions and could, in any case, 
disregard them. Therefore the views of the consumer representatives were not widely 
disseminated. Finally in January 1981 a new directorate for the Environment, Nuclear 
Safety and Consumer Protection was created. However, Young remains critical of this 
development claiming that the new Directorate General emphasised environmental issues 
rather than consumer protection and that the consumer protection directorate was under- 
funded and under-staffed (Young: 1997: 212). 
Soft Law 1957-1986 
The term `soft-law' refers to the range of documents outlining policy strategy, stating 
policy intentions or recommending particular courses of action, not having the force of 
actual legislation; for example, Commission programmes, Council resolutions, Green 
Papers, White Papers, and declarations. Soft-law initiatives have been an important tool 
at the Commission's disposal for expanding the scope of its competence with regard to 
consumer policy and have been used to lend strategic direction and impetus to 
community consumer policy from the earliest stages. Such initiatives were particularly 
useful for expanding policy parameters before consumer "policy" was specifically 
included in the treaties themselves. They have therefore also been instrumental in 
keeping the momentum going in consumer policy. 
Prior to the SEA, consumer policy was created via a mix of harmonisation laws, soft-law 
and by assessing the validity of national consumer laws impeding trade (Weatherill: 
1997). Prior to the inclusion of a separate title for consumer policy in the Maastricht 
Treaty (1992), soft law was the principal mechanism used for advancing Community 
consumer policy. As indicated earlier, the programmes were initiated as a result of a 
decision made by Heads of Government meeting in Paris in 1972 during which they 
requested the Commission to elaborate a consumer protection policy programme. This 
was followed in April 1975 by a Council Resolution on a preliminary programme for a 
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consumer protection policy (OJ 1975 C92/1). The resolution was based on key points 
from the 1962 Kennedy declaration on consumer rights and included: the right to 
protection of health and safety, the right to protection of economic interests, the right of 
redress, the right to information and education and the right of representation. This 
resolution was the "first attempt to provide a systematic basis in Community law for the 
protection of the consumer interest"(Micklitz & Weatherill: 1993: 292-293). Indeed, 
these categories have provided the basic framework for successive consumer 
programmes. 
The first programme provided a very clear rationale for developing a Community 
consumer policy. The rationale was to a large extent based on the Commission's 
perception of the increasing inequality in the market place between consumers and 
suppliers and of the inadequacy of the market alone to redress this imbalance (Council: 
1975: 2). 
However, neither this programme, nor the following programmes until the mid-1980s 
appear to have had much impact in developing the Community's consumer policy. As 
Micklitz and Weatherill point out, the reference to a notion of consumer rights in the1975 
Council resolution appeared to indicate the Council's recognition that the consumer 
interest should go beyond the narrow focus for consumers provided by the Treaty of 
Rome (Micklitz & Weatherill : 1993: 293). 
In May 1981 the second consumer protection programme was adopted (Young: 1997). It 
bore considerable similarity to the first and continued to emphasise the notion of 
consumer rights (Micklitz & Weatherill: 1993). The 1981 programme also included 
measures to improve consumer information and redress (Maier: 1993). 
To summarise, although this period was predominantly characterised by the absence of a 
Treaty basis on which to develop a direct and overt consumer protection policy, an 
embryonic consumer policy did begin to emerge from 1975 onwards. This was mainly a 
result of the activities of the European consumer associations and also the Commission's 
pro-activity in developing consumer policy through soft law instruments after the 1975 
Council resolution. 
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Development of Consumer Policy 1986-1992 
By the mid eighties, pressures to revive the pace of European economic development, 
coupled with the Commission's own interest in reviving the project of European 
integration, led to the first major treaty revision since 1957. After years of so-called 
'Euro-sclerosis', the Commission won the backing of the member states to support a 
project to complete the internal market. Drake (2000: 88) explains that the most 
significant reasons for renewed interest in integration largely stemmed from an economic 
rationale, she claims: 
Europe was falling behind in global competitiveness, unemployment was rising and 
was higher than in competitor countries (especially the US and Japan). Europe, 
moreover, had also dropped behind in high-technological development and 
business circles - and more significantly, business leaders - were calling for 
concerted action. 
The project was intended to revive the process of European integration and to boost the 
EC's flagging economies. (Moravcsik: 1991) 
The White Paper on Completing the Internal Market (Cockfield Report: COM (85) 310 
Final) confirmed the disappointing progress of the seventies and early eighties and 
roundly criticised the protectionist actions of member states. It pointed out that during 
periods of recession, far from diminishing, 'non-tariff barriers' multiplied as governments 
sought to protect their economies, not only against competition from third countries, but 
also from other member states. It also highlighted the increased use of public funds to 
support non-viable companies. This was particularly evident in the case of services (EC: 
1985: 5). 
The White Paper recalled the three main objectives of completing the internal market: 
first, the welding of individual markets into one single market of (then) 320 million 
people; second, ensuring the further expansion of the market and third, ensuring that the 
market is flexible. It further stressed in bald economic terms the advantages in getting rid 
of border controls, commenting: "the maintenance of any internal frontier controls will 
perpetuate the costs and disadvantages of a divided market" (EC: 1985: 6). The 
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Cockfield Report affirmed the need for'a strong and coherent' competition policy to 
prevent the continued partitioning of the single market, stemming not only from 
protectionist state interventions, but also from restrictive practices of firms. It further 
stressed the need for other policy areas to interact with the internal market, and 
emphasised in particular transport, social, environment and consumer protection policy 
(Commission: 1985: 8). 
However, on the freedom of the citizen consumer to shop as a matter of course across 
borders, the document was much less positive. The report makes an astonishing 
distinction between "genuine" travellers and those who crossed borders to go shopping" 
(EC: 1985: 44). Such distinctions, appearing in a document apparently utterly committed 
to the notion of a single market only serve to emphasise the quite different attitudes 
prevailing towards the exercise of citizen consumers' economic rights compared with 
those of enterprises. Once again, the'supply side' bias showed itself in unmistakable 
terms. 
Single European Act 
The Cockfield report projected that the Single Market programme would encourage the 
development of economies of scale by increasing competition and promoting 
specialisation. The resulting Single European Act (SEA) focused heavily on meeting the 
needs of the supply-side of the market and was indeed strongly lobbied for by the 
suppliers themselves. Green Cowles describes how the European Round Table of 
Industrialists lobbied the member state governments with the following message when 
they showed signs of wavering interest: "support the single market programme or 
European industry will invest elsewhere" (Green Cowles: 1997: 130). 
However, the pressure of trans-national business interests alone provides an incomplete 
explanation of the renewed impetus towards integration. Moravcsik, for instance, 
suggests a number of other factors which help to set the creation of the SEA in a fuller 
context (Moravcsik: 1991). Macro-political factors included the importance of inter-state 
bargains between Britain, France and Germany, particularly after the election of the 
Thatcher government in 1979 and a French right-wing coalition in 1986, giving rise to a 
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climate sympathetic to the liberalisation of the European market. Moreover, it was 
during this period that France and Germany exploited the threat of a two-track Europe, 
excluding Britain from the fast-track, to persuade the British government to support 
closer integration. In the light of flagging interest in integration, the EC institutions, 
themselves, took the opportunity to exert pressure at all levels to re-invigorate the 
integration process (Moravscik: 1991). 
The SEA set the conditions for the attainment of an integrated internal market by 1992 
and in particular introduced Article 100a, which provided for the introduction of 
Qualified Majority Voting regarding decisions to be taken in respect of the completion of 
the Single Market. This mechanism would speed up the decision-making process. It is, 
however, significant that at this stage, there was still no serious attempt to balance the 
supply-side orientation of the SEA with an explicit provision for the development of a 
community consumer policy. As with the Treaty of Rome the consumer was seen by 
policy-makers as the ultimate indirect beneficiary of the single market. 
Nevertheless, Article 100a(3) contains a brief explicit reference to consumer protection 
stating that "The Commission, in its proposals envisaged in paragraph 1 concerning 
health, safety, environmental protection and consumer protection, will take as a base a 
high level of protection. " The inclusion of this clause is important because it added to the 
small catalogue of direct Treaty references to the consumer. It also provided a link 
between the Single Market and consumer protection. The reference to a `high level of 
protection' was designed to pacify member governments' fears that Article 100a might 
undermine states with a good record of domestic consumer protection. The inclusion of 
Article 100a (4), however, also provided member states with a mechanism for obtaining a 
derogation from Community legislation under certain limited circumstances. 
It appears, in any event, that the small scope given to the protection of consumer interests 
by the SEA was not maximised by the Commission. Very few specific measures 
designed to protect consumers were put in place in the years immediately following the 
launch of the SEA, though numerous measures on consumer safety were agreed. Even 
these measures, according to Young, "were largely adopted with an emphasis on 
removing barriers to trade rather than ensuring consumer safety" (Young: 1997: 214). 
31 
According to Young, Karel Van Miert, Commissioner for Consumer Policy in 1990, 
"observed that `consumer policy is lagging behind in the march towards the single 
market. ' The reason he gave for this was that the inclusion of consumer issues in the 
Commission's legislative programme would have overloaded the already ambitious 
single market. " (Young: 1997: 214). This explanation highlights the extent to which the 
role of the citizen consumer was undervalued in respect of the contribution an effective 
demand-side ought to make to the efficient workings of the Single Market. Had the 
consumer's role been taken more seriously, one might have expected it to have figured 
more centrally in the whole programme. However, the explanation for the absence of 
progress in this policy area, may further be attributed to the difficulties experienced by 
those formulating the treaty in obtaining the agreement of the member states to the 
revision of the original Rome Treaty. A number of states, notably Britain, wished to 
safeguard their sovereignty. Therefore the SEA was limited to aspects of integration, 
such as the liberalisation of the member states' markets, upon which, everyone could 
agree. Thus the extension of the competencies of the supranational bodies was limited to 
those areas immediately necessary for the realisation of the Single Market. 
Institutional Developments 
Whilst the SEA failed to include any specific provision with respect to consumer policy, 
the period running up to 1992, the due date for the completion of the Single Market, was 
marked by a change in the priorities of EC policy-makers. EC policymakers feared that 
problems concerning the implementation and enforcement of Single Market legislation 
would threaten to undermine the whole project (Tallberg: 1999). In addition, there was 
concern both within the Commission and amongst the Member States that EU citizens 
viewed the project of EU integration with suspicion. More emphasis therefore was given 
to policies seen by policy-makers as popularising the integration process. Consumer 
policy benefited from this general concern and it was accordingly given a higher profile. 
Evidence of this change may be seen when, in February 1989, the Commission decided to 
upgrade the Consumer department from within the DG for the Environment, Nuclear 
Safety and Consumer protection, making it into an independent service within the 
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Commission (the Consumer Policy Service). Maier remarks that the CPS owed its 
existence to a recommendation included in the 1989 three year action plan presented by 
the pro-active Commissioner Karel Van Miert - the first Commissioner to be charged 
with consumer affairs as his main task. Although it was not yet considered important 
enough to become a directorate in its own right, the head of the service was given the 
status of Director General, in recognition of the probable elevation of the service to the 
rank of DG at a later stage. The CPS had a number of principal functions. First, it was 
charged with the task of administering the Community consumer policy budget. Second, 
it was to assess all Commission measures touching on consumer interests. Third, it had a 
role in formulating some of the measures intended primarily to protect consumers' 
interests. Fourth, it organised information campaigns directed at European consumers 
and fifth, it provided the CCC with administrative services (Maier: 1993). 
Consumer representation also developed in response to the growing importance of other 
related aspects of market integration. For example, enhanced consumer representation in 
European standardisation was born out of two related developments: the increased 
importance of standardisation work in the European integration process, and concerns as 
to the impartiality of standardisation and regulation especially given the increased 
participation of private agencies in the harmonisation process. The role performed by the 
European standardisation agencies increased considerably after a Council decision was 
issued in May 1985 delegating to them much of the detail concerning the approximation 
of national standardisation rules and regulations (Young : 1997). The Commission, in its 
1990-92 action plan, explained the logic of improving consumer representation with 
direct reference to the importance of securing the confidence of EU citizens and their 
support for standardisation - one of the principal mechanisms for achieving the Single 
Market (EC 1990: 6). 
In a further initiative, in 1989, the Commission decided to upgrade the Consumers' 
Consultative Committee to Council status and to enlarge its functions; the number of 
CCC members was also increased. In addition to the 16 representatives from the four 
main European consumer groups, there were now 17 representatives from national 
consumer organisations and six Commission nominated independent experts (Maier: 
1993). However, in spite of these changes, the CCC failed to perform its tasks 
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adequately. Young remarks that "Disagreements among its constituent groups, its slow 
response time, and a lack of regard for it within the Commission all impeded its 
influence" (Young : 1997: 229). Furthermore, the CCC's membership had been extended 
to 48 and was slow and bureaucratic. It was not until 1995 that a more appropriate 
response to the institutional problems of the CCC was conceived. 
Soft-law 1986-1992 
During this period, soft-law initiatives began to take on a more dynamic aspect with the 
substitution of phased action plans for the earlier series of consumer protection 
programmes. This change of nomenclature was more than cosmetic and reflected a more 
general renewed impetus in the Commission to improve administrative support for 
existing consumer policies and to sustain pressure for further action. However, 
consumer policy at this time is best understood within the framework of the drive towards 
the Single Market. 
The Single Market Programme was adopted in June 1985, as a result of the Cockfield 
White Paper discussed earlier and the Commission subsequently produced a document 
entitled `A New Impetus for Consumer Protection Policy' which it submitted to the 
Council as the Third Consumer Protection Programme (two others were published in 
1975 and 1981). The document concentrated on consumers' ability to exercise choice in 
the Common Market. It emphasised product safety and health standards and the need to 
integrate consumer interests in other areas of Community policy (Maier: 1993). 
Comparing the 1986 document with previous programmes, Micklitz & Weatherill draw 
attention to an apparent shift in policy emphasis, commenting: 
"The discourse has moved more towards the consumer as the beneficiary of the 
process of market integration. Consumer choice rather than consumer rights has 
emerged as the dominant theme. "(Micklitz & Weatherill: 1993: 294 citing Reich: 
1992: 25" - my emphasis) 
It might, however, be argued that effective choice is dependent on the existence of an 
effective administrative and legal infrastructure to protect consumers' rights, enabling 
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them to select and access goods, services and suppliers without market hindrance. 
However, the 1986 resolution must be understood within the context of the SEA; an 
agreement whose principal raison d'etre was market liberalisation. The discourse of 
'consumer choice' reflected the popular market liberalisation ideology that had made the 
SEA project acceptable to the right-wing governments of a number of the principal 
member states. It is interesting to observe that as the experiences of the Single Market 
project began to bite the emphasis in later documents shifted towards rectifying the 
imperfections of the market by improving the ability of consumers to enforce their 
economic rights. Thus the shift from 'consumer choice' back to 'consumer rights' might 
be interpreted as an acknowledgement by EC policy-makers of the limitations of an 
approach to consumer protection based mainly upon regulation by market forces. 
Action Plan 1990-1992 
In May 1990 the consumer policy unit published the first in a series of three-year 
consumer policy action plans. This first action plan (COM (90) 98 Final) 
covered the period from 1990-1992 and clearly recognised the importance of consumer 
access across borders: "To achieve full benefit from the internal market, it is necessary 
that its citizens be prepared to use the market by purchasing goods and services available 
anywhere in it. " (EC: 1990: 14). The plan offered a number of policy areas as focal points 
for action during the ensuing three years. The four areas, consumer representation 
consumer information, consumer safety and consumer transactions were chosen "because 
of their importance in building the consumer confidence necessary to support the 
implementation of the internal market" (EC: 1990: 5). The overall emphasis of the plan 
was directed towards a consideration of the position of consumers relative to their ability 
to take advantage of the Single Market. It is interesting to note at this stage the 
Commission's growing concern to make the Single Market palatable to the EU consumer 
as a citizen. This concern may be viewed against the wider context of attempts by the 
Commission and the member states to equip EU citizens with direct and accessible rights. 
These issues along with the emerging status of the citizen-consumer are explored in detail 
in Chapter Four. 
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Importantly, with reference to the main thrust of this study, the theme of building 
consumer confidence was particularly applied to the concept of cross-border consumer 
transactions. The Commission's rhetoric of the consumer as 'citizen' clearly indicates its 
recognition of the importance of equipping the consumer with trans-border market-based 
rights as a means of legitimising the Single Market in the eyes of the 'citizen consumer' 
(EC: 1990). The rhetoric was also complemented by specific actions; for example, the 
plan highlighted the importance of transposing a number of existing directives into 
national law related to strengthening consumers' economic rights and their ability to use 
the internal market. ' In this respect the plan emphasised consumer problems caused by 
differences in conditions of sale across the member states, especially differences in 
contract laws allowing for potentially damaging terms in the small print. The possibility 
of adopting Community-level models of contract conditions was suggested - an early hint 
at the later Unfair Contract Terms Directive (1993) and the European Directive on the 
Sale of Consumer Goods and Associated Guarantees (Directive 1999/44/EC). The 
necessity for improving consumer redress was also emphasised, with particular reference 
to the possibility of group actions in the future, i. e. the empowerment of consumer 
organisations or administrative agencies to take action on behalf of consumers. Again, 
this hinted at a later Directive on Injunctions for the Protection of Consumers' Interests in 
1998 (98/27/EC). Another aspect of cross-border transactions addressed in the document 
was the potential benefits and dangers for consumers posed by the increased use of new 
technologies for long-distance transactions. The Commission's desire to devise ways of 
safeguarding consumers' interests with respect to the new technologies was again linked 
to the issue of consumer confidence; without confidence the economic benefits presented 
by the new technology would not be realised. The Commission's vision was to bear fruit 
in the later Directive on the Protection of Consumers in Respect of Contracts Negotiated 
at a Distance (European Parliament and Council Directive 97/7/EC 20 May 1997). 
Implementation of the product liability directive, 85/374 
Misleading advertising directive 84/540 
Credit directive 87/102 
Door stop selling directive 85/577 
Food labelling directive 79/112 
Toy safety 88/37 
36 
Integrally linked to the issue of consumer confidence was the Commission's strategy of 
educating and informing consumers, which it intended to pursue by promoting co- 
operation between consumer organisations and member states' education systems in 
exchanging materials to improve teaching. Importantly as part of its information strategy 
the plan notes Commission support for three pilot projects, establishing European 
consumer information and advice centres in selected border regions; this was the start of 
the European Consumer Centre network. 
With regard to the Commission's policy on market transparency, the action plan 
especially emphasised the need for improved transparency for consumers regarding the 
banking, insurance and financial sectors, possibly, through recourse to Community 
legislation. The need for proposals to assure transparency in cross-frontier financial 
transfers and payments, further stressed the Commission's concern for the consumer's 
ability to access goods and services across borders. 
The plan's consistent emphasis on the need to reassure the citizen-consumer recognises 
the essential role of citizen support for the realisation of the Single Market. However, 
whilst some of the above targets are specific and unambiguous, others are much less 
directed, apparently expressing vague good intentions. The plan often lacks precise 
details as to how objectives are to be achieved. The plan clearly recognises the 
importance of information, transparency and access to redress in the development of 
consumer confidence in cross-border transactions. However, Young (1997: 216) is 
critical of its effectiveness: 
The ESC [Economic and Social Committee] criticised the Commission's first three 
year action plan on consumer policy (1990-3) for assuming that 'the final objective 
[of EC consumer policy] is the achievement of a single market'. As a result, the 
wave of legislation in the early 1990s left gaps, most notably in the areas of 
consumers' economic and legal rights (ESC, 1993). As a consequence of these 
shortcomings, consumers have largely failed to recognise the promised benefits of 
the SEM (BEUC, 1995b; ESC 1995). 
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Development of Consumer Policy 1992-1997 
The Treaty on European Union 
The SEA had set a deadline of 1992 for the completion of the Single Market. Inevitably, 
the realisation of the project gave rise to implications and consequences, which were not 
foreseen in 1986 (Corbett, R: 1993). For example it became increasingly difficult for 
member states separately to regulate a number of key areas, notably, environmental 
standards, banking, consumer protection and taxation, without distorting the market. 
However, by the early 1990s it became evident that these codifying and 'tidying-up' 
processes lacked the political magnetism to serve as an engine for further progress on 
integration. It was to larger political projects that the European leaders looked to achieve 
this end. The main thrusts of the Maastricht Treaty were in the areas of economic and 
monetary union, including the creation of a single currency, an autonomous European 
Central Bank, mechanisms to promote a common foreign policy and, particularly relevant 
to this study, the creation of a framework for common citizenship. However, it was the 
first of these thrusts, which became the main vehicle for change at this time. 
However, the Maastricht Treaty did represent a significant breakthrough for consumer 
policy. As the completion of the Single Market approached and as many national trade 
regulations were removed, regulatory gaps in consumer protection began to appear. 
Young claims that this provided renewed pressure tore-launch' the EC's generic 
consumer protection policy (Young: 1997: 216). 
In response to these concerns, the Treaty on European Union included, for the first time, 
a separate Title (Article 129a) recognising Community competence to develop a 
Consumer Protection Policy. (Young: 1997). 
The Title contains the following provision: 
1. The Community shall contribute to a high level of consumer protection through: 
a. measures adopted pursuant to Article 100a in the context of the completion of the 
internal market; 
b. specific action which supports and supplements the policy pursued by the Member 
States to protect the health, safety and economic interests of consumers and to 
provide adequate information to consumers. 
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(Council of the European Communities: 1992: 129a) 
In addition to the specific provisions contained in article 129a, the Maastricht Treaty 
contained a provision, which altered the institutional balance of power in favour of the 
Parliament. Article 189b effectively gave the Parliament co-decision making powers 
with the Council across a number of areas specified in the treaty, including consumer 
policy. 
Theoretically, the inclusion of the Title meant that the Community was free to take a 
more holistic approach to the development of a consumer policy since it no longer had to 
be tied to the adoption of measures intended to enhance the functioning of the single 
market (Weatherill: 1997). However, Bourgoignie (1998: 447) contests this interpretation 
on the grounds that paragraph 1 (a) of Article 129a continues to obfuscate the 
Commission's mandate to act independently in the field of consumer policy by 
maintaining a link between consumer policy and the Internal Market. The result of this 
confusion may be seen in the limited use of this treaty provision as a basis for the 
adoption of directives. For instance, in 1994 Article 129a was used as the basis for a 
Council and Parliament decision to make the European Home and Leisure Accident 
Surveillance System (EHLASS) permanent (Young: 1997) and, again, in 1998 it was 
used as the basis for a directive on price indication (EC: 1998c: 7); however, proposals to 
base other directives, for example on timeshares, distance selling and guarantees, on 
Article 129a were initially discussed and then abandoned. 
Both Weatherill and Bourgoignie suggest that part of the problem for advancing 
consumer policy may still lie in the difficulty of obtaining agreement amongst the 
member governments for specific consumer protection measures (Weatherill: 1997, 
Bourgoignie: 1998). 
Institutional Developments 
During the early 1990s successive revelations about inadequate national responses to 
consumer concerns about food safety across a variety of products came to light. New 
evidence on the transmission of Bovine Spongiform Encephalitis, gave rise to a new 
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order of public anxiety stretching across the EU. As seen earlier, the Maastricht Treaty 
had already given consumer policy an independent status in a separate title. However, 
the problematic process of ratifying the treaty in certain member states, for example 
Denmark and the UK, along with a more general concern of Commission actors to 
popularise the image of the EU and the need to address the public backlash to successive 
food safety scandals, led to the recognition of the need for action at the EU level. 
However, it was not until March 1995 that the Consumer Policy and Consumer Health 
Protection Directorate (DG XXIV) was created. It is significant that the new directorate 
specified consumer health protection as 50% of the area of responsibility defined by the 
title. Nonetheless, this development represented, a significant step in the realisation of 
the drive to enhance the status of consumer policy in that this area now merited a degree 
of autonomy and status previously denied to it. 
A further aspect of the Commission's response to increased evidence of consumer 
concerns with respect to health and safety may be seen in renewed efforts to promote 
better consumer representation on bodies concerned with product standardisation. In 
1990 the Commission published a Green paper on the future development of 
standardisation; however, progress to enhance consumer representation was delayed 
because of contention between the EC and the standardisation bodies as to the form that 
representation should take (Armstrong & Bulmer: 1998: 164). 
The resulting structural innovation was ANEC (European Association for the Co- 
ordination of Consumer Representation in Standardisation). Created as an independent 
body in February 1995, ANEC is "composed of eighteen national members, one selected 
by the consumer organisations of each member state of the EU and European Free Trade 
Area... and four representatives from the CCC and two from the Consumer Consultative 
Council from the EFTA Secretariat. " (Young: 1998: 167) 
In spite of the improvements that ANEC has brought to the problem of consumer 
representation in standardisation, Armstrong and Bulmer note some enduring problems. 
In particular they mention that "access [by consumer representatives] is also needed to 
the policy-making structures of the European standards agencies and the Commission. " 
(Armstrong & Bulmer: 1998: 165) 
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Limited resources and funding are also highlighted as problems, in spite of help from the 
Commission in the form of funding. 
In a further initiative, in 1995, the Commission disbanded the CCC and re-invented it as 
the Consumer Committee. The new CC was much smaller, with only one representative 
from each European consumer group and each member state. Young criticises these 
reforms on the grounds that "the latest reform still does not address the more 
fundamental issue of the place of such a body in the EU's policy structure. " (Young 
: 1997: 230-231) 
Soft-law 1992-1997 
Action plan 1993-1995 
The second consumer action plan (COM (93) 378 final) covered the period 1993 to 1995 
and was divided into two main sections. The first comprised an introduction and review 
of the Community's activities during the period 1990-1992 and the second set out 
Community priorities for action during the period 1993-1995. As with the first consumer 
action plan discussed earlier, the second concentrates on the consumer's ability to benefit 
from the single market; significantly, the second paragraph formally introduces the term 
"consumer-citizen" for the first time, (EC: 1993c: 2). The introduction summarised in 
general terms ways in which the 'citizen-consumer' had already benefited from the Single 
Market, reiterating the importance of making the internal market accessible to the 
consumer. As with the first plan, the second emphasised consumer confidence as integral 
to the success of the internal market (EC: 1993c: 5). 
As part of its strategy to build consumer confidence, as in the previous plan, this later 
document specifically mentions the need to improve consumer information and 
consumers' access to justice. The plan described progress on a number of important 
actions undertaken during this period on these issues. Particularly relevant to this study 
were the pilot projects establishing a number of transfrontier centres for consumer 
information and counselling. The creation of these transfrontier centres marked the 
beginning of the Euroguichet network (European Consumer Centres), which represented 
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an attempt by the Commission to bolster consumers access to their rights across borders. 
This initiative is examined in detail in Chapter Five and explores the success of the 
Commission's strategy in decentralising EC rights to consumers through selected 
initiatives. Regarding access to justice, the Commission specifically encouraged the 
creation and testing of a number of pilot projects for simplifying the settlement of 
consumer disputes at national level. For example, a pilot project was initiated in 
Dundee, which led to the establishment of a small claims procedure before the Scottish 
courts. Another such project was initiated at Deinze and Marchienne-au-pont in Belgium 
(Commission: 1993a: 9). These projects anticipated the Commission's growing focus on 
small claims procedures and alternative dispute resolution mechanisms in the later 1990s. 
Again, a fuller examination of this aspect of the Commission's work is to be found in 
Chapter Five. 
The review section further included an appraisal listing the legislative instruments and 
specific actions adopted during that period2. The most significant of which, for the 
purposes of this study, was a Council Directive aimed at enhancing consumer protection 
with respect to package travel, holidays and tours (Council Directive 90/314/EEC). 
It is significant that, even at this stage, the Commission had already identified the gap 
between policy intentions and the reality experienced by the citizen-consumer at ground 
level as problematic and worthy of attention in the quest to secure citizen confidence. To 
this end, the Commission recalled the essential part played by the member states in 
achieving and monitoring proper implementation evidently in an attempt to prompt them 
to offer their full support (Commission: 1993c: 11). In particular, the plan complained of 
concealed disparities in the member states' transposition rates of directives and also "the 
extent to which national implementing measures [had] been communicated without 
reference to the actual state of application of these measures. " (Commission : 1993c: 12). 
2 Council Directive 92/59/EEC (29/6/1992) on General Product Safety 
A number of directives approximating Member states' legislation concerning the labelling and presentation 
of foodstuffs intended for the final consumer. Specifically, directives 90/406/EEC (24/9/1990), 91/72/EEC 
(16/1/1991), 91/238/EEC (22/4/1991) and 92/11/EEC (22/4/1992) were adopted. 
An amendment to directive 87/102/EEC concerning the approximation of laws, regulations and 
administrative provisions of the member states concerning consumer credit (Council directive 
(90/88/EEC (22/2/1990) was also adopted. 
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This admission is clear evidence of the Commission's recognition of the special nature of 
monitoring cross-border practices and of enforcing provisions designed to protect 
consumer rights. Two authors (Tallberg: 1999,2000a, 2000b; Jordan: 1999) have already 
attempted to analyse the institutional constraints and ambiguities which exacerbate the 
problems of enforcement. These institutional arrangements have clear implications for 
this thesis and are examined in greater detail in Chapter Three. 
The introduction to this Action Plan also stated its intention to make use of the new 
powers given to consumer policy in the Maastricht Treaty (article 129a). As with the first 
plan, a review section listed the legislative instruments adopted during the period of the 
first Action Plana. Further progress had been made regarding the protection of 
consumers with respect to package travel, holidays and tours (Council Directive 90/314 
EEC of 13 June) and some progress had also been made regarding the adoption of a 
directive on unfair terms in consumer contracts (Council Directive 93/13/EEC of 5th 
April 1993) 
The two main tasks for the second action plan were to consolidate existing Community 
legislation and to pursue "selective priorities to raise consumer protection and to make 
consumers more aware of their rights" (EC: 1993c: 7). 
The plan outlined four specific areas for action: consumer information; access to justice; 
improved concertation and financial services. 
The projected actions to be taken both in the field of consumer information, and 
representation showed considerable continuity with those of the previous plan. For 
example, emphasis was laid on the need to educate the consumer. Consumer 
organisations in the member states were pin-pointed as the principal mechanisms for 
achieving this aim with Commission support. 
"Council directive 92/59/EEC of 29th June 1992 on general product safety. 
Several directives on the approximation of Member state legislation concerning labelling and presentation 
of foodstuffs intended for the final consumer, and notably directives 90/406/EEC of September 1990, 
91/72/EEC of 22 April 1992. 
Council directive 90/88/EEC of 22 February amending Directive 87/102/EEC on the approximation of the 
laws, regulations and administrative provisions of the member states concerning consumer credit. " 
(Commission: 1993: 8-9) 
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The role played by the consumer transfrontier centres was also highlighted and the 
Commission pledged continued support for the project. Existing centres at Lille, 
Luxembourg, Barcelona, Gronau, Aix-la Chapelle/Eupen/Heerlen and Vale do Ave were 
to be supplemented by the creation of four more centres in 1993 at Marseilles-Turin, 
Flensberg, Kehl and Vittoria. The activity of these centres was to be enhanced by a new 
Commission policy to improve communication between the various information 
networks. The European Consumer Centres are important in the general context of the 
Commission's aims directly to connect with the citizen consumer and to provide the 
citizen with information about rights targeted to facilitating cross-border transactions. 
Given the precariousness of consumer protection enforcement and access to justice, 
particularly across borders, and given the Commission's limited role in direct 
intervention, these centres have since become important mechanisms in the 
Commission's strategy to assist the consumer, providing information, advice and 
assistance; their significance is elaborated in Chapter Five. 
Action to be taken in the fields of access to justice and the settlement of disputes seemed, 
in particular, to be prompted by the Sutherland report, which emphasised "the increase in 
the number of disputes of a transfrontier nature involving consumers" (EC: 1993c: 22). 
The report recommended a survey of the then prevailing conditions relating to accessing 
justice in the Community and suggested solutions to ensure the protection of consumers' 
rights, involving the creation of out-of-court conciliation procedures. The Commission 
announced its intention to draft a Green Paper on access to justice during 1993, which it 
later did. The Green Paper (COM (93) 576 Final) examined the particular difficulties 
facing consumers in gaining redress in cross-border disputes involving relatively small 
sums of money and examined ways of simplifying the settlement of these disputes. 
Consumer Action plan 1996-1998 
In 1995 the Commission published the third action plan covering the period 1996-1998. 
Entitled "Priorities for Consumer Policy 1996-1998, " (COM (95) 519 Final) it set out 
directions for consumer policy during that period. In the introduction, the plan stated an 
intention to "deal with the broad range of consumer issues, not just those related to the 
internal market project", which recalls the wider remit given to the Commission to act in 
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this field by the TEU (EC: 1995a: 101). The document, however, is atypical of the action 
plan series in that it did not include a section attempting to summarise or evaluate 
progress made by the previous plan. Instead, the evaluation exercise appeared to have 
been temporarily postponed and in 1997, the Consumer policy DG began to publish a 
series of annual reports. These documents were primarily concerned with reviewing and 
evaluating progress in the field of consumer policy and the work of the consumer policy 
DG. Their creation might account for the lack of a review section in the 1996-8 action 
plan. 
The introduction made special reference to consumers' concerns about public services, 
financial services and food safety. Consumer information and education was also 
mentioned as an important theme, since poor consumer information and education 
compound enforcement problems (EC : 1995a: 103); that is to say, consumers need 
knowledge in order to protect themselves (EC: 1995a: 102). 
The document states the Commission's intentions to complement and support the work of 
member states although it clearly indicates that consumer education in particular is the 
responsibility of the member states. 
Adequate implementation of internal market legislation was again noted as an important 
priority and the document indicated that the Commission would be considering actions in 
response to the Green paper on access to justice and guarantees. 
The need to improve certain aspects of financial services, in particular consumer 
information and aspects of the consumer credit market were singled out for mention. 
Other areas for priority action included the need to liberalise public services, the need to 
inform and educate consumers, with regard to opportunities presented by the information 
society, adjustments in the regulatory system to cover consumers in the new electronic 
market, and the need to improve consumer confidence in foodstuffs. 
1997Annual Report 
The 1997 Annual Report (EC: 1997a) comprised a review of the progress achieved by the 
DG over the course of the year. One of the principal purposes of the 1997 review was to 
communicate to the wider interested audience (national policy-actors, researchers, 
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academics, journalists, consumer organisations) information concerning the 
reorganisation of DGXXIV which took place in the light of the recommendations of the 
European parliamentary committee of enquiry into the BSE crisis (1997). This 
connection is highlighted in the introduction to the report: "One of DGXXIV's major 
challenges since its restructuring has been the increasing workload following its new 
health protection mission. A substantial part of its efforts was devoted to the relevant 
activities of the European Parliament and, principally, to the work of the European 
Temporary Committee on the follow-up of recommendation on BSE. " (EC: 1997a: 1). 
The reorganisation reflected the Commission's heightened concern to ensure consumer 
safety and, according to the Commission, to reassure the citizen-consumer. Much of the 
document was concerned with a description of the work of the numerous scientific 
committees and the newly established food and veterinary office. 
Nevertheless, a more generalised account of progress in specific sectors was included. 
Regarding the protection of consumers' economic interests, the Directive on Distance 
Selling (97/7/EC) was adopted in May 1997 and the Directives on `Comparative 
Advertising' (97/55/EC) and `Price Indications' (98/6/EC) were adopted in October 1997 
and February 1998. A Directive on Trans-border Injunctions in Consumer Related 
Infringements (98/27/EC) was going through a second reading. This directive is 
significant in providing greater legislative protection for consumers across borders and is 
discussed in greater detail in Chapter Five. Studies were also being conducted into the 
likely economic impact of directives on `Price Indication' and `Guarantees'(1999/44/EC). 
More importantly for the focus of this study, evidence of progress was also provided 
particularly with regard to legal matters and the development of consumer information, 
education and representation. For example, in terms of monitoring the transposition of 
existing legislation, the report listed a number of instances where transposition was 
unsatisfactory and where `reasoned opinion' letters had been sent to member states. 
Work focused, in particular, on the directives governing time-shares, unfair contractual 
terms, package travel and consumer credit. Moreover, the document noted that the 
Unfair Contractual Terms Directive (93/13/EC) and the Package Travel Directive 
(90/34/EC) had necessitated the opening of a number of infringement procedures. 
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With regard to enforcement issues, DG XXIV continued to pursue a number of strategies 
which included the adoption of two policy documents: a working paper on the 
enforcement of European Community legislation (27/3/1998) drafted by DG XXN and a 
final version of a Communication on the out-of-court settlement of transborder consumer 
disputes. The latter document proposed two initiatives, namely: a recommendation 
establishing criteria for the creation and functioning of out-of-court procedures, 
applicable to consumer disputes and a standard claim-form for consumer disputes. 
Again, the significance of these developments is examined in detail in Chapter Five. 
DG XXIV also continued to encourage a policy of transparency in the availability of 
information and data regarding the application of consumer legislation, and of 
administrative co-operation between the member states. To this end and in collusion 
with the member-states, it created a new database - CLAB Europa ('Clauses abusives') 
showing a collection of case law regarding unfair terms in consumer contracts in the 
European Economic Area (EEA). The database provided information about contract 
terms considered to be unfair within the different member states of the EU and was made 
available both to the member states' administrations and to the general public. 
With regard to consumer information, as a result of an unfavourable review of the 
effectiveness of the 17 Euro-guichets supported by the Commission in 1996, only 10 
were to continue to receive funding. Their remit was to be widened from dealing solely 
with cross-border issues to handling a broader range of consumer affair. 
In 1996 the Commission published a supplementary Action Plan (COM (96) 13 Final) 
focussing specifically on consumer access to justice. It noted the problems widely 
encountered by consumers, reviewed existing procedures to facilitate consumer access to 
justice and explored potential Community initiatives for facilitating redress across 
borders (EC: 1996). These matters are dealt with in Chapter Five. 
This period was dominated by concerns for food safety, especially BSE, although 
Salmonella in chicken and eggs and the presence of anti-freeze in German wine also gave 
cause for alarm and this is shown in the re-organisation and enlargement of DGXXN. 
That apart, the emphasis in the 1996-1998 Action Plan was on enhancing the enforcement 
of consumer legislation through improving the availability of information and access to 
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justice. In response to evidence of the unsustainable costs involved, the period saw the 
genesis of initiatives designed to support the individual consumer in cross-border redress. 
Nevertheless, this emphasis still reflected the overall policy of relying on individuals to 
take appropriate action for themselves, in order to protect their rights. 
Consumer Policy 1997-2000 
The Amsterdam Treaty 1997 
In contrast to the previous SEA and Maastricht treaties, the Amsterdam Treaty (European 
Communities: 1997) lacked a clear focus (Dehousse: 1999: 23). Having achieved 
enlargement to fifteen member states in 1995, the negotiators at Amsterdam were faced 
with the commitment to further accession negotiations, expanding the Union up to 25 
members by 2004. It was thus mainly the pressure to proceed with enlargement 
negotiations that drove forward the process of treaty re-negotiation. There was a 
reluctance amongst the member states at the Amsterdam IGC to address the constitutional 
and institutional consequences of such a major restructuring. Those member states, 
intending to adopt the single currency were particularly anxious not to destabilise the 
third stage of the project's implementation (Dehousse: 1999: 25). Dehousse also argues 
that there was growing disillusionment with the functioning of the new European 
economy, in particular with the failure of governments to compensate for the contraction 
and relocation of traditional industries and with the economic rigours experienced in 
those states struggling to meet the economic criteria of entry into the single currency. 
In the absence of consensus on a larger political objective, in the field of social and 
economic affairs, the treaty focused on a series of relatively low-key constitutional and 
institutional reforms (Dehousse: 1999). It was out of this context of minor reform that - 
along with strategies to promote an adaptable labour market, to support, across the Union, 
efforts to improve levels of training and re-employment, and to protect services of 
general public interest - the provisions on consumer protection should be seen. These all 
had the virtue of appearing politically 'safe', of promoting low level consensus and of 
rendering the EU reforms potentially more palatable to discontented electorates. The 
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strengthening of consumer policy in the treaty involved one significant amendment and a 
number of other minor institutional changes outlined below. 
One of the most salient features of EU Consumer policy is that it is `horizontal' in nature. 
Consumer interests cut across a variety of policy sectors. This poses problems for EC 
policy actors in terms of monitoring and influencing policies which affect consumers, but 
which fall outside of the remit of the consumer policy DG's competencies. The Treaty of 
Amsterdam made formal provision, for the first time, for the integration of consumer 
interests in other policy areas, through section 2, the so-called `horizontal clause". In 
addition to the commitments made to consumer policy in Article 129a EU, the revised 
article (renumbered 153), included references to the promotion of consumers' rights to 
"information, education and to organise themselves in order to safeguard their interests. " 
(European Communities: 1997: 40) 
It also included an important reference to measures allowing a role for the Commission in 
monitoring the consumer policy pursued by the member states. 
Institutional Developments 
As we have seen in the 1997 Annual Report, the Parliament's Temporary Committee of 
Inquiry into the EU's handling of the BSE crisis published a report, which was "highly 
critical of the organisation of public health responsibilities within the Commission. " 
(CEG: 1997: 2) In particular, the committee "highlighted the lack of an integrated 
approach which hampered the co-ordination and efficiency of the Commission services 
concerned" (CEG: 1997: 2). Previously, food safety had not been viewed as a policy area 
in its own right and competence for food safety had been spread across a number of DGs, 
including industry, agriculture and consumer policy. 
The EP Committee made a number of recommendations. It suggested that the 
transparency of scientific committees advising the Commission should be increased and 
confined to an advisory role. The committee also called for the creation of a Public 
Health Protection Unit "responsible for the exercise and co-ordination of powers aimed at 
ensuring effective action on matters of food law, food quality and hygiene, human and 
animal protection and consumer protection. " (CEG: 1997: 2). 
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Significantly, the committee emphasised that the new unit should be separated from 
industrial and agricultural interests. As a result of these recommendations, DG XXIV 
was renamed 'DG for Health and Consumer Protection'. Scientific committees were 
thenceforth to report directly to DG XXIV and the Rapid Alert System for Dangerous 
Products moved from DGIII to DG XXIV (CEG: 1997). The units primarily responsible 
for food policy and animal and plant welfare were considerably expanded, strengthened 
and relocated to DG XXIV. The over-arching objective behind these changes was to help 
promote confidence in EU citizens regarding food policy. Again, the Commission's 
reaction should be understood within the broader drive to 'connect' with the citizen. 
Innovations in consumer representation during this period were principally directed at 
directly involving the citizen-consumer to a greater extent in the policy process. The 
Commission attempted to do this by strengthening the role of consumer representation in 
the policy process and by making consultation at both the policy formulation and 
feedback stages more widely accessible. One of the objectives, for example, was to 
encourage greater co-ordination and exchange of information between national and 
European consumer organisations and the Commission. The principal mechanism for 
achieving this objective was the Consumer Assembly. The first Consumer Assembly was 
convened by the Commission in 1998 in Brussels and was intended as an annual event. 
Attended by the main consumer organisations of the member states and the EU applicant 
countries, its purpose was to provide an arena for direct communication between 
consumer groups and the Commission. The Assembly facilitated discussions on the 
latest developments and trends across the wide arena of consumer interests providing the 
Commission with a policy feed-back system (DG XXIV Consumer Policy and Consumer 
Health Protection (1998)). The Assembly represented a small step in facilitating the 
exchange of information between interested parties and representatives of diverse 
consumer groups from different member states. However, since it is not formally a 
consultative forum, its impact on the policy process is likely to be limited. 
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Soft Law 1997-2000 
Soft-law documents during this period demonstrate an increasing emphasis on 
enforcement, again reflecting growing recognition in the Commission that adequate 
enforcement was an essential precondition for the effective functioning of the Single 
Market. Furthermore the Commission recognised that citizen-consumers' image of the 
EU would be vastly improved if they were seen to exercise, in practice, rights the Single 
Market theoretically conveyed. A further aspect of improving the functioning of 
consumers' economic interests may be seen in the increased attention to the integration of 
consumer interests into other EU policy areas. This follows significantly from the 
specific inclusion in the Amsterdam Treaty of a clause, noted above, expressing the need 
to integrate consumer interests in other EU policy areas. Sections devoted to the 
integration of consumer interests in other policy areas are given greater emphasis in 
Action Plans and Reports during the post Amsterdam period as the section below 
illustrates. 
Annual Report 1998 
As with the 1997 report, the 1998 Annual Report (EC: 1998d) concentrated on food safety 
issues and much of the report was concerned with the work undertaken by the scientific 
committees, the risk assessment unit (concerned with food safety) and the Food and 
Veterinary Office. In the light of a Working Paper on Enforcement in EU Consumer 
Legislation (SEC (98)527 Final), examined below, DGXXIV took a number of specific 
actions. For example, an attempt was made to strengthen inter-governmental co- 
operation within the framework of the existing IMSN (International Marketing 
Supervision Network) - an international body created for the purpose of the exchange of 
experience and best practice between national enforcement bodies. These exchanges 
took place over the course of three meetings during 1998. In addition to these 
developments a variety of initiatives continued in the fields of consumer information and 
education. Nonetheless, some significant progress was made regarding the enforcement 
of consumers' economic rights. The adoption of the Directive on the Injunction for the 
Protection of Consumers' Collective Interests (1998/27/EC) was a key element in the 
development of an effective legal instrument for consumers to gain redress, particularly 
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(and critically) across borders. The directive also took an important step towards offering 
consumers a more powerful voice against suppliers by empowering consumer 
organisations and/or other appropriate administrative bodies to tackle issues on behalf of 
consumers' collective interests. The advantages of such bodies over the individual 
consumer may be clearly discerned by comparing their relative resources and expertise. 
Further progress through the EU policy process of the Directive on the Sale of Goods and 
Associated Guarantees (1999/44/EC) demonstrated a further commitment on the part of 
the policy-makers to strengthen consumers' rights when engaging in cross-border 
transactions (Chapter Five explores the implications of both of these directives in greater 
detail). The opening of a number of infringement procedures also indicates heightened 
interest on the Commission's part in tackling member-states' non-compliance or 
inadequate compliance with the implementation of Community consumer legislation. 
'Consumer Policy Past Achievements' (1998)(SEC (1998)564) and the Commission's 
Working Paper on Enforcement of European Consumer Legislation (1998) 
(SEC(98)527 Final) 
1998 also saw the publication of two more Commission working documents; one which 
sought to evaluate and review the achievements accomplished in consumer policy to date, 
and an analytical document, which concentrated on the Community's problems with 
regard to the enforcement of European consumer legislation. Both contained a number of 
interesting insights into the problematic nature of implementation and enforcement of EU 
consumer legislation. 
The renewed impetus with regard to the enforcement of consumer legislation may be 
viewed in conjunction with the Commission's wider attempts to improve the functioning 
of the Single Market through improved enforcement mechanisms. The Internal Market 
DG, in particular, had been engaged in a campaign to improve implementation and 
enforcement of Single Market legislation, principally through the strengthening of the 
infringement procedures (under articles 169 and 171) provided for in the treaties. These 
are principally aimed at the member states' administrations themselves and attack cases 
of non-implementation (transposition) or poor implementation of Community legislation. 
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The introduction to the Commission's Working Paper on Enforcement of European 
Consumer Legislation (EC: 1998f) clearly highlights the enforcement of consumer 
protection as a Commission priority. The implications of this position are examined in 
detail in Chapter Three. 
Consumer Action Plan 1999-2001 
As with the previous documents in this series, the Fourth Action Plan (COM (1998) 696 
Final) covering the period 1999-2001, was organised according to the predominant 
themes of consumer information and representation, consumer health and safety and 
consumers' economic interests. At the outset the plan included an explicit statement of 
the connection between Article 153(1) of the Amsterdam Treaty and the structure of the 
Action Plan. (EC: 1998b) 
The principal theme running through the Commission's policy strategy in consumer 
information, remained the consumers' ability to protect his/her own interests by being 
informed as to the specific rights conferred by the Community on the consumer. The 
document states: "helping consumers to help themselves is an essential part of 
policymaking" (EC: 1998b: 8). 
Specific actions to be taken by the Commission included continued support for consumer 
associations (including financial support) and systematic consultation of consumer 
associations in the policy-making process. The document stated the Commission's 
intentions to encourage greater co-operation at national level and to strengthen the 
capacity of consumer associations to take collective legal action by ensuring that they 
have the adequate expertise to undertake such matters. This was seen as essential for the 
proper functioning of the 1998 Directive on Injunctions for the Protection of Consumers' 
Interests (98/27/EC). 
Other actions again demonstrate a high degree of continuity with policy objectives 
expressed in previous action plans. The Consumer Committee was to be routinely 
consulted regarding enforcement, training and information campaigns. The plan 
expressed an intention to encourage further the participation of consumers in the 
Commission's Consultative Committees and other relevant forums. The development of 
53 
the'Permanent Dialogue between Citizens and Business' was to be enhanced through the 
setting up of sectoral-based ad-hoc and informal dialogues. The establishment of a 
consumer hotline was envisaged for consumer associations to call the Commission with 
queries. Finally, the role of the Euro-guichets was pinpointed for further development 
and their work was to be integrated within the framework of the aims and intentions 
outlined above. 
With regard to consumers' economic interests, the principal priority listed was the need 
to improve enforcement and implementation of existing Community legislation. The 
document stated: 
Enforcement is a priority in a dynamic market in which it is increasingly hard to 
keep pace with new products and services. The Commission recognises that 
ineffective enforcement will undermine the best intentions of EU legislators. 
Enforcement is also the critical issue in relation to soft law or self regulation 
agreements. (EC: 1998b: 17) 
Significantly, in its strategy to improve enforcement and implementation, the plan 
expressed a number of key points, which recall a number of familiar and recurrent themes 
from past policy documents. The points listed mainly centred on notions of a 
decentralised and 'soft' approach to enforcement. This approach again reflects the 
constraints under which the Commission operates. For example, the plan emphasised the 
need to improve administrative co-operation, which is essentially a strategy based on 
intergovernmental goodwill. Specific action envisaged under this heading included the 
improvement of transposition of EU law by encouraging informal dialogue among the 
member states prior to transposition with the aim of addressing particular problems. The 
document noted that transposition was to remain principally the responsibility of the 
member states, although the Commission would aid the process by facilitating and 
encouraging administrative co-operation within and between the member states, the 
Commission and consumer associations, and also by encouraging the co-ordination of 
enforcement by national agencies. The strategy concerning co-operation was to be 
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further facilitated by efforts on the part of the Commission to improve the exchange of 
information and co-operation between the EU members of the International Marketing 
Supervision Network. Another aspect of the overall strategy to improve enforcement was 
to enhance the effectiveness of soft-law and to promote dialogue between business and 
consumers. Specifically the plan envisaged the compilation of reports on the 
effectiveness and state of implementation of a number of directives affecting consumers' 
economic interests. In addition to these, the plan expressed intentions to examine and 
report on cross-border complaints in comparative advertising by the end of 1999 and to 
continue comparative price surveys in order to identify sectors in which the internal 
market is not working properly. Finally in this regard the plan expressed the 
Commission's intentions to support the implementation of measures outlined in the 
Communication on out-of-court settlement. 
The final elements in the Commission's strategy regarding the enforcement of consumers' 
economic rights included the need for a balance between regulatory and non-regulatory 
approaches, and the need to integrate consumer concerns more systematically into the 
wider policy-making process. To this end, the Commission committed itself to a review 
of existing legislation and to a number of unspecified proposals to plug existing gaps in 
the regulatory framework. The Commission also expressed its intention to take further 
general steps to ensure the effective integration of consumer interests into the wider 
policy-making process. This plan included for the first time, following the provisions of 
the Amsterdam Treaty, proposals for the horizontal inclusion of consumer economic 
interests in the development of other EU policies. The Commission concluded by 
committing itself to a first step in maintaining the right balance between liberalisation 
and measures central to sustaining real consumer choice- particularly quality and 
transparency of information in services of general interest (EC: 1998b). 
Directorate General Health and Consumer Protection Annual Report 1999 
Once again the 1999 Annual Report was dominated by routine reporting mainly of the 
concerned with 1, health, 2, public health, 3, public animal and plant health and 4, food 
and veterinary matters. The sections dealing with consumers' economic interests 
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constituted the minor part of the report. The most significant development pertaining to 
the protection of consumers' economic interests was the work begun by the Consumer 
DG to improve the statistical and factual resources available to policy-makers for the 
process of monitoring and evaluation. This involved in particular the collection of data 
of prices in the internal market and consumer satisfaction with reference to services of 
general interest e. g. transport, telecommunications, postal services, energy, water, audio- 
visual services. Although this work is in line with the general policy commitments of the 
Action Plan, it reflects none of the detailed commitments set out in that plan. The report 
goes on to specify some initial steps - the formation of a working group and the initial 
conference to promote the integration of consumer policy into other areas. However, 
progress was not impressive. In some specific areas namely telecommunications, postal 
services and air transport, some progress was made in ensuring that the internal market 
'has consumer concerns at heart' (EC: 1999d). Of these, the work on telecommunications 
was the most significant recognising the need to incorporate universal access, complaint 
handling and redress into the proposals for the next stage of telecommunications 
liberalisation. 
On the protection of consumers' economic interests in cross-border transactions, the main 
focus of this study, the Report recorded limited progress. The most significant 
development reported was the transposition into state law of Directive 1999/44/EC on the 
Sale of Consumer Goods and Associated Guarantees, embodying the principle that 
consumers should enjoy specific after-sales legal rights throughout the EU. Although 
this provided some evidence of progress, it fell short of generalising consumer protection 
in the case of cross-border sales. 
General Framework for Community Activities in Favour of Consumers 1999-2003 
(Decision 283/1999/EC of the European Parliament and Council) 
Finally, in 1999 the European Parliament and Council issued a joint decision establishing 
a Community framework in favour of consumer activities. The purpose of this 
framework was to create a legal instrument allowing the Commission to offer financial 
support to a range of consumer initiatives to support and supplement the policies pursued 
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by the member states. The decision is important to this study because it enabled the 
Commission to promote a number of initiatives specifically designed to help consumers 
to access their economic rights across borders. The most significant of these initiatives 
are reviewed in Chapter Five. 
Consumer Policy 2000 onwards 
Treaty of Nice (2001/C 80/01) 
The Treaty of Nice (European Communities: 2001) was principally concerned with 
questions associated with EU enlargement and common Foreign and Defence policies. 
It contained no specific provisions pertaining to the advancement of consumer policy. 
The only reference that might be thought of as having any relevance is contained in a 
revision to Article 100. Whilst the above provision was certainly framed to cover a wide 
range of possible circumstances, it might arguably be used in situations such as the 
emergence of a food related crisis. Under such exceptional circumstances, the revised 
provision might be used to the benefit of consumers. However, the Treaty as a whole 
represents no significant extension to existing provisions relating to protection of 
consumers' economic interests. 
White Paper on European Governance (2000) (Commission SEC (2000) 154717 final) 
The development of consumer policy during this period is best seen within the wider 
context of attempts by the Commission to address evidence of citizen dissatisfaction with 
the workings of the union. These issues are addressed in the Commission White Paper on 
European Governance, entitled "Enhancing Democracy in the European Union", 
published in October 2000. The document examined ways in which the processes of 
governance might be improved in the EU. It was compiled in response to a number of 
identified challenges: the challenge posed by enlargement, by the notion of a "democratic 
deficit" and the challenge posed by the institutional inadequacies of existing governance 
arrangements. The document had a number of objectives; the most relevant, for the 
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purposes of this study, are examined below. First, the document expressed the intention 
to improve citizens' perception of the EU especially with regard to criticism concerning 
its "democratic deficit" (EC: 2000g: 5). 
This was to be achieved mainly through improved communication between policy-actors 
and citizens; encouraging citizens to become better informed with respect to issues and 
developments occurring at the EU level of governance. Information and education 
campaigns were intended as the key mechanisms for realising this goal. Improved media 
coverage of EU politics along with special conference activities open to the general 
public in the different member states were to form the principal means for realising this 
objective. The document expressed the Commission's specific intentions to concentrate 
their efforts on improving the transparency of scientific and technical information for 
citizens, especially with regard to the sensitive issue of food safety. 
Second, the document aimed to examine ways of reforming the processes of preparing 
and implementing Community rules and policies. Again, the document confirmed the 
Commission's intention to: 
Reform the processes for preparing and implementing Community rules and 
policies to ensure that they are pertinent and coherent. This includes improving the 
interaction between public and private actors and between different geographic 
levels of responsibility. (EC: 2000g: 5) 
The analysis of this objective formed the majority of the study. The document suggested 
a number of ways in which the institutions might improve the EU's regulatory 
framework. First, the Commission stated its intentions to involve key sub-national policy 
actors earlier in the process of policy-formulation. It also expressed its commitment to 
creating adequate arrangements for evaluating the effectiveness of rules ensuring the 
independence and transparency of the evaluation mechanisms for the EU institutions. 
Second, the Commission aimed to improve the management of the regulatory framework 
by examining ways of increasing the amount of decentralisation of EU executive 
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responsibilities, particularly in respect of tasks needing "thorough scientific knowledge 
and for the management of programmes. " (EC: 2000g: 10). Two possible methods were 
suggested. The first, 'horizontal decentralisation' would "respond to the need for an 
authority free from all national leanings to elaborate technical viewpoints that are 
coherent and uniform at Community level... " (EC: 2000g: 10). This approach should 
involve a more extensive use of agencies. The alternative approach was "vertical 
decentralisation" involving a "much more flexible application of the rule... giving a 
greater margin of assessment according to local situations... Vertical decentralisation 
involves more power sharing of responsibilities with national, regional and local 
authorities, in particular on Community policies with a strong territorial impact 
(environment, transport, regional policy. )" (EC: 2000g: 10) 
Third, the Commission emphasised its intention to promote "coherence and co-operation 
within a 'networked' Europe" (EC: 2000g: 11) recognising the increasing importance of 
co-operation between networks of actors. 
Once again, the trend towards improved co-operation reflects a general strategy already 
instigated in the field of consumer policy as Consumer Policy Action Plans demonstrate. 
Indeed it is within the wider framework of improvements to the system of EU governance 
and attempts to improve EU citizens' perception of the integration process that many of 
the initiatives to improve enforcement in the domain of consumer policy should be 
ultimately viewed. 
One of the greatest difficulties that an outside observer encounters in assessing the impact 
of the consumer policy programmes is in the way in which the policy objectives and 
achievements are laid out. The format of the annual reports often seems to bear little 
relation to the lay-out of the initial policy programme, making it difficult to link actual 
achievements to the stated aims and objectives. In effect, the annual reports provide an 
often generalised summary of the year's progress, but without necessarily clearly stating 
whether or not the aims and objectives have been achieved. 
Bourgoignie (1998: 444) commenting on the effectiveness of the action plans, concludes: 
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These programmes provide the foundations for an active and ambitious policy of 
consumer protection at community level and establish the legislative framework 
required for this purpose... Although on the political level, a clear choice was thus 
taken at Community level in favour of a specific and coherent programme of action 
with regard to consumers, the process of actually giving substance to these 
intentions, has, unfortunately, been well below expectations. The legitimacy of the 
basis for action by the community in this area remains uncertain because the action 
plans adopted remain simple political declarations and are not Community acts of a 
mandatory nature. 
Sot law 
The general principles set out in the White Paper were taken up in the field of consumer 
protection; much of the soft-law documents issued during this period concentrated on 
creating mechanisms to assist consumers to enforce their economic rights across-borders. 
This strategy involved the development and financial support of a number of specific 
initiatives in this field, in particular, the European Extra Judicial -Network (EEJ-Net -a 
co-ordinated cross-border network of national alternative dispute resolution (ADR) 
bodies). The strategy also involved the continued support of the European Consumer 
Centres, the development of a European Consumer Complaints Form, a proposal for a 
Directive on Unfair Commercial Practices (2003) and a proposal for a Regulation on 
Consumer Protection Enforcement Co-operation (2003). These initiatives form the 
principal subject of Chapter Five where they are explored in considerable detail. The 
initiatives were encompassed by a number of supportive documents, reaffirming the 
general principles underpinning the policy and establishing connections between the 
individual initiatives. For example, the Commission Communication on "Widening 
Consumer Access to Alternative Dispute Resolution" (COM (2001)161 Final) extended 
the common principles for out-of-court bodies involved in the consensual resolution of 
consumer disputes adopted previously in Recommendation 98/257/EC on the Principles 
Applicable to Bodies Responsible for Out-of-Court Settlement of Consumer Disputes. 
These principles, in support of initiatives such as the EEJ-Net, embodied criteria of 
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impartiality, transparency, effectiveness and fairness. The purpose of the initiatives, as 
we see in Chapter Five, was to bolster consumers' confidence in exercising their 
economic rights across borders in the Single Market and to meet citizens' expectations of 
the integration process. 
Conclusions 
From the historical analysis above, a number of inferences may be drawn, which account 
for the slow and uneven development of EU consumer policy. 
From the beginning, the creation of the Common Market rested on a supply-side 
approach. This is evidenced by the lack of treaty provisions for the development of 
consumer policy until the Maastricht Treaty in 1992. The Single Market project was 
largely a response to unemployment, to globalisation, and the demand from the business 
sector for market liberalisation. The project was consequently conceived in a manner, 
which favoured supply-side interests. There was no real attempt to balance the interests 
of consumers against those of the suppliers through the SEA. The consumer was seen as 
the ultimate beneficiary of the development of the market. Until Maastricht, 
developments which benefited consumers tended to be linked to the Single Market 
process and concentrated on the harmonisation of health and safety measures. Policy 
aimed at enhancing consumers' economic interests played a "catch-up" game. 
Consumer policy has also suffered from a lack of institutional advocacy; this has been 
both a symptom and a cause of slow development. It may be said to be a symptom, 
insofar as the lack of institutional advocacy has been the result of low political priority. 
The low priority accorded by policymakers to this area has resulted in the allocation of 
relatively poor resources, low prestige and the late development of institutions. 
Inadequate, under-resourced institutions, with little standing, have themselves served to 
impede progress in this policy field. The same may be said of arrangements for 
institutionalised consumer representation; under-resourcing, and low priority, coupled 
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with organisational problems, have helped to reduce the effectiveness of such 
representation in driving forward the consumer protection agenda. 
In any event, the Commission's ability to pursue agendas that run contrary to the 
perceived interests of the member states is limited. One of the Commission's primary 
aims is to promote further integration and it looks for policy pathways that will help to 
accomplish this end. In its attempts to build such pathways, the Commission 
concentrates on issues and projects on which the majority of actors can agree. This 
practice tends to result in the pursuit of consensus politics. The development of 
consumer policy may be interpreted in this light. For example, the protection of 
consumers' health and safety was integrally linked to the principal mechanisms used to 
achieve the Single Market (i. e. harmonisation, standardisation and mutual recognition). 
Initially, the rationale for improving the protection of consumers' economic interests was 
weaker; building consensus for action in this area therefore took more time. 
The lack of political advocacy is probably the single most important factor in retarding 
the development of consumer protection policy and underpins many of the problems 
described above. Young certainly maintains that "[t]he reluctance of member 
governments to cede responsibility for consumer protection to the EU has restrained the 
development of a fully fledged common consumer policy and is the key to explaining the 
shape that European policy has taken. " (Young: 1997: 207) 
Renewed interest in consumer policy was born out of a change in the political climate, 
brought about by the mounting concern of both national and EU policy actors to evidence 
of general citizen dissatisfaction with the project of European integration. Reinforcing 
consumer protection may be viewed as part of a wider policy to alter citizen perceptions 
of EU integration by addressing areas seen by policymakers as having a direct impact on 
citizens' lives. The creation of a culture of citizenship and of citizens' rights during the 
1990s was the Commission's response to this problem, though some have interpreted this 
strategy as opportunistic and manipulative. For instance, the Consumers in Europe 
Group observed: 
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The development of consumer policy was minimal until the Commission saw it as a 
useful policy to strengthen the establishment of the internal market. Since then, EU 
consumer policy has had some limited success thanks to the Commission's attempts 
to give a "human face" to the process of economic integration, which from the 
outset has been biased in favour of producers. (CEG: 1999 b: 5) 
Integrally linked to the creation of a culture of citizens' rights and legitimacy, is the issue 
of enforcement. The history of consumer policy demonstrates an increasing 
preoccupation with redress and enforcement throughout the 1990s and into the 21st 
century. The Commission, limited in its ability to engage in detailed monitoring by treaty 
provisions and inadequate resources on the one hand and by the emphasis on private 
redress in safeguarding consumers' economic interests, on the other, has sought to adopt 
an increasingly decentralised approach to these problems. Thus, in part, the Commission 
has relied on the pro-activity of the well-informed citizen-consumer to enforce their 
economic rights in the Single Market. The links between the central themes of 
citizenship, legitimacy and enforcement are explored in Chapter Three on enforcement, 
Chapter Four on the citizen-consumer and Chapter Five, which examines selected EU 
initiatives to protect consumers. 
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CHAPTER 3 
ENFORCEMENT 
"To govern is not to write resolutions and distribute directives: to govern is to control the 
implementation of the directives. " (Joseph Stalin, quoted in Jordan: 1999: 69) 
Definition of implementation and enforcement 
The terms 'enforcement' and 'implementation' are sometimes used in a fluid manner. 
Implementation is occasionally applied in a broad sense and is taken to mean putting 
decisions into effect at ground-level. This understanding of implementation subsumes 
the notion of enforcement, although in fact, the two are quite separate. 
When discussing the notions of implementation and enforcement with reference to the 
EU, however, it is important to take into account the specific connotations that the 
vocabulary assumes within that context. From and Stava (1993) suggest that it maybe 
useful to distinguish between notions of administrative implementation and notions of 
legal implementation. They understand legal implementation to mean the transposition 
of EU legislation into national legislation. They describe administrative implementation 
as connoting "the idea that some administrative unit is actually applying the decision or 
directive" (From and Stava: 1993: 60). 
The notion of enforcement within the context of the EU usually refers to its powers to 
supervise the effective implementation of EU legislation at the national level. Because of 
the restricted nature of those powers, discussion about EU enforcement often centres on 
the formal procedures available to the Commission and the European Court of Justice to 
ensure member-state compliance with EU legislation and with Treaty provisions. Except 
for a minority of policy areas, once EU legislation has been incorporated into national 
law, enforcement is taken to be the responsibility of the member-state. The EU's role in 
monitoring enforcement, has therefore been largely restricted to ensuring that proper 
legal implementation has taken place. 
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This chapter addresses aspects of the third and fourth research questions set out in 
Chapter One. With regard to the third question: 
Given the institutional constraints imposed upon the Commission's capacity to supervise 
proper enforcement at member state level, how has the Commission attempted to 
compensate for these constraints in the domain of consumers' economic rights? To what 
extent has it been successful? 
The chapter sets out the institutional constraints on the Commission's ability to supervise 
proper enforcement and gives an account of how the Commission has attempted to 
compensate for these constraints. With regard to the fourth question: 
How far is it possible to demonstrate the existence of a connection between the themes of 
enforcement, citizenship and legitimacy, in the context of the EU institutional framework, 
with particular reference to policy in the domain of consumers' economic interests? 
The chapter demonstrates the connection between the rise in importance of enforcement 
and the political objective of the completion of the single market. Because it was such a 
major political objective, the completion of the Single Market came to be viewed by 
Commission and member-state policy actors as integral to the legitimation of the process 
of EU integration. Without adequate enforcement, the success of the Single Market 
would not have been assured. Citizen support for the Single Market presents a further 
dimension to the issue of legitimacy. Evidence of citizen alienation and dissatisfaction 
explored in Chapters Four and Five led both sets of policy actors to court citizen support 
for EU integration. Improving EU policy performance through enhanced enforcement, 
particularly in policy areas viewed by policy actors as having a human dimension (such 
as social, environmental and consumer policy) was a key mechanism for achieving this 
aim. Furthermore, one of the ways in which the Commission sought to improve 
enforcement was by decentralising to individual citizens the capacity to enforce their EC 
rights within the member states. Thus citizens were not only targeted by the EU for their 
support but, insofar as they were active in enforcing their rights, became a means of 
achieving legitimacy by helping to improve enforcement and thus policy performance. 
This chapter has a number of objectives: first, to describe the role of the Commission and 
the Court in supervising the implementation and enforcement of EU legislation in the 
member-states; second to examine the relationship between the EU institutions and the 
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member states in implementation and enforcement; third, to offer an account of how the 
supervisory role of the Commission and the ECJ has developed; fourth, to offer an 
explanation for the rise in importance of the enforcement/implementation phase of the 
governing process in recent years; fifth, to review the literature on enforcement in the EU 
in order to position the arguments of this thesis within the context of the broader 
academic debate. 
Role of the Supranational Institutions in Enforcement 
The institutional arrangements, which characterise the relationship between the EU 
supranational institutions and the member-state governments, are unique. They reflect a 
peculiarly uneven division of competencies between the different levels of governance 
for the different stages of the policy-making process. This uneven sharing of powers is 
deliberately built into the EU's institutional design in order to help preserve the member- 
states' sovereignty and because the EU lacks sufficient resources adequately to carry out 
implementation and enforcement. This is the key to understanding the problems that the 
supranational institutions face in attempting to ensure that the policies constructed and 
adopted in Brussels have the intended effect at ground level in the member-states. The 
powers of the Commission to initiate and influence the creation of policies are by no 
means matched by its ability to enforce and implement policy. Quoting the work of 
Maria Mendrinou, Jordan notes that: 
The Commission is a particularly precocious entrepeneur. Constantly on the look- 
out for opportunities to expand its competence in areas regarded as peripheral by 
the member states. But when it comes to putting the acquis communautaire into 
effect at the national level, the Commission is on a steep upward slope, possessing 
neither the political resources nor the legal competence to delve substantially into 
national affairs. This begs the question of why the architects of the EU constructed 
an international organisation with an in-built "pathology of non-compliance". 
(Mendrinou: 1996 quoted in Jordan: 1999: 70) 
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Although the Commission does have certain powers to supervise the enforcement and 
implementation of policy at ground level, its ability to do so is impaired for a number of 
reasons. First, the Commission has a limited legal basis on which to act in the field of 
enforcement. The founding treaties apportioned a somewhat circumscribed role for the 
Commission in this respect. For instance, Jordan explains: "... Article 130r(4) makes it 
abundantly clear that, subject to strictly limited and carefully delineated expectations, 
member states are primarily responsible for undertaking the implementation of measures 
adopted by the Council" (Jordan: 1999: 74). 
Article 211 (formerly Article 155) entrusted the Commission with the task of being the 
legal 'guardian of the treaties', with the responsibility for ensuring that member states 
complied with the treaty provisions. Moreover, Article 10 (formerly Article 5) of the 
EEC Treaty imposes upon the member states the duty to implement legislation adopted 
by the Council. According to Grant, Matthews and Newell, the obligation to achieve 
treaty objectives comprises three components. First, the states must establish rights and 
obligations at national level as described in the text of legislation. Second, they must 
amend contradictory national legislation and, third, they must create the necessary 
structures ensuring that the terms of legislation are carried out. (Grant, Matthews & 
Newell : 2000: 70) 
The third component is particularly important to the success of the policy intentions. 
Unless the necessary structures are put in place and are carefully monitored, there is no 
guarantee that policy objectives will be achieved. Evidence from initiatives examined in 
Chapter Five, suggests that this is a particular problem in the field of consumer policy. 
Article 226 (formerly Article 169) empowers the Commission to take action against 
states that fail to comply with treaty provisions, a process which ultimately entails 
referring cases of non-compliance to the ECJ. Only the Commission can initiate such a 
procedure. The role of the ECJ, as defined in Article 164, is to "ensure that in the 
interpretation and application of this Treaty the law is observed". The Court may 
determine whether or not member states are complying with treaty provisions; however, 
it cannot initiate the infringement process. The procedure, by which cases of non- 
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compliance are handled, is not specified by the Article, and the Commission has 
preferred to develop a largely informal approach to dealing with such cases. 
Its reasons for doing so must be understood in the context of the Commission's overall 
position in the model of supranational governance. In many respects, the Commission is 
in a weak position with regard to forcing member states to comply with treaty provisions. 
The Commission has a limited supervisory role in enforcement, moreover that role is 
delegated to it by the member states themselves. Therefore the Commission finds itself 
in the invidious position of trying to tame the forces that grant it independent powers; 
also, as an unelected body, the Commission is conscious of the need to behave in a 
circumspect manner. Consequently, the Commission largely prefers to bargain and 
negotiate with member-states to redress problems of non-compliance and only tends to 
open formal legal proceedings against a state with the ECJ as a last resort. 
There are currently four stages to the Article 226 infringement process. During the first 
stage the Commission writes an informal letter to the member-state asking for an 
explanation. If the state fails to provide an adequate response, the Commission sends an 
official Article 226 letter, to which the state is obliged to respond. At the third stage, the 
Commission sends a 'reasoned opinion'to the state, outlining its justifications for 
beginning legal proceedings against the state and, at the fourth stage, the Commission 
presents the case to the ECJ. (Tallberg: 1999, Jordan: 1999) 
Jordan, however, notes the reluctance with which the Commission initiates the fourth 
phase of the 226 procedure: 
Even when formal proceedings are initiated, something like 80% are settled before 
they go to court (CEC, 1997, p. 8). Court cases tend to be long-winded, extremely 
complicated, stretch the Commission's meagre resources and endanger the good 
will of the states. Decisions to take cases to the Court are not taken lightly. They 
must be sanctioned by the Commission's legal service and receive support from the 
College of Commissioners. (Jordan: 1999: 81) 
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If, as a result of the court's proceedings, a state is found to be in breach of the treaties, 
and still fails to comply with the court's rulings, a further Article 226 process may be 
initiated under the provisions of Article 228 (formerly Article 171). 
The ability of the supranational institutions to secure compliance from recalcitrant states 
was reinforced in the 1992 Treaty on European Union, which amended Article 228. The 
amended procedure enabled the Commission to impose financial penalties on non- 
complying states, providing that the ECJ returned a judgement of non-compliance on the 
completion of the second hearing under the Article 226 procedure. Under these 
circumstances, the amended procedure allows the Commission to propose the amount of 
the penalty to be paid by the state, although ultimately it is the Court's role to decide 
whether or not to impose the sanction. The decision of the member-states to agree to a 
revision of Article 228 at the 1991 Inter-governmental Conference (IGC) reflected their 
growing concern for the success of the internal market project at a moment when 
incidences of non-compliance, in part, brought about by the strains of the completion of 
the internal market, were on the increase (Tallberg: 1999: 175-8). 
Another reason cited for the Commission's limited scope in enforcement is the limited 
administrative resources at its disposal. The Commission is a relatively small 
bureaucracy, a situation that both reduces its capacity to carry out fast and effective 
monitoring and strongly encourages it to leave the task of implementation and 
enforcement largely to the administrations of the member states. Moreover, the 
Commission lacks sources of independent information on which it can rely for an 
accurate picture as to how EU legislation is being enforced and implemented in practice. 
The power-sharing arrangements have the effect of dissociating the supranational 
institutions both geographically and politically from the ground level of enforcement and 
implementation in the member-states. Moreover, in recent years the logic of devolving 
tasks to the lowest level of governance has been reinforced by formally enshrining the 
notion of subsidiarity in the Maastricht Treaty. 
Jordan claims that "In many respects, the tension - or what Weiler (1981) terms the 
'dualism' - between the intergovernmental and supranational aspects of the EU is more 
starkly revealed in the implementation phase than in any other" (Jordan: 1999: 77-78). He 
argues that tension has arisen from the conflicting objectives of the policy actors who 
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shaped the EU, and that the resulting system of governance is an uneasy compromise 
between, on the one hand, a supranational legal system created by policy actors with 
largely federal beliefs, and, on the other, a system of policy implementation that is 
dominated by the member-states (Jordan: 1999: 77-78). 
He further suggests that enforcement was always a problem for the EU even during the 
early years of integration. Citing Macrory (1992), he claims that the member-states had a 
tendency to view directives more in terms of policy commitments than legally binding 
instruments: "In advance of a firm indication from the ECJ that directives were binding in 
their entirety, a distinctly de minimis view of European law prevailed. " (Jordan : 1999: 
74). 
Development of the Supervisory Role of the Commission and the ECJ 
In response to the perceived inadequacies of the centralised enforcement procedures, 
described in the passages above, the supranational monitoring bodies have, in recent 
years, attempted to strengthen the enforcement of EU law by reinforcing the capacity of 
individuals to enforce their EU rights in the national courts thus creating an effective 
decentralised tier of national enforcement. Tallberg characterises this as: "A boosting of 
decentralised enforcement became the supranational supervisor's solution to the problem 
of inadequate enforcement means at the centralised level. " (Tallberg: 1999: 196). 
The ground-work for a decentralised system of enforcement had already been laid via a 
number of leading decisions issued by the ECJ during the 1960s. In 1963 a judgement 
passed down by the ECJ in the Van Gend En Loos case stipulated that EC law created 
legally enforceable rights for individuals (i. e. the principle of direct effect) which they 
could invoke before national courts. Moreover, this position was reinforced in 1964 as a 
result of the decision in Costa v. ENEL, which first established the principle of the 
supremacy of EC law over national law (Tallberg: 1999: 199). 
During the late 1980s and 1990s, the Commission and the ECJ worked to strengthen the 
decentralisation of enforcement; the ECJ through the development of case law and the 
Commission through measures launched in policy programmes, aimed at strengthening 
the structure of decentralised enforcement. Central to the ECJ's success in reinforcing 
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decentralisation was the establishment of the principle of state liability. Prior to the 
establishment of this principle, national courts were limited as to the circumstances under 
which they could grant damages to individuals who had suffered as a result of state non- 
compliance. 
The principle of direct effect only provided a remedy in the individual case, where 
Community acts clearly conferred directly enforceable rights. Many EU directives 
did not fulfill the requirements of direct effect... As it stood in 1990, the 
decentralised enforcement system therefore provided neither an adequate protection 
of individual's EC rights, nor effective sanctions to deter member states from non- 
compliance. (Tallberg: 1999: 207) 
The ECJ established direct effect in its 1991 decision on the Francovich case. The case 
regarded the failure of the Italian government to implement a directive intended to protect 
employees in the event of the employer's bankruptcy. The ECJ recognising that 
individuals had no recourse to financial compensation, argued that an individual's rights 
would be weakened in circumstances where they could not obtain compensation from 
states that had violated their treaty obligations. A further number of high profile court 
cases (Brasserie du Pecheur, Factortame III and Dillenkofer) helped to confirm and 
elucidate this ruling (Tallberg: 1999). The effect of these decisions has been to 
strengthen the position of the individual EU citizen, in enforcing their rights at national 
level. 
The Commission also adopted a number of measures in its policy programmes, which 
aimed to reinforce the Court's activism with regard to decentralising enforcement. As 
Chapter Two demonstrated, in 1998 the Commission published two working papers 
analysing past achievements in consumer policy and explaining its enforcement strategies 
in this field. The document on past achievements provided a particularly illuminating 
passage concerning the legislative instruments used to realise consumer policy. An 
important distinction was drawn between the different approaches employed for the 
creation of legislation affecting consumers' health and safety compared to those used for 
legislation affecting consumers' economic rights. Legislation affecting consumers' 
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health and safety is dealt with through public law, whilst consumers' economic rights are 
protected largely (although not exclusively) through private law mechanisms. The 
Commission distinguishes between a 'public' system where public authorities are 
responsible for enforcement through mechanisms of public law (investigative powers, 
administrative authorisations, etc) and a 'private' system where enforcement is left to 
individual consumers, businesses or organisations through civil law remedies (EC: 1998f: 
13). This effectively means that national governments are viewed as having obligations 
to intervene in the market with regard to matters pertaining to consumers' health and 
safety. Their obligations regarding the protection of consumers' economic interests are 
more restricted, since these are left, to a much greater extent, to individuals to enforce 
through private actions in the courts. The 'Past Achievements' document explains the 
reasons for the differences in the choice of legal instrument: 
Private law directives with an individual enforcement of rights conform more to 
consumer policy favouring economic reasoning, because the private law system of 
individual enforcement of rights is traditionally regarded as the counterpart to a 
market economy system. (EC: 1998c: 6) 
On the other hand, this system can work to the disadvantage of the consumer because the 
costs involved in gaining redress often outweigh the benefits, as Chapter Five 
exemplifies. Moreover, although private law mechanisms give a degree of flexibility to 
consumers, insofar as they themselves are left to decide whether or not to pursue a 
particular matter, this flexibility might in fact disadvantage them because the defendant is 
normally in a better negotiating position. Private law mechanisms generally favour 
consumers who are well educated in respect of their rights; hence the close correlation 
between access to justice and consumer information/education. Public law, on the other 
hand, normally used to enforce health and safety legislation, takes these problems away 
from the consumer because it relies on government intervention. Moreover, public law is 
used to enforce health and safety matters because states generally take the view that they 
are under a moral obligation to protect consumers' health and safety and that issues of this 
nature are too important to be left to the dictates of market forces. However, the 
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document notes that public law is not always flexible enough to respond directly to the 
requirements of the plaintiffs (EC: 1998c: 6). 
The Commission's choice of legal instruments has significant implications for the ways in 
which it conducts policy for consumers' health and safety concerns on the one hand, and 
their economic interests, on the other. Because it is primarily left to well-informed 
consumers to protect their economic rights, access to redress, information and education, 
represent the main pillars in the Commission's strategy for safeguarding consumers' 
economic interests (EC: 1998c: 1). As the working paper on enforcement points out: 
Generally, these directives [concerned with consumers' economic interests] do not 
give the Commission any specific powers, nor do they foresee any specific 
procedures for monitoring. Moreover, non-safety directives normally aim to give 
rights to consumers, which they can invoke against enterprises. (EC: 1998f: 12) 
The working document on enforcing consumer legislation specified several categories of 
problems facing consumers. These are first, differences between national systems of 
enforcement; second, differences between member states in the follow-up of the practical 
application of the directives; and third, difficulties with respect to access to justice for 
individual consumers and cross-border problems. 
These categories are elaborated below: 
1. Differences between national systems of enforcement 
The document explained that a number of enforcement problems were associated with the 
variation in the application of the two systems of public and private law directives. As 
the document explains: 
These two systems are normally applied in a mixed form by the Member states. 
These systems do not only vary between the Member states with respect to one 
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directive, but also within each Member state with respect to different directives and 
even to different provisions of the same directive. (EC : 1998f 13) 
An example of the differences, resulting from the variations in application of public and 
private law, can be seen in the Unfair Contract Terms Directive (93/13/EEC). Some 
countries (in this case, Portugal, UK, Sweden, Denmark and Ireland) leave certain of the 
directive's objectives in the hands of the public authorities, whilst others (notably 
Germany and Belgium) leave the matter of redress to private actors. Where redress is left 
to private actors, again, certain countries (e. g. Germany) place the consumer in a more 
favourable position by subsidising consumer associations. In contrast, other countries 
(e. g. Belgium) place consumers in a more difficult position - not only are Belgian 
consumer associations not subsidised, they are obliged to pay the costs of court 
proceedings even if they win. In this manner, member-states themselves might be 
regarded as deliberately contributing to the uneven state of affairs confronting European 
consumers attempting to gain legal redress. 
Variations in the provisions open to individual consumers to gain redress across the 
member-states, also makes for an uneven playing field with regard to gaining access to 
justice. 
2. Member states' follow up of the practical application of the directives 
Another problem, identified in the document, regarded the Commission's lack of 
information as to the member-states' follow up of practical application. The document 
explained that, generally, the Commission is not informed as to arrangements pertaining 
to the practical application of laws implementing EU directives. Moreover, "[i]n some 
cases, this follow up does not exist at all, in particular when the practical application is 
made by courts or other bodies responsible for the settlement of disputes" (EC: 1998f: 
14). 
3. Access to justice 
The document described the Community's basic strategy towards the protection of 
consumers' economic rights, in the following terms; European directives aim to give 
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consumers rights, which they can use against suppliers. Failure or difficulty in gaining 
redress leads to failures in the enforcement of EU law at national level. As already noted, 
variations in the application of directives and variations in the nature of provisions for 
consumers to gain redress complicate the situation. 
The document further included an outline of initiatives adopted by the Commission, 
aimed at improving the situation regarding the enforcement of EU consumer legislation. 
The Commission's actions have primarily consisted of a mixture of elaborate information 
campaigns aimed at a variety of audiences (EU citizens, businesses, the legal profession), 
coupled with initiatives to improve the level of intergovernmental administrative co- 
operation between the member states (establishment of contact points, work exchanges, 
databases) and initiatives designed to improve judicial redress within and across borders 
(e. g. establishment of EE-J-Net, directive on injunctions for consumers' economic rights). 
These initiatives have important implications for this study as it is argued that, in the 
absence of more direct supervisory powers, the consumer DG has attempted to bolster 
consumer enforcement through recourse to these more decentralised initiatives. The 
significance of this line of policy is explored in greater detail in Chapter Five, which 
examines the effects of the EEJ-Net and Injunctions Directive along with other relevant 
selected initiatives (European Consumer Centres, European Complaints Form, proposal 
for an Unfair Commercial Practices Directive and the Regulation on Consumer 
Protection Enforcement). 
The Growing Importance of Implementation Issues 
Mendrinou, writing in 1996 about the problem of non-compliance and the Commission's 
role in monitoring enforcement, offers a rationale that seeks to put into context the 
Commission's behaviour with regard to its enforcement strategies since its inception. She 
explains the choices of the Commission and the member states in terms of a 'strategic 
game' that she charts with the help of a matrix designed to show the highest and lowest 
preference outcome of each 'player' after a treaty violation has occurred. Mendrinou 
refers to a number of events that have influenced the course of EU integration, such as 
enlargement, the 'empty chair' crisis or the single market project. She offers these in part- 
explanation for the Commission's strategic choices, arguing that these events have 
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provided opportunities or constraints to which the Commission has been obliged to 
respond. Until the mid 1960s, it was rational for the Commission to avoid strains in its 
relations with the member states by settling for a policy of restraint, despite pressure from 
the EP for a more determined use of its monitoring powers. Mendrinou explains: 
... The protectionist tendencies as a result of the economic strains of the early and 
mid 1970's, along with the first enlargement, added new supporters of a more 
rigorous enforcement policy against a background of asymmetries in compliance 
records among states. Moreover, the prospect of reinforcing and expanding its 
policies through the Court was particularly attractive for the Commission (Stein 
1981: 24-27). From the late 1970's, under the Jenkins Presidency the Commission 
pursued a more rigorous policy of enforcement. The Commission began to review 
its monitoring powers as means for strategic action that would both increase its 
policy-making capacities and support integration. (Mendrinou: 1996: 15-16) 
Mendrinou further explains that the introduction of the SEA and the Single Market 
Programme greatly reinforced the Commission's hand in monitoring the enforcement of 
EU law. She claims that the "attainment of the 1992 deadline required maximum 
effectiveness from national and supranational administrations. The Commission's opting 
for the best strategy, which instigated a rigorous monitoring policy, had a further 
advantage, as states' best outcome under this Commission strategy was compliance. An 
important contributing factor has been the increasing reliance on the national courts as a 
tier of enforcement. " (Mendrinou : 1996: 16) 
A number of authors concur with Mendrinou's analysis of the situation. Jordan, for 
example, reports that during the 1980s awareness grew, particularly in industrial circles 
of the need for a comparable regulatory environment in order to create equal competition 
(Jordan: 1999). The need for adequate enforcement of EU legislation was also 
recognised by Lord Cockfield in the 1985 White Paper (Com (85) 310 final) who 
commented on the increasing commitment of the heads of the member states to the 
completion of the internal market. According to Cockfield, after years of "eurosclerosis": 
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... the mood has begun to change, and the commitment to be rediscovered: gradually 
at first, but now with increasing tempo. The Heads of state and Governments at the 
European Council meeting in Copenhagen in 1982 pledged themselves to the 
completion of the internal market as a high priority. The pledge was repeated at 
Fontainebleau in June 1984; at Dublin in December of that year; and most recently, 
in Brussels, in March 1985. (EC: 1985: 5) 
Tallberg also traces both the surge in enforcement problems and the Commission's 
interest in tackling those problems to the Single Market Programme. He explains that the 
Single European Act aimed to speed up the creation of the Single Market by introducing 
the more rapid Qualified Majority Voting process for policy areas associated with the 
Single Market. Prior to the Single European Act, the decision-making process in the EU 
had been hampered by the principle of unanimity. The new procedure had the effect of 
rapidly increasing the body of existing legislation, which put added pressure on the EU 
institutions to supervise the application of the new legislation in the member-states and 
arguably helped to create the conditions for a rise in implementation and enforcement 
problems. In essence, the increase in legislation created an implementation and 
enforcement backlog which rendered the problem more visible. As Tallberg remarks: 
"When the Commission and the ECJ embarked on a crusade to strengthen EU 
enforcement in the early 1990s, they did so for a clear and identifiable reason. This 
reason was the European internal market and the rampant compliance problems 
threatening the realisation of this project. " (Tallberg: 1999: 107). 
The process of creating the Single Market put considerable pressure on the member- 
states' administrative, legal, political and economic machinery. As Tallberg again 
explains: "the process of eliminating these [largely non-tariff trade] barriers imposed 
palpable adjustment costs and strains on the member states" (Tallberg: 1999: 117). He 
argues that in order to implement these measures, states were obliged to "refashion 
domestic regulatory regimes, overturn existing practices, and frame new relationships 
with the economic operators of the market" (Tallberg: 1999: 120). 
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Tallberg more specifically addresses three types of strains on the economic, political and 
administrative structures of the member-states, which help to explain the member-states' 
slow speed of adjustment to enforcing Single Market regulations. 
The first concerns the capacity of states' legislative and administrative arrangements to 
cope with transposing a large amount of EU legislation within a relatively short space of 
time. Tallberg also mentions the adjustments that states had to make to already long 
established administrative behaviour and practice. Whilst this task could be made even 
harder by administrative actors reluctant to embrace changes, the states needed the 
administrative capacity to bring about reforms as a prerequisite to success. Mendrinou 
further elaborates on this theme and argues that the significant differences in the 
comparative administrative arrangements of the member states contribute towards 
implementation problems (Mendrinou : 1996). 
The second strain that Tallberg identifies refers to the state's role in the economy and to 
the government's ability to intervene in the market. By agreeing to adopt common 
standards through EU regulations and harmonisation, the states were agreeing to limit the 
scope of their capacity to influence their domestic economies, by denying themselves the 
use of a number of previously well-used economic instruments, for instance, company 
rescue plans based on state-aid. The reluctance of some states to abandon such strategies 
is well illustrated by the political furore in the EU over the French Government's Alstom 
rescue plan (2003). 
The third strain, partly a concomitant of the policies associated with the second strain, 
concerns the increased pressure that economic operators in the member-states found 
themselves under. Whilst the programme of liberalisation that the Single Market 
heralded worked to the benefit of some companies, it did not do so for all. Weaker 
companies suffered from the increase in competition, and whereas previously, they might 
have approached the domestic government in the hope of obtaining a subsidy, the 
member-states had agreed under the terms of the new treaties to abolish state subsidies. 
Financial hand-outs to companies in difficulty, therefore, became a matter of political 
contention between the member states and the EU. According to Tallberg, the 
Commission recognises that governments tend to succumb to domestic pressure from 
industries anxious to delay the transposition of EU legislation. He takes up Weatherill's 
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point that, on the one hand, parties adversely affected by Community policies, look to 
'their' governments to dilute their practical effect, and that, on the other, governments 
tend to yield to such pressure where the interests prejudiced by their imperfect 
compliance lie beyond their own borders (Tallberg: 1999: 123). 
A second reason for the increased amount of attention given over to solving problems 
posed by poor implementation was the increased perception both within the Commission 
and amongst the member-states of the need to legitimise the Single Market in the eyes of 
the consumer. Citizens were particularly targeted in their capacity as consumers because 
of the centrality of the completion of the Single Market to EU integration. The 
legitimacy of the Single Market needed to be secured by the support of citizen- 
consumers. General evidence of citizen alienation towards the EU coupled with 
mounting evidence that EU consumers were not able to maximise the benefits of the 
Single Market, particularly across borders because of problems caused by inadequate 
enforcement and redress arrangements, led Commission policy actors to target this policy 
area for improvement. This is an important theme and will be explored in greater detail in 
Chapters Four and Five. 
Literature on Enforcement 
Having established the relevance of the issue of enforcement to this study, it is further 
desirable to examine how this issue has been treated in the contemporary academic 
literature in order to position the focus of this research. The majority of the literature that 
seeks to analyse the EU policy process has so far tended to concentrate on the policy 
initiation and formulation stages, neglecting the role of the EU institutions in 
implementing and enforcing EU legislation at the national level. This is an observation 
confirmed by a number of authors writing recently on implementation and enforcement 
(Tallberg: 1999, Knill and Lenschow : 2000). 
However, the EU is not the only field of study to have suffered neglect in this respect. 
Certain authors claim that research into implementation and enforcement has been late to 
develop in a number of fields. For example, Jordan writes: "The EU was by no means 
unique in neglecting the implementation of policy. Implementation has often been the 
poor relation of policy analysis, only emerging as a separate focus of sustained academic 
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study in the late 1960's... " (Jordan: 1999: 7 1). Knill and Lenschow also confirm that 
research in implementation and enforcement has been late to develop in other fields of 
study, notably international relations and regime analysis (Knill and Lenschow: 2000: 1). 
Furthermore, much of the literature on enforcement has been approached from a legalistic 
angle. Most of it has concentrated on the formal procedures that the Commission and the 
Court use to deal with instances of non-compliance. For example, Evans (1979) 
examined in detail the Commission's discretion in applying the 169 procedure, as did 
Dashwood and White (1989) and Audretsch (1986), who concentrates on enforcement 
through the 169 procedure. Others focus on the effect of particular ECJ rulings (e. g. 
Josephine Steiner (1993) on the effect of the Francovich case) and on the role of the 
Court (e. g. Eric Stein (1981) in extending the principle of direct effect; Pescatore (1983) 
also comments on direct effect). There is another small body of literature that has 
approached the issue of enforcement and implementation from a political science 
perspective. Again, the bulk of this literature has concentrated on the formal procedures 
available to the Commission and the Court for dealing with instances of non-compliance 
and on the legal implementation of EU legislation. Relatively little has been written 
about administrative implementation and even less research has been conducted into the 
limitations to the Commission's formal supervisory role or of its consequences for the 
practical enforcement of laws at state level. 
Whilst it is true to say that, so far, political scientists have concentrated on policy- 
initiation and formulation, largely neglecting issues concerned with enforcement and 
implementation, a few authors have written in this field. Several different approaches to 
understanding and studying implementation and enforcement have been advocated. 
Citing the work of Haigh for example, Jordan distinguishes between notions of formal 
and practical compliance (Jordan: 1999). He takes the notion of formal compliance as 
referring to the accurate transposition of EU legislation into national law. Practical 
compliance refers to the practical implementation and enforcement of those laws at 
ground level. Jordan notes that the majority of studies conform to the former description 
and concentrate on assessing the extent to which EU legislation has been correctly 
enacted at national level and for example, whether the responsible administrative 
machinery was put in place. Some contributions conforming to Jordan's former 
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description have centred on the study of the application of the Article 169 procedure (for 
example; Mendrinou: 1996, Jonsson & Tallberg : 1999). Others have addressed the issue 
of enforcement from a number of different perspectives. Tallberg, for example, focuses 
primarily on the capacity of the Commission and the Court to act autonomously in 
enforcement and implementation, i. e. to exceed the formal limitations of their 
competencies to supervise enforcement, as proscribed by the treaties (Tallberg: 1999, 
2000a, 2000b). 
However, Jordan (1999: 72) remarks on the limitations to this approach: "What such 
studies conspicuously fail to address, however, is the 'real' implementation problem: 
delivering political outcomes". Citing the work of both Easton (1965) and Weale 
(1992), Jordan explains the difference between policy outputs and policy outcomes. 
Policy outputs are "'the laws, regulations and institutions that governments employ in 
dealing with policy problems"' (Jordan quoting Weale: 1992: 45, in Jordan 1999: 72). 
Policy outcomes are "'the effects of those measures on the state of the world' " (Ibid). 
Jordan also mentions another approach to studying enforcement/implementation 
problems suggested by Weale. Weale argues that enforcement and implementation 
problems can be caused by policy actors failing to adopt an appropriate course of action 
at the policy formulation/implementation stage of the policy process. Weale argues that 
alternative ideas that fail to be made into legislation, or even fail to be considered as 
options for legislation, may be important in explaining deficiencies in outcomes. 
However, Jordan remarks on the potential difficulties of adopting such an approach. He 
criticises Weale's proposals on the grounds that studies of this nature would be both 
normative and hypothetical and obtaining a clear answer might prove difficult. 
In addition to this, the field of EU environmental policy has proven particularly fruitful 
with regard to articles on enforcement (for example, Jordan: 1999, Knill and Lenschow 
: 2000, Grant, Matthews & Newell: 2000). Whilst these articles tend to focus on 
particular problems in enforcing EU environmental legislation, they also comment more 
widely on generic issues relating to the enforcement of EU legislation and, as such, 
provide a useful added source of information. As we have seen, Jordan links the 
peculiarity of the governing arrangements between the EU institutions and the member 
states to the Commission's limited capacity to supervise effectively the enforcement of 
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EU legislation. Previdi (1997) also associates the notion of regulatory anomalies with the 
EU's peculiar institutional arrangements. He lists five atypical characteristics of the EU's 
regulatory system. Of these, two are particularly relevant to this study: the first is the 
lack of clear separation of legislative and executive powers. Previdi argues: "The 
Commission.... does not actually wield executive power. Rather, executive responsibility 
is exercised by the member governments... " (Previdi: 1997: 69). The second refers to the 
lack of precise separation between EU and national competences: "Devoid of a formal 
delegation of competences - such as occurs in a federal state or in a country where 
regulatory powers are devolved to local governments - the Treaty on European Union 
(TEU) struggles to define this principle of separation of competences known as 
subsidiarity. " (Previdi: 1997: 70). These atypical characteristics are exemplified in later 
chapters of this study and Previdi's analysis supports aspects of the findings in the 
concluding chapter. 
Tallberg makes a number of similar observations in his thesis. He draws upon an 
extended principal-agent model to help explain the peculiar position, with regard to 
enforcement, in which the EU institutions find themselves. Insofar as this study partly 
focuses on approaches taken by the Commission to bolstering enforcement in the 
member-states, it is perhaps worth reviewing the relevant tenets of Tallberg's arguments: 
of particular significance is the notion of the conflicting roles that the member-states 
play. Tallberg notes that the states have a number of potentially conflicting preferences, 
which he describes using the Principle-Supervisor-Agent vocabulary: 
First, as principals, they [the states] want to see the policy proposals agreed to in 
the Council properly implemented and complied with, and to this end they need to 
equip the Commission and the Court with the necessary enforcement powers. 
Second, and also as principals, member states are anxious to protect state 
sovereignty, and this obviously puts a limit on the desire to delegate fiercer 
enforcement weapons to the supranational supervisors. Third, as agents, member- 
states prefer to soften the adjustment demands of new EU policies on national 
political, economic and administrative structures. All EU member states hold all 
three kinds of preference (Tallberg: 2000a: 107). 
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Tallberg explains that the Commission is constrained by the fact that it is ultimately 
answerable for its actions to the member-states, which can, and have vetoed or diluted 
various proposals that it has put forward for strengthening the EU institutions' capacity to 
impose sanctions on non-complying states. Even if the Commission were to go beyond 
the limits defined by the member-states, it is difficult to envisage how the actions of the 
Commission would either go undetected or unchecked. The Commission appears to have 
very little in the way of effective sanctions that it can impose on companies or individuals 
who seek to undermine the integrity of the internal market. It can, for example, 'name 
and shame' states that fail to implement directives; it can begin an enforcement procedure 
against a state. However, as Tallberg suggests, the majority of cases are dealt with by the 
Commission through a process of communication with the state in question, largely 
negating the necessity for the Commission to refer the case to the ECJ. 
Perhaps the most comprehensive study of the implementation of Community law was that 
undertaken by Siedentopf and Ziller (1988). They analysed the implementation of 
seventeen different directives across the member states, comparing differences in 
practical implementation and the modus operandi of the various states' administrations. 
They analysed in detail the various stages of implementation from the preparatory phase 
to the incorporation of the directives into national law and finally to administrative 
application and control (Siedentopf and Ziller: 1988: 57). One of their most important 
findings centred around the idea that good enforcement infers the incorporation of 
interested parties during the early policy-making stages. This is a conclusion with which 
From and Stava also concur (1993). When applied to the enforcement of consumers' 
economic interests, this observation makes for an interesting point of analysis. Consumer 
representation, as Chapter Two illustrates, is relatively weak during the policy 
formulation stages, particularly compared with those of supply interests. Furthermore, 
not only are consumer interests under-represented at this stage, unlike many other policy 
areas, the protection of consumers' economic interests is largely enforced through private 
means, leaving the responsibility for enforcement with the individual. Therefore, those 
responsible for the practical enforcement of consumers' economic interests are the weak 
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and atomised consumers themselves, who failed to be sufficiently consulted during the 
earlier stages of the policy-making process. 
Jordan makes a number of observations regarding the evolution of EU environmental 
policy, which it might be argued, to a certain extent, mirrors initiatives undertaken for the 
protection of consumers' economic interests. For example, he comments: 
... the Commission understands full well the political constraints 
it is under and has 
learnt to think tactically and act cautiously ... Reflecting the post-Maastricht 
demands for greater subsidiarity, the over-arching theme is one of fosteringjoint 
responsibility' among actors, complementing the top-down approach to 
enforcement. (Jordan: 1999: 84) 
This approach would seek to strengthen consultation, increase national reporting, 
improve auditing and encourage the use of non-regulatory instruments. Furthermore, he 
continues: "Wilkinson (1992, p. 226) observes that better consultation and the use of soft 
(that is non-legislative instruments) allows the Commission to achieve the environmental 
objectives without being seen to interfere directly in the affairs of the member states. " 
(Jordan : 1999: 84). 
Conclusions 
It is possible to discern a similar trend towards an increasing reliance on co-operation and 
co-ordination between the member states and the Commission in the field of EU 
consumer policy. For example, the creation of the EEJ-Net, the strengthening of the 
International Marketing Supervision Network (IMSN), the Commission-funded pilot 
projects for rapid out-of court settlements, the Karolus exchanges, as well as the various 
information-based initiatives, such as the 'Citizens First' sign-posting system or the 
European Consumer Centres, indicate that the Commission has adopted a similar 
approach to reinforcing the decentralised enforcement for the protection of consumers' 
economic interests at national level. 
The existing literature tends to focus on the formal procedures available to the 
Commission and to the Court as set out in the treaties. It does not really address the 
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Commission's limited attempts to bolster proper enforcement at state level. Although 
Tallberg does begin to analyse the Commission's attempts to reinforce decentralised 
enforcement of Single Market legislation, his analysis is by no means exhaustive and its 
aim is primarily to detect the extent to which the supranational bodies are capable of 
acting independently of the member-states, rather than to evaluate how successful the 
Commission's strategy has been. Neither does the existing body of political science 
literature focus on case studies of proper enforcement across particular economic sectors 
in an attempt to gauge whether or not proper enforcement at state level is inhibited in 
certain sectors, by the strength of corporate interest representation. Nor does the literature 
deal with how the Commission is monitoring this. 
The present study holds that the Commission has been largely unable to create a 
comprehensive and coherent regulatory framework which can adequately address the 
enforcement of consumers' economic interests because of a variety of factors, including 
treaty obligations, the division of competencies between the EU and the member-state, as 
well as the sectoral and jurisdictional limitations of the legal instruments used to deal 
with consumers' economic interests across the member-states. Until the adoption of the 
Injunctions Directive in 1998, consumers' economic interests across borders were largely 
enforced by individuals through private means rather than by public bodies. In order to 
ameliorate this situation, the Commission has engaged in a variety of non-legislative, as 
well as legislative, initiatives aimed at improving enforcement largely (although not 
exclusively) through co-operative ventures. 
Moreover, until the mid-1990s the ability of consumers to enforce their economic rights 
had not been high on the EU agenda. As Chapter Two demonstrates, more attention was 
initially paid to enforcing the supply side of the regulatory framework with a view to 
ensuring the success of the Single Market project. Recently, evidence of citizen 
dissatisfaction has induced the Commission to try to improve the capacity of consumers 
to exercise their economic rights particularly across borders. The main purpose of the 
next chapter (Four) therefore is to examine the Commission's growing pre-occupation 
with citizen perceptions of the Single Market, with particular reference to consumer 
policy. The purpose of Chapter Five is critically to evaluate selected initiatives created in 
order to bolster the exercise of citizen-consumers' economic rights across borders and 
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address unfavourable citizen perceptions of the Single Market. Chapters Six and Seven 
attempt to exemplify the impact of these governance structures and on consumer 
protection strategies in selected market sectors. 
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CHAPTER 4 
THE CITIZEN-CONSUMER 
Introduction 
The main purpose of this chapter is to examine the contentions set out in the first two 
initial research questions: 
First, the study asks whether the Commission's increased attention to the ability of 
citizen-consumers in the EU to exercise their economic rights across borders in the 
Single Market was used as a means of legitimising the Single Market in the eyes of 
the citizen? 
Second, the study analyses the extent to which, as part of this strategy, the 
Commission used the rhetoric of the 'citizen consumer' as a device to court citizen 
support for the single market project. 
In other words the purpose is to analyse the contention that the Commission has sought to 
use consumer policy as a means of altering citizen perceptions of the Single Market as 
essentially biased in favour of the supply side. The following analysis is predicated on 
the widespread notion that the EU is currently suffering from a legitimacy deficit that the 
Council, the Parliament, but in particular the Commission have been trying to address 
since the late 1980s. It is argued that apparent citizen opposition and apathy during the 
1990s, both in response to the Treaty on European Union and to wider issues, led both 
national and EU actors belatedly to address citizens' concerns, particularly in respect of 
the Single Market. They did so because of the centrality of the Single Market to the 
wider project of EU integration. If the legitimacy of the Single Market is questioned, 
then, arguably, the wider project of EU integration will be undermined. The EU has 
sought to address these problems by developing the relationship between the citizen and 
the Union through the creation of citizens' rights, in particular seeking to elevate these 
across a variety of policy areas, perceived to be of concern to citizens. The EU strategy 
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has been both to widen the scope of citizens' rights and to deepen them by increasing 
their practical efficiency. The aim of strengthening the consumer's hand has been 
approached through structural policies to improve market performance on the one hand 
and through enhanced consumer protection enforcement and redress mechanisms on the 
other. The 'persona' of the citizen has consequently become one of the central planks in 
the EU's pursuit of self-legitimation. It is argued here that the 'citizen consumer' has 
become an increasingly important device for the Commission in its attempts to enhance 
the legitimacy of the Single Market. The term'citizen consumer' is to be interpreted quite 
literally as EU citizens acting in their capacity as consumers and in particular refers to the 
consumer rights that the EU has accorded its citizens. Reich, (1998: 432) not only 
acknowledges the concept of the citizen-consumer, but even goes so far as to suggest the 
existence of a'European economic constitution' which comprises an "(incomplete and 
dynamic) body of laws which protect the ordinary European citizens in their economic 
role of consumers, in their functions as ecologically responsible subjects and in their 
individual and collective access to courts of law in case of need of protection". This 
policy reflects the Commission's recognition that consumers are an important 
constituency because the very success of the Single Market relies in part on consumers 
having full and unfettered access to the Single Market. In the early 1990s the 
Commission foresaw a number of beneficent economic effects consequent upon fuller 
consumer participation -a downwards pressure on prices, an incentive for the growth of 
small to medium enterprises (often cited by the Commission as the likeliest potential area 
of economic growth), which in themselves might be expected to improve employment 
levels. 
A central component of the argument in this chapter, therefore, draws upon a critical 
examination of the Commission and Council's construction and use of rhetoric relating to 
the citizen-consumer in key policy documents. Later chapters will compare the rhetoric 
with the effects experienced by consumers at ground level. 
The development of citizenship within the EU, in particular the emergence of the 
concept of the citizen-consumer, provides a conceptual framework within which to 
consider both the citizen's role itself and the Commission's attempts to improve 
perceptions of its performance. This chapter therefore comprises three parts. The first 
88 
part examines the basis of the EU's legitimacy and explores the connection between the 
concept of citizenship and legitimacy. The second part seeks to provide an overview of 
the development of 'European Union citizenship' and discusses the relevance of the 
concept of the citizen-consumer, within the wider conceptual frame of 'the market 
citizen'. The third part attempts to analyse the Commission's practical use of the concept 
of the citizen-consumer in its attempt to enhance the legitimacy of the single market. 
Consumer Citizenship and the Legitimation of EU 
The assertion that the Commission has used the 'citizen-consumer' as a device in order to 
legitimise the single market in the eyes of the citizen merits further investigation; it is 
desirable to put this claim into the wider context. Since 1957, the creation of the internal 
market has been the lynch-pin of European integration; this has been especially the case 
since the Single European Act (1986) and the Treaty of Maastricht (1992). Given the 
dominance of the concept of the Single Market, the acceptance and acknowledgement of 
the success of this project, above all other, may be said to be necessary in order to confer 
legitimacy upon the EU as a whole. Conversely if the Single Market does not function to 
the benefit of its citizens, as it is designed to do, then they may well doubt its relevance to 
their lives and to call into question the legitimacy of the whole EU venture. As it is the 
Commission's role, in particular, to ensure the effective functioning of the Single Market, 
it is likely to be the Commission's legitimacy that will be particularly threatened by 
failure in this task. 
It is perhaps appropriate to begin this analysis by establishing the criteria for the 
legitimacy of the EU and in particular, the Commission. Beetham and Lord (Beetham & 
Lord : 1998) attempt to establish such criteria. They conclude that the EU requires 'direct 
legitimacy' based upon the same criteria as those normally applied to liberal democratic 
nation states. Their claim is that only a direct model of legitimacy, based on liberal 
democratic principles, will be sufficient to secure the support of the majority of citizens 
for the authority of the EU. They contend (Beetham & Lord : 1998: 23) that'direct 
legitimacy' should be based on three particular criteria: identity, democracy and 
performance, which they define in the following terms: "effective performance in respect 
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of agreed ends, democratic authorisation accountability and representation and agreement 
on the identity and boundaries of the political community respectively". 
They also discuss the implications of the'indirect democracy' model, suggesting two 
alternative routes to legitimation. On the one hand, they claim that the acceptance of the 
authority of the EU by the member-states - themselves recognised as legitimate liberal 
democratic entities - confers legitimacy on the EU. On the other hand, they discuss the 
possible legitimation of the EU via technocratic means. The technocratic approach 
contends that the public good is ensured by professionals, who are insulated from, and 
not biased by, democratic and, in particular, electoral politics. Beetham and Lord are 
critical of both of these routes on a variety of grounds; they criticise the first on the basis 
that the EU's rules and regulations impinge directly on citizens' daily lives in a variety of 
ways and therefore may require their direct co-operation and acceptance. They criticise 
the second, technocratic approach because it precludes citizens from participating in the 
process of choosing between competing policy priorities, which, they claim, is one of the 
basic activities underpinning liberal democracies. 
Beetham and Lord conclude therefore that, because the EU in many respects lacks 
sufficient direct legitimacy, it suffers from a legitimacy deficit, a claim, which according 
to Moravcsik (2002: 605), is a position widely accepted amongst both EU citizens and the 
academic fraternity. It is instructive to examine the nature of this'legitimacy deficit". 
Most authors only focus on one particular aspect. Of the three components that Beetham 
and Lord identified as central to legitimacy (democracy, performance and identity) a 
number of authors have concentrated on notion of democracy and the EU's 'democratic 
deficit'. Wiener and Della Sala, for example, compare demands for effective citizen 
participation with the lack of effective constitutional provisions to facilitate participation 
(Wiener & Della Sala : 1997). Lodge concentrates on the deliberate misinterpretation of 
the 'democratic deficit' by the member states in their reaction to the disappointing 
message conveyed to them by citizens in the wake of opposition to the Maastricht treaty 
(Lodge: 1994). She claims that politicians deliberately misinterpreted a debate, which 
centred on democracy as one, which centred on the transparency of the Commission. 
This strategy had the benefit of side-stepping the real issue, which was how to make the 
EU decision-making mechanism more accountable and how to facilitate greater 
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involvement of citizens in the process of supranational governance, and which, instead, 
shifted responsibility and blame on to the Commission. National politicians used to their 
advantage popular mistrust of the Commission in order to divert public attention away 
from the lack of national accountability in EC governance (Lodge: 1994). 
Most authors appear to agree that there are insufficient opportunities for direct 
democratic participation at the EU level. The problem with this particular avenue of 
legitimacy is that, because of the constitutional set-up of the EU and because of the 
reluctance of member states to concede more authority to it, this deficiency cannot be 
easily rectified. The EU is only a system of governance, not a government. In spite of 
attempts to increase democratic accountability and participation through other routes, in 
the wake of the EU White Paper on Governance (EC: 2001a), increased transparency, 
increased opportunities for'interested stake-holders' to contribute to the decision-making 
process, or to regulate jointly particular policies/decisions, are still in the process of 
development and their success or failure is, as yet, untested. These criticisms of the EU's 
lack of direct democracy are therefore likely to hold good for some time to come. 
On the subject of identity, the equation becomes even more complicated. Identity may be 
said to be dependent on a variety of factors; some authors emphasise the importance of 
common ethnic roots, some a common language or common historical experiences. As 
Beetham and Lord (1998) point out, the EU is peculiarly deficient in these respects, 
having no common language, lacking a common ethnic basis and having, as their 
common historical experience, significant periods of inter-state conflict. However, some 
authors have pointed to the sharing of certain fundamental values such as liberal- 
democratic or Christian values. Identity may also depend on a long-developed emotional 
attachment to the myth of a particular nation or locality; such an attachment may be 
supported and nurtured by geography, climate, culture as well as the trappings of identity 
- national anthems, flags, currency etc. Although it is thought that identities may be 
partly artificially constructed - as in the US - the EU lacks many of the other essential 
components that might help to nurture the idea of a common identity. As Ulrich Haltern 
(Haltern: 2001: 6) comments: 
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In nation states, some legal texts - constitutions - embody ideal historical meaning 
which links the present to the past, to some point of origin, like a revolution and the 
consecutive writing of the constitution. Such texts constitute states as 'imagined 
communities' and continue them over time. They can claim loyalty as their source 
of moral support because they are 'ours'. Union texts are not ours. They are just 
texts, empty shells with no roots. Rather than an embodied set of meanings they 
are seen as a set of ideas without the power to make a claim upon the citizen. They 
do not bear deep social meaning. In the Union, there is nothing to remember, and 
hence nothing to maintain. Union texts do not constitute a collective self; rather 
they constitute a common market. Markets cannot tell us who we are... 
The EU has attempted to construct some notion of common identity based on certain 
superficial symbols; but as Haltern (Haltern: 2001: 4) comments, without the backing of 
the more solid components of identity, such symbols are more likely to alienate than to 
encourage EU citizens. He argues that the Commission fails to understand why 
Europeans feel alienated from the Union: 
The answer is right there, in its face on its own web site. Look up the European 
anthem... the countless Jean Monnet awards, the European Woman of the Year 
awards, The European years of Whathaveyou (cinema, culture, the environment... ) 
look these things up and you will have an instinctive understanding of the citizens' 
complete indifference towards "their" Union. 
It remains to be seen whether the creation of a new EU Constitution will go some way 
towards remedying this sense of alienation. However, although the argument for 
developing a sense of EU identity might be tenuous if based on the traditional tenets, 
Beetham and Lord (1998) argue that it is possible to view a common identity based, not 
upon the past, but on present and future commonalities. According to their argument the 
notion of successful policy outcomes becomes intrinsically linked to the creation of 
identity. They contend that some prospects for a common identity might be built on "the 
construction of a common European citizenship and agreement on a shared political 
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future... " (Beetham and Lord : 1998: 29). They argue that "the guarantee of key rights to 
all European citizens across the European political space, wherever they happen to live 
and work: civil and political rights, basic economic, social and cultural rights, equality of 
respect and opportunity regardless of social or national differences" 
(Beetham and Lord : 1998: 29), would be central to such a conception of citizenship. This 
theory is supported by a number of authors who point to the acquisition of rights as a 
major component of EU citizenship. 
In this respect, identity is strongly related to and dependent on successful outcomes - in 
essence this is what Beetham and Lord (1998) have defined as the third component of 
legitimacy - performance. If direct democracy in the EU is relatively weak, and identity 
is both embryonic and potentially dependent on performance, then it might be argued that 
the EU's legitimacy currently rests disproportionately upon performance - outcomes. 
Horeth (1999: 250-251) is strongly supportive of this line of argument. He claims that the 
current debate on legitimacy concentrates too heavily on input mechanisms and argues 
that the legitimacy of a political system depends on its capacity to achieve the citizens' 
goals and solve their problems. 
The Union, after all, enjoys utilitarian support through the economic welfare, which 
it facilitates. Not all human behaviour can be explained by economic motives, but 
experiences have shown that people can be won over by favourable economic 
conditions... As long as the efficiency and effectiveness of European policy- 
making leads to more noticeable benefits than costs the utilitarian support of large 
parts of the European population, and hence the membership in the Community, is 
unlikely to be questioned. 
These analyses of the legitimacy of the EU appear to be shared by leading EU politicians. 
For example, Romano Prodi (the Commission President) set out the problem of citizen 
perception very succinctly in a speech which might be regarded as rhetoric, but which 
clearly demonstrates his sensitivity to the issue: 
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I am committed to closing the gap between rhetoric and reality in Europe. People 
want a Europe that can deliver the goods. This Commission is committed to 
deliver. (Prodi : 2000a) 
This utilitarian perception of EU citizenship is shared by Everson. Everson, (1995: 90) 
however, points to the dangers inherent in performance-related legitimacy, with special 
reference to the case of the market citizen. She characterises the EU dilemma as a 
community of self-interested market citizens, who owe no allegiance to the Union which 
created them and who may, at some future date, withdraw their support. Everson argues 
that the initial self-interest of a minority group of large business interests formed the basis 
for EU integration at a time when the Commission was having difficulty in obtaining the 
support of the member states for a more positive form of integration. Thus, integration 
was based upon the removal of barriers to trade -a strategy which the Commission fully 
supported. However, Everson claims that the establishment of the supply-side of the 
market was not an indication of the success of the Single Market, but merely an 
indication that the market was open. She argues that the practical realisation of the 
Single Market depended upon "the willingness of large numbers of consumers 
themselves to engage in trade with those cross-border entrepeneurs. The person of the 
consumer thus became integral to Community strategies, and various aspects of the 
internal market citizen's character were accordingly translated into the secondary 
Community legislation designed to shape the newly opened internal market. " 
(Everson : 1995: 87). 
These perceptions fit closely with the preliminary analysis earlier in this chapter. 
The implication of this analysis is that the development of the role of the consumer- 
citizen, in some senses, became the logical response of the Commission to the 
overdeveloped supply-side model of the market. However, the examination of the history 
of EU consumer policy in Chapter Two demonstrates the limitations to these claims. In 
practice, EU consumer policy has been slow to develop and limited in its impact 
constrained by the lack of political support given to this policy area by the member states. 
94 
Burgess, (2001: 109) suggests that the use of issues of popular concerns to citizens, such 
as consumer protection, health, food safety or the environment as legitimising devices, is 
not simply unique to the EU. Burgess claims that EU consumer policy was elevated to a 
higher status in the 1990s as part of an attempt at self-legitimation by institutions seeking 
new ways of securing the confidence of the citizen. 
European Union Citizenship 
Having argued that the citizen consumer comprises a central plank in the EU's quest for 
self-legitimation, it is important to try to set the concept of the citizen consumer within 
the wider context of the development of EU citizenship. There are fundamental 
differences between EU citizenship and national citizenship as the two are built on 
different premises; this has implications both for the legitimacy basis of the EU and for 
the status of the citizen consumer. Citizenship in the modem sense of the term is linked 
with concepts of nationality and statehood. Commenting on the work of T. H. Marshall, 
Bulmer and Rees (Bulmer & Rees : 1996: 31) highlight this point: "Citizenship describes 
the rights and obligations associated with membership in a social unit, and notably with 
nationality. " 
Moreover, citizenship is linked to ideas of inclusion and exclusion - drawing boundaries, 
which may be geographical or ethnic in nature in order to define the scope of these social 
units. For example, citizenship may be based on place of birth or on the nationality of the 
parents. However, this is not how EU citizenship should be understood. The EU is not a 
state; there is no one directly democratically accountable EU government to which 
citizens might be said to owe allegiance. Rather mechanisms exist at EU level for the 
collective governance of the EU, constitutionally endorsed and provided for by the 
member states. One cannot be a citizen of a system of governance; EU citizens are 
therefore citizens of the EU by virtue of the fact that they are already citizens of one of 
the signatory states. There is thus a certain dislocation between the status EU citizen and 
the EU governing mechanisms. As discussed earlier, citizenship in the conventional 
sense often relies on a number of characteristics to which the EU cannot lay claim. It is 
not essential for a nation state to be legitimised and validated by a long gestation period 
(such as the UK); indeed, it is not uncommon for some nation states to come into 
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existence rapidly, as the result of revolution, as did, the United States or Italy. The 
rapidity of the birth of new nation states does not necessarily undermine their legitimacy 
if they are popularly created and popularly endorsed. 
The EU, on the other hand, although it came into existence quite rapidly, was not 
popularly created by the people themselves but created by their political representatives. 
Not only can the EU not lay claim to the tenets of conventional citizenship, outlined 
above, it cannot lay claim to direct popular derivation. EU citizenship, therefore, is based 
primarily on a set of laws, rules, regulations and economic foundations agreed by the 
member states, the majority of which rest on the creation of the Single Market. As the 
EU has based its legitimacy in large part on the conferred legitimacy of the member- 
states, which itself rests on liberal democratic principles, the EU is obliged to operate 
accordingly. Indeed, possession of the basic characteristics of liberal democratic 
government is a key requirement for countries seeking EU membership. As one of the 
foremost characteristics of liberal democracies is that they are based on the rule of law, 
and as EU citizenship rests principally on a set of legal rights, it might be argued that it is 
essential for the EU to provide citizens with rights that are accessible and enforceable 
through law. This line of argument brings us to the role of the citizen consumer within 
the general concept of EU citizenship. If it is accepted that EU citizenship, in the main, is 
based on a set of legally enforceable rights, it then becomes possible to discern different 
categories of citizens' rights: political rights, social rights, economic rights. Wiener and 
Della Salla (1997) coined the term 'fragmented citizenship' to describe this particular 
framework. Because the development of different policy areas in the EU depends on the 
political support of the member-states, the various policy areas have developed unevenly. 
EU citizenship, linked as it is to the development of rights in different policy areas, may 
consequently also be conceptualised as having developed unevenly. 
Formal notions of citizenship embodied in the treaties have only existed since the 
ratification of the Treaty on European Union (1992). It is arguable, however, that the 
concept of citizenship can be traced back as far as the Treaty of Rome in the form of the 
'acquis communautaire' - the accumulated collection of rights that citizens 
have 
developed since the EU's inception. A number of authors have argued that the basis of 
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these rights were the 'market rights' implied in the four fundamental freedoms 
(Everson: 1995, Bartle: 2002 and Downes: 200 1) 
Warleigh, citing Taschner, (2001: 22) argues that the Commission played an important 
role in creating a union citizenship based on 'market rights' by referring cases to the 
European Court of Justice. This view is supported by Marias (1994: 3), who also argues 
that the ECJ played a critical role in this process by ruling, in opposition to the member- 
states, that the Rome Treaty differed from other international laws and that the member 
states could not prevent the EU from directly creating rights for citizens, rather than 
acting through the member states. Marias (1994: 3) comments: "... the Community, stated 
the Court, constituted a new legal order of international law the subjects of which 
comprised not only member states but also their nationals. Community law therefore, 
concluded the Court, was not only imposing obligations on individuals but was also 
intended to confer rights upon them". 
Marias argues that the decision of the ECJ in the Van Gend en Loos V. Nederlandse 
Administratie der Belastingen case (1963) was critical in establishing the concept that 
citizens could freely exercise the economic and social rights conferred upon them by the 
treaty. Marias argues that the pro-activity of the ECJ in this respect during the 1960s and 
mid-1970s contributed considerably to the investment of EU citizens with substantial 
rights. 
However, Warleigh, whilst acknowledging this trend, takes a more circumspect view of 
EU citizenship and notes the lack of political drive to the creation of a formal sense of 
citizenship (for example, through treaty provision) at this stage. He argues that the early 
years of EU integration afforded the citizen no significant role in the integration process, 
because the view taken by the majority of policy actors was that the success of the 
integration process would rest on its efficiency and on the appreciation by citizens of the 
beneficial impact of the union. During the 1960s and 1970s, policy actors saw the 
process of elite mobilisation and the support of interest groups as more important than 
direct popular endorsement. 
Nonetheless, both Warleigh and Marias argue that the 1980s brought a change in strategy 
with regard to citizenship on the part of the Commission and leading actors in the 
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member states. He contends that, following the economic slow-down of the early 1980s, 
successful regeneration of the member states' economies depended on the creation of the 
Single Market. Both national and EU politicians began to view individuals as important 
to the realisation of the single market in terms of transferable labour. Greater labour 
mobility required that migrants should be able to access welfare provisions in their host 
state. The deepening of citizenship rights through the provision of social and labour 
rights thus enabled the member-states to create a connection between the citizenry and 
the union without having to restructure the union along federal lines. As Marias 
(1994: 4) concludes: 
It was in the framework of this political system, the creation of which was sealed 
by the Maastricht Treaty that the citizens of the union were called upon to play an 
important role, that is the role of the legitimation basis of the system. Granted with 
citizenship of the Union, they were asked to support the Union decisively in order 
to enlarge their own material basis through the market. 
This statement sets out unambiguously the implicit bargain between the citizen and the 
Union. On the one hand, the continuing benefits of the Single Market for citizens were 
viewed as dependent on their support for EU integration. On the other hand, however, 
the reciprocal can also be argued: support for the political legitimacy of the Union 
depended on the delivery of tangible economic benefits arising from the development of 
the Single Market. 
Marias, like Warleigh, argues that in the late 1980s the economic and social dynamic of 
the Union spilled over into the political arena. Citizens' legitimation of the Union was 
intended to be sealed by granting citizens certain core political rights not based on 
economic relationships which were formalised in the European Union Treaty in 1992. 
Article 8 of the TEU formalised, for the first time, the concept of Union citizenship. It 
confirmed the idea that citizens are entitled to benefit directly from the rights conferred 
on them by EU treaties. The article re-asserts citizens' rights to move and reside freely 
within the EU. The majority of the article, however, is devoted to the creation of political 
and diplomatic rights for EU citizens. For example, it extends limited political 
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participation to EU migrants by allowing citizens in host states to vote and to stand as 
candidates in municipal and European Parliamentary elections. It also provides for EU 
citizens in third countries, in the absence of representation from their own state, to 
receive diplomatic protection from representatives of any other member-state 
Although this extension of the political rights of EU citizens seemed, in some way, 
designed to seal a contract of legitimacy between the citizen and the EU's institutions, 
endorsing the process of integration, it is difficult to imagine why it should be expected to 
have such an effect in practice. For the great majority of EU citizens, these rights must 
remain largely tangential, theoretical and symbolic. Rey Koslowski (1994: 369) explains 
why the Commission felt the need to extend democratic rights to EU migrants in the 
years shortly preceding the Maastricht treaty (1992). Koslowski, quoting statistics 
obtained from Eurostat maintains there were 4.9 million EU nationals living in other EU 
member states in 1993. He cites this as the main reason prompting the Commission to 
push for the inclusion of political rights in the Maastricht Treaty and quotes from a 
Commission document which states (Koslowski : 1994: 369) 
At present over four million Community citizens are deprived of the right to vote in 
local elections simply because they are no longer in their member state of 
nationality. In a Community of member-states whose basic common characteristic 
is that they are all democracies, implementation of one of the four fundamental 
freedoms provided by the Treaty has, by virtue of national legislation, led indirectly 
to the loss of certain political rights. This paradox in the building of Europe cannot 
be allowed to continue if the principles underlying the democratic political systems 
of the Member States are to be respected. 
Although 4.9 million citizens is undeniably significant, compared to the total population 
of the EU, it is minute in its proportions. On January 1st 1993, the total population of the 
EU reached 368 million 935 thousand 291 ("Total Population on 1 January -Annual" 
Eurostat (14/5/2003) http: //europa. eu. int/comm/europstat). In percentage terms, rounded 
up to the nearest million (i. e. 369 million), this works out at just over 1% (1.3279133%). 
Furthermore, the number of people choosing to avail themselves of the right to vote is 
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likely to fall well below that of 4.9 million, given that neither local nor European 
elections are popular events and given the trend towards voter abstention generally. 
The Notion of 'Market-Citizen' 
From the above overview it is possible to discern two trends in the creation of the EU 
citizen. The first relates to the period up to the mid-1980s. During this period, 
citizenship was developed through the case-law of the ECJ, ruling on the basis of the four 
freedoms, as discussed above. This concept of citizenship, which some authors have 
called'market citizenship' (Everson: 1995, Marias: 1994: Bartle: 2002) was based on the 
development of rights which were themselves derived from the market logic of the Rome 
Treaty. The citizen's support for EU integration was at this stage taken for granted; the 
EU's legitimacy was not questioned, consequently the need for citizen support as a basis 
for legitimising the EU was not considered important. Therefore there was no politically 
driven incentive to promote a sense of citizen identification with the EU. The second 
trend, illustrated above, stems from a greater self-conscious effort on the part of 
policymakers to use citizen support as a basis for legitimising EU integration. 
It is argued here that, whilst the notion of the citizen-consumer might be thought of as 
having its roots in the market emphases of the first phase, it was in fact the second trend 
that helped to promote this particular area of citizen's rights. However, to engage in such 
a discussion is to accept without question the notion that citizenship may extend beyond 
the concept of political rights, incorporating economic or market rights. This is not an 
assumption that should be taken for granted; the validity of this position is examined in a 
later section. 
Citizenship Based on ECJ Case-law 
The first trend in this process maybe detected in a sequence of ECJ judgements between 
1984 and 2001. However, as a precursor to a discussion of the early impact of the ECJ in 
developing citizens' market rights, one should first pose the fundamental question - what 
connection is there between the Common Market and the notion of citizenship? In 
answer to the above question, it may be useful to consider briefly the role of markets as 
an abstract notion. 
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Effective markets depend on a number of pre-existing conditions, which often reflect 
taken-for-granted assumptions about the larger political context. Without the institution 
and definition of certain social mores in legal terms - the right to own and exchange 
property, for example - the whole basis of market operations would be undermined. 
Rudimentary commercial frameworks may come into existence simply by virtue of 
common consent, between buyers and sellers, regarding the establishment of conventions 
governing their transactions. However, in complex societies, the authority and support of 
an overarching political entity, such as a city or a state, have become essential elements 
in the smooth working of free markets. In principle, market actors do not need to be 
citizens in order to undertake their roles - visitors or tourists may be market actors, but 
not citizens. However, the complexity of modern societies has led, in practice, to the 
creation of social, economic and legal frameworks in which the status of the market actor 
becomes important. The concept of the 'market citizen' is therefore also important 
because the increasing complexity of the economic context makes it necessary to define 
more clearly the status and rights of market actors. 
The Treaty of Rome sets out four fundamental freedoms: the free movement of persons, 
capital, services and the right of establishment, which a number of academics have 
interpreted as forming the basis of an early and limited concept of community citizenship, 
which they call 'market citizenship'. However, on inspection it seems desirable to qualify 
this term. First, the four freedoms were not simply accessible to individual citizens, but 
some, at least, are also available to market actors in general, (for example, corporate legal 
entities) which do not rank as citizens in the normal sense. Second, the notion of 
citizens' rights implies a certain degree of exclusivity. Whilst it would be true to say that 
the original six enjoyed the benefits of these added exclusive rights within a 
geographically and legally defined area, over time the EU's external barriers have 
weakened with, for example, the general lowering of barriers to international capital 
movements. 
Some writers have indicated that some EU rights do not fit exactly with common notions 
of citizen's rights. Downes suggests that, in origin, these might best be termed'rights 
akin to citizenship' (Downes: 2001). However, these rights, originating in the four 
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freedoms to engage in market activity, have, over time, become generalised, partly as a 
result of ECJ judgements (Downes quotes the cases of Luisi and Carbone v. Ministero del 
Tesero (1984) and Cowan v. Le Tresor Public (1989)). 
These two cases established two separate, but related principles, significantly 
generalising the notion of market citizen. In the first, the principle was established that 
consumers should have freedom of movement to search the market for desired goods and 
services, rather than to limit this freedom to the activities of producers in search of 
customers. This had the important effect of eroding the producer-orientation of the 
founding treaties. 
In the second, a further closely related principle was established. This case concerned 
Cowan, a British tourist, staying with relatives in Paris, who claimed redress from the 
French criminal injuries compensation scheme after having been attacked near a Metro 
station. His claim was refused on the grounds that he was neither a French national nor a 
resident, so he challenged the decision at the ECJ under Article 12 EC. The significant 
feature of this judgement is that Cowan was deemed to be engaging in economic activity 
merely by travelling to a neighbouring EU state. This, in effect confers a general right of 
citizenship with regard to freedom of movement, since any cross-border travel must 
imply a minimal level of consumption in the host-state. 
From 'Market Citizen 'to 'Consumer Citizen' 
The second trend, identified above, explores the political dynamic underpinning the 
explicit recognition of the need for the EU to connect with the citizen and to concentrate 
on policy areas which affect the citizen in demand-side as well as supply-side roles. 
Since early notions of community citizenship derived their legitimacy largely from the 
predominantly economic goals of the Common Market, it is hardly surprising that the 
emerging nature of EU citizenship has been shaped in different periods by the prevailing 
economic pressures of the time. For example, Weiner and Della Sala (1997) report that, 
since the 1970s politicians have been seeking to encourage popular support for European 
integration. These authors have briefly charted the development of an EU citizenship 
discourse since the 1970s. They remark, for example, that during the 1980s Commission 
politicians tended to link citizenship themes to the movement of workers across borders 
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in an attempt to promote flexibility in the labour market. This response might be viewed 
as reflecting the concerns of politicians during a period of politically engineered 
economic liberalism throughout much of Western Europe. The emphasis on creating 
identity through the establishment of reciprocal administrative arrangements, aimed at 
facilitating the movement of workers across borders, might be viewed as being in line 
with a supply-side response to widespread unemployment. In this economic climate, the 
rights of citizens as consumers were largely neglected. Thus, in the late 1970s and 1980s 
emphasis was placed on freedom of movement of workers. 
In the later 1980s and 1990s, more emphasis was placed on citizens' concerns with regard 
to consumer, social, health and environmental rights. The explanation for the rise in 
importance of these policy areas is various and differs across policy areas, although the 
desire to connect with the citizen appears to be one of the key motivations. Bomberg, 
Peterson and McCormick, for example, relate the growth in emphasis on environmental 
policy to a heightened awareness amongst both politicians and the public of the increased 
salience of environmental issues (McCormick : 1999, Peterson & Bomberg: 1999). 
Nevertheless, it is significant that Peterson and Bomberg specifically relate the growth of 
environmental regulation to the need to create a 'level playing' field in the single market 
by eliminating trade distortions between the member states (Peterson & Bomberg: 1999). 
Thus, in the case of environmental policy, politicians could claim to be responding both 
to public and international environmental concerns, whilst addressing the economic 
priorities of the Single Market. 
Similarly, in the field of social policy, whilst the 1980s saw a revival of this policy area 
relative to the economic imperatives of the Single Market, the 1990s have witnessed 
social policy moving beyond the narrow economic logic of the internal market 
(Borchardt: 1995: 64-65). Whereas social policy in the 1980s was primarily linked with 
the Community's objective to use the Single Market to boost the EC's economy and 
tackle unemployment, in the 1990s social policy had become part of the Community's 
response to citizens' perceptions of the Single Market as a predominantly producer- 
oriented phenomenon. Thus, the Commission began to promote social policies that go 
beyond the economic imperatives of the Single Market. For example, their policy on 
promoting gender equality also includes commitments to combating violence against 
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women and their policy against ethnic discrimination is of a generalist nature, and is not 
simply oriented towards discrimination in the work-place (EC: 2000: 20-21). In a similar 
way, the growing profile of consumer policy during the late 1980s, throughout the 1990s 
and into the 21st century shows a similar pattern. The rhetoric issuing from Community 
policy documents demonstrates an apparent anxiety to connect with the citizen and 
recognition of the importance of citizens' support, as consumers, for the ultimate success 
of the Single Market. The changing attitude of the politicians towards consumer policy 
and its altered status is noted, for example, in the Commission's first three-year action 
plan on consumer policy (EC: 1990), which overtly links the importance of consumer 
policy to the creation of the internal market. The Commission document states: 
In 1985 a programme was launched to give a new impetus to consumer policy. 
This coincided with the publication of the white paper on the internal market and 
increased consciousness of the importance of addressing consumer concerns in the 
concentrated preparations of the Internal Market. Many of the measures, which, the 
Community has taken in recent years have addressed consumer interests. However, 
with the imminence of 1992, pressure has been applied by the Council of Ministers 
of November 9th, 1989, for a further effort to intensify activity addressed to the 
consumer. (EC: 1990: 2): 
As Chapter Two demonstrated, the Consumers in Europe Group support this view and 
have linked the inclusion of a separate title for consumer policy in the Maastricht Treaty 
to attempts by the Commission to soften the supply-side image of the Single Market 
(CEG: 1999b: 5). 
The argument that the new impetus to bolster consumer policy was politically driven by 
both the Commission and the member states' politicians is also supported by evidence 
concerning the timing of consumer legislation and regulation. An examination of the 
amount of legislation and documentation produced in the field of consumers' economic 
rights from 1970 to the present day clearly demonstrates the additional attention given 
over to this policy area in the light of the completion of the internal market. For example, 
it is significant that before 1980, only one official document relating to consumers' 
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economic rights was produced -a Council Resolution was passed in June 1979 regarding 
the indication of the prices of foodstuffs and non-household products. During the period, 
1984-1990, eight pieces were published, four Council directives, two Commission 
recommendations, one Council resolution and one Council recommendation. During the 
period 1990-2000, fifteen documents were produced; two Council regulations, two 
Council directives and four Parliament and Council directives, three Commission 
regulations, one Council framework decision, one Council resolution, and two 
Commission recommendations. From 2000 onwards (i. e. only three years at the most), 
seven documents have been produced, three directives, one council framework decision, 
one Council resolution, one Commission decision, and one Commission regulation. This 
clearly demonstrates a steady increase of legislation and official documentation 
pertaining to consumer policy. 
The specific contexts that favoured the rise in importance of these policy areas were 
accompanied by a general climate of malaise on the part of citizens towards the EU. 
Lodge, for instance, notes that with regard to the ratification of the Maastrict Treaty, the 
notion of citizenship and issues concerned with legitimacy and transparency in the EU 
became focal points for politicians in the wake of evidence of public dissatisfaction with 
European integration and with the EU institutions. Public opposition to the ratification of 
the Maastricht Treaty in Denmark and France exposed a more serious level of euro- 
scepticism than politicians had previously anticipated. As Lodge explains: 
During the ratification of the Maastricht Treaty on European Union (TEU), it 
became clear that not only were people mystified by some of its terminology (such 
as the concept of subsidiarity) but that they were becoming increasingly alienated 
from the idea of the European Community. (Lodge: 1994: 343) 
Apart from the food-related scandals of the period (Burgess: 2001: 98), public 
dissatisfaction was further fuelled in the mid-1990s by revelations regarding the 
Commission's mismanagement of its own internal affairs, which resulted in the 
resignation of the Santer Commission. Renee Cordee (2000: 13) makes this point quite 
clearly when she explains: 
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Until fairly recently, EU leaders regarded consumer protection more like a lover 
than a spouse, good for the occasional passionate encounter but without meaningful 
commitment. The Union devoted only limited resources to consumer policy as 
recently as a decade ago... Several food scares and a new Commission later, 
policymakers have realised that it would be political suicide to ignore the Union's 
largest, most powerful vocal population. After all, each of the EU's 375 million 
citizens is either a current or future consumer. 
The political reaction to the bad publicity generated by the food scandals and by the 
failures of the Santer Commission was rapid and decisive. In response to the food crises, 
there was a well-publicised internal reorganisation of policy competencies in the 
Commission. This led to the separation of competencies for aspects of food control from 
the more commercially orientated DGs and the re-housing of animal, plant and public 
health controls within the consumer policy directorate. Moreover, the Commission's 
capacity for scientific analysis and veterinary controls was significantly expanded in 
response to consumers' concerns (Cordee (2000: 13). 
In response to the crisis provoked by the Santer Commission, the new Commission 
president, Romano Prodi (in office from 1999), paid significant attention to wooing back 
EU citizens. This strategy is evidenced in his speeches (Prodi: 2000a), for example, in a 
speech to the European Parliament in February 2000 he claimed: 
Honourable members, action speaks louder than words. Effective action by 
European institutions is the greatest source of their legitimacy. The greatest threat 
to popular support for Europe is to continue multiplying unfulfilled promises. It is 
not Euroscepticism we should be worrying about: it is public apathy, based on the 
perception that we talk too much and do too little. (Prodi, R: 2000a) 
It is also evident in his commitment to improving EU governance (although, obviously, 
this was partly intended as a response to the prospect of enlargement). Commission and 
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national politicians have further been unnerved by the general level of political apathy of 
EU citizens; by increased abstentions in general elections and poor turn-out in EP 
elections, and by the rise of right-wing extremist parties in certain EU countries (notably 
Italy, Austria, France, Belgium and Holland). This is evident in the introduction to the 
White Paper (EC : 2001a: 3) on European Governance, which recognises that, on the one 
hand, Europeans want their political leaders to find solutions to the major problems of 
contemporary societies, but are increasingly distrustful and distant from European 
politics and institutions. It concludes: 
The problem is acknowledged by national parliaments and governments alike. It is 
particularly acute at the level of the European Union. Many people are losing 
confidence in a poorly understood and complex system to deliver the policies they 
want. The Union is often seen as remote and at the same time too intrusive. The 
Irish 'no' highlights the impact problems on many people. This was reflected not 
only in the final outcome of the referendum, but also in the low turn-out and the 
quality of the debate which preceded it. 
However, in terms of the overall history of the EU, politicians have been slow to respond 
to citizens' concerns. This is clear from the amount of time that it has taken for policy 
areas such as environmental, and consumer policies to become established; even when 
policy actors did belatedly respond, there is evidence of a degree of reluctance and 
cynicism in their actions. In some instances, they have tended deliberately to 
misinterpret the causes of public dissatisfaction, responding inappropriately to public 
concerns, as Lodge reports with regard to citizens' concerns over the democratic deficit in 
the wake of the Maastricht ratification (Lodge: 1994). Other ways in which politicians 
have attempted to avoid effectively addressing citizens' concerns are by arming them 
with rights that are either peripheral to the majority (as in the case of political rights 
afforded by the Maastricht Treaty), difficult to enforce (for example cross-border 
consumer rights), or which have an ulterior motive (as in many social, environmental and 
some consumer rights) - that of serving the producer interests of the internal market. 
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Member states appear to have pursued this strategy because they have been unwilling to 
make concessions that would affect their level of control. 
Evidence and Analysis of Official Documents and Reports of Interested Parties 
Having established the context for the argument that the Commission has used the 
rhetoric of the citizen-consumer as a legitimating device, one aimed at redressing citizen 
perceptions of the Single Market as unbalanced in favour of producers, the purpose of 
this section is to examine the accuracy of the above analysis with reference to material 
drawn from Commission documents. In other words, what evidence is there in the 
official documentation that the Commission tried to bolster consumer policy, using the 
rhetoric of the citizen-consumer, in order to legitimise the single market in the eyes of the 
consumer? Indeed, this analysis is supported by other academics writing on the subject. 
Burgess (2001: 108), for example, notes: 
In retrospect, the EU... is unashamed of locating its discovery of consumer concerns 
in the need to sell the internal market as something more than a business 
proposition. Charting the emergence of consumer policy, a recent Community 
publication explains that: "... it became gradually accepted that there was a need to 
recognise and enhance the rights of consumers. In order to avoid the perception 
that the concept of European integration existed exclusively for the benefit of 
industry, EU consumer protection initiatives evolved as a corollary to the internal 
market programme which culminated in 1992. (EC, 1998: 9) 
In tracing the emergence of the rhetoric on the citizen-consumer, one surprising result to 
emerge is that, although the notion of the citizen as consumer is used variously 
throughout the Commission's documentation on consumer policy, the actual term 'citizen 
consumer' only appears once - in the Commission's Second Action Plan for Consumer 
Policy 1993-95 (EC: 1993c), discussed in Chapter Two. This second plan shows a 
marked change of emphasis vis-a-vis consumer confidence, compared with the first. The 
first referred only to the need to "reassure [consumers] that their interests are properly 
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represented" and emphasised "considerations of physical and economic safety" (EC: 
1990: 2). The second took a much more instrumental view and conceded: 
All in all, it is essential that the advent and deepening of the larger European 
market make itself felt in consumers' everyday life in the shape of tangible benefits. 
It is only thus that the internal market will win their confidence and finally succeed. 
(EC: 1993c: 5) 
In 1993, the Commission issued a Green Paper (EC: 1993a: 7) "Access of Consumers to 
Justice and the Settlement of Consumer Disputes in the Single Market" in which it 
explicitly makes the connection, not only between the promotion of consumer protection 
policy and the credibility of the Union in the eyes of the citizen, but critically links in to 
this equation the enforcement of consumer rights and consumer redress: 
There are two reasons for opening the debate with a Green Paper devoted to 
"consumer access to justice". These can be summarised as follows: 
Firstly, the credibility of European construction in the public eye. Consumer 
protection is a domain of Community law that affects all European citizens in their 
everyday life, and which thus brings European construction "closer" to them - the 
gap between law and reality, summarised under the rubric "access to justice would 
hence correspond to the disparity between the overarching principles of a "People's 
Europe" and the everyday experience of the European citizen... 
The Action Plan for 1996-8 showed another interesting shift of emphasis. Whereas the 
Second Action Plan spoke of the success of the internal market in terms of consumer 
confidence, its successor explicitly recognised the possibility of manipulating consumer 
confidence to promote wider popular support for the EU in general. Referring to 
consumer information, the plan comments: "The benefit which will accrue will not just 
have a market effect but also public attitudes to the European Community in general will 
be greatly improved as realisation of the relevance of its work to citizens' well-being 
sinks in. " (EC: 1995a) 
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Action Plans for other policy areas reflected a degree of consistency in the application of 
the strategy of bolstering citizen support through the delivery of tangible outcomes. For 
instance, the Single Market Action Plan of June 1997 states: 
The Single Market stands or falls on confidence: confidence that all the key rules 
are in place; that they are fully and fairly applied; that problems will be addressed 
quickly; that the ground-rules for fair competition are fully respected; confidence 
for consumers in the reliability of goods and services and of information; 
confidence for smaller companies, the employment generators, that the market can 
work for them; confidence that each and every government is committed to making 
it work. Doing business, moving, living, working in the Union "without internal 
frontiers" should become as easy as within any member state. (CSE : 1997: 1) 
The Consumer Policy Action Plan for 1999-2001 saw consumer policy as 'coming of 
age', along with other policy areas directly affecting the lives of ordinary citizens. 
Evidence of awareness of the implications for the wider political context, to be found in 
the previous plan, was reinforced and broadened by the recognition that "political 
currents driving the growth of consumer policy are part of a wider political trend for 
policies that deliver effective solutions to the problems faced by the general public. " 
(EC: 1998b: 1) 
Moreover, for the first time the planners admitted the need to establish an appropriate 
regulatory framework to foster consumer confidence, though this proposed measure was 
limited to the monitoring of electronic commerce. However, the plan revealed evidence 
of a hidden agenda harking back to earlier producer-oriented policy formulations. The 
planners remarked: 
Consumer confidence is essential for successful businesses. Policy measures to 
reinforce consumer confidence are, therefore, essential to economic prosperity and 
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any additional costs for business are generally outweighed by the overall benefits 
for them of improved consumer confidence in the market. (EC: 1998b: 4) 
Thus, in the midst of a plan to enhance consumer confidence in the Single Market in 
particular and the EU in general, there is evidence of a return to the once-dominant 
tendency to view developments largely through a 'supply-side lens'. 
However in spite of repeated commitments on the part of the Commission in favour of 
bolstering consumer rights, it seems that, in general, EU citizens have proved less open to 
manipulation than the politicians hoped; the latest Action Plan still characterises EU 
citizens as "increasingly alienated from the EU and its processes and institutions". 
(EC: 2002e: 10) 
It draws the same inferences as earlier plans and argues that "future EU consumer 
protection policy should both produce concrete benefits for citizens in their daily life, but 
goes on to recognise explicitly the need to engage consumers in the development and 
implementation of that policy". This approach seems to reflect the general strategy of 
improving EU governance, set out in the White Paper (EC: 200I a). 
The introduction of the single currency represented a unique opportunity to win enhanced 
citizen approval for the EU, as a result of the tangible benefits expected to accrue. The 
Commission recognised that this departure represented a critical moment in the 
development of the single market; one which required more than the simple adoption of a 
common currency. Evidence of awareness of citizen dissatisfaction is obvious in the 
conscious reference to the risks of a collapse in citizen satisfaction set out in the 2001 
Green Paper on Consumer Protection which noted: 
The circulation of the Euro notes and coins beginning in January 2002 gives a huge 
opportunity to develop the consumer single market. If it is not taken, citizens will 
be left with the impression that the EU's core project - the internal market - is an 
irrelevance to their daily lives and simply a project designed to serve the interests 
of business. " (EC: 2001b: 3) 
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Once again, there is evidence of an overt recognition of the connection between the 
economic benefits actually accruing to citizens as consumers via the working of the 
Single Market and their willingness to continue to support the EU and its institutions in 
general. Indeed the above extract suggests a growing anxiety of EU Commission 
officials that failure to deliver the promise of economic pay-offs for consumers could 
lead citizens to perceive the Single Market as terminally unbalanced in favour of business 
and thus prompt a critical erosion of support for the whole EU project. 
It maybe that the Commission's use of the rhetoric of the 'citizen-consumer' is not aimed 
directly at the citizen (one has to ask the question, how many average citizens actually 
read Commission documents addressing consumer rights issues? ) but at member states' 
politicians. The rhetoric of the 'citizen consumer' may have been intended to prompt 
national politicians into supporting Commission objectives with regard to consumer 
policy. As Chapter Three explained, the support of the member states in achieving 
Commission objectives is critical, as the Commission needs member states to approve its 
policy propositions and relies upon their close co-operation to put policy decisions into 
effect at ground level. The member-states are the key mediators between the EU and its 
citizens. The language of the 'citizen' has tended to be presented by the Commission as a 
non-specific imperative, one which is paraded as a conspicuous justification to national 
politicians of their undeniable obligation 'to put the citizen first'. 
Conclusions 
The explicit appearance of the concept of 'the citizen-consumer' in the development of the 
model of EU citizenship was relatively late. It is only recently that this aspect of the 
citizen role has been emphasised in academic or political discourse. Before the late 
1990s, it is noticeable that the notion of the citizen-consumer appears to have been 
largely absent from the common discourse on citizenship at the EU level (ESC : 1996). 
Its inclusion in academic literature also appears to have been very limited, although Reich 
has taken up this theme (Reich: 1998). The relative absence of a discourse on the 
'citizen-consumer' seems all the more curious given the centrality of the Single Market 
project to European integration. Of all the transnational activities that European citizens 
112 
engage in, it might be thought that making purchases, in one form or another, would be 
the activity in which they are most frequently involved. 
An essential element of a constitutional democracy is that citizens should be able to 
exercise and enforce their rights. Enforcing their rights implies more than access to 
redress mechanisms. It also implies that the systems created by the framework of law 
should work to deliver the protection they promise. Reich makes this point when he 
comments: "there is no doubt that the European Union/Community as it stands has, 
despite its contradictions and limitations, developed an impressive set of consumer and 
citizens' rights in a broad sense. Enforcement, however, is still weak... " (Reich: 1998: 
467). 
It appears that the rhetoric has, however, amounted to more than 'hot air'. The rhetoric on 
the citizen consumer has been translated in some areas into formal policy commitments 
and EU legislation. This is clearly evinced in a number of principal documents. For 
example, in a Resolution of 28th June 1999, the Council entered into a commitment to 
promote consumer policy in the EU in the following terms: "... the consumer policy of 
the Community should support and supplement the policy pursued by the Member States 
and Member States may adopt or maintain in force more stringent provisions - which 
must be compatible with the Treaty - to ensure a higher level of consumer protection; " 
(Council: 1999: 1) 
Rather more significantly, the same Resolution formally called upon the Commission to: 
... continue its active policy aiming at the maintenance of market transparency and 
market balance in the interests of the consumer, in particular in the area of the 
information society, electronic commerce, distance selling, financial services and 
the opening to competition of public utilities; continue as part of this policy to work 
on the protection of the legal interests of consumers including in particular their 
easy access to redress procedures... (Council: 1999: 2) 
This Resolution is very significant in that it represents an overt admission by politicians 
of the member-states that, hitherto, the Single Market has been so unbalanced against the 
interests of consumers that a major policy drive is essential to redress the balance. It is 
113 
also significant in that, although specific commitments are made to tackling this 
imbalance, initially in specific areas - information society, e-commerce, distance selling, 
financial services and public utilities - the commitments to transparency and market 
balance are general and may be expected, in principle, to apply right across the market. 
This policy has been carried forward by Directives aimed at the areas listed above. 
A month before this Resolution was adopted, the EU had already published a new 
Directive on guarantees and redress in the case of defective goods which embodied a 
clear commitment to promote cross-border sales. This was followed a year later by a 
Directive on electronic commerce and again, in September 2002, by a Directive on the 
distance marketing of consumer financial services. 
Nonetheless, the use of rhetoric, policy commitments and even the publication of 
Directives does not necessarily mean that the intentions contained therein are translated 
effectively at ground-level. Successful performance relies upon another, less easily 
traceable strand of political will - implementation and enforcement. The ensuing 
chapters will attempt to relate the rhetoric of the Commission and Council's commitments 
towards citizen consumers with the reality that they experience at ground level, through 
the examination of selected Commission initiatives and through two case-studies of 
consumer experiences in specific market sectors. 
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CHAPTER 5 
REVIEW OF SELECTED EU INITIATIVES ON CONSUMER POLICY 
Introduction 
The previous chapter examined the concept of the citizen-consumer and explored how the 
Commission had invented the rhetoric of the citizen-consumer in an attempt to strengthen 
the legitimacy of the Single Market in the eyes of the consumer. It was argued that an 
essential component of improving legitimacy was by ensuring that consumers could 
access the rights granted by the Commission through adequate enforcement and redress 
mechanisms. The Commission's desire to address matters of concern to citizens as 
consumers is both a response to perceptions of consumer dissatisfaction or inertia and 
also to the results of studies undertaken on the part of the Commission of the 
inadequacies of cross-border consumer redress systems. These will be considered in 
greater detail below. 
The Commission has adopted a multi-layered approach in its attempt to improve the 
functioning of the Single Market for its consumers. The scope of the Commission's 
supervisory capacity is limited by the EU treaties, as are its powers actively to enforce 
EU laws on the ground. As explained in Chapter Three, the nature of EU regulation 
involves a power-sharing arrangement in which competencies and responsibilities for 
different parts of the regulatory process are divided between the different levels of EU 
governance. The majority of enforcement and monitoring powers are consequently 
devolved back down to the level of the member states themselves. Thus, in addition to 
EU regulations and existing national legal provisions, EU directives, once incorporated 
into the national legal systems, become applicable in the national courts as national law. 
The EU has adopted this approach because of the diversity of the states' different legal 
traditions and because of the complications that would arise from attempting to develop 
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EU legislation that automatically fits fifteen (or more) legal systems. However, the effect 
of this approach has been largely to cut the Commission out of the supervisory and 
feedback loop as to what is happening at ground level. The approaches adopted by the 
Commission to bolster enforcement and monitoring, have therefore been a mix of 
legislative and non-legislative measures and it is possible broadly to categorise the 
Commission's approaches into two main types: first, dispute resolution/information based 
measures and second, legislative measures designed specifically to cover cases relating to 
cross-border consumer problems. 
The present chapter is designed to respond specifically to the research foci in Chapter 
One, in exploring how the Commission, limited in its abilities to monitor implementation 
and enforcement at ground level, has attempted to compensate for the constraints under 
which it is obliged to operate. The chapter also aims to describe and examine the 
functioning of these strategies in order to make some assessment as to the success of 
these measures. 
The chapter falls into two broad sections. The first section offers an analysis of the 
rationale behind the Commission's increased focus on policies to facilitate cross-border 
enforcement and redress of consumer problems; the second section concentrates on the 
initiatives that formed the main back-bone of the Consumer Protection and Health 
Directorate's approach (DG SANCO). The initiatives to be examined in the second 
section comprise the following: European Consumer Centres (gradually developed since 
the early 1990s), the European Extra Judicial Network (2000), and the European 
Consumer Complaints Form (1999); these three initiatives may be broadly categorised as 
dispute resolution/information measures. In addition to these, are a number of legislative 
measures including the Directive on Injunctions for the Protection of Consumer Interests 
(1998); the Sale of Goods and Associated Guarantees Directive (1999); the proposal for a 
directive on Unfair Commercial Practices (2003); and the proposed regulation on 
consumer protection co-operation (2003). These have been chosen because they are 
directly designed to improve the enforcement and access to redress of consumers' 
economic rights across borders. 
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Rationale for Action 
Problems Faced by Consumers in Cross-Border Claims 
An appropriate starting point for this chapter is to establish and examine the main 
problems that continue to face EU consumers in fully accessing the Single Market, as 
perceived and addressed by the Commission. In essence, consumers face two major 
obstacles. First, consumers suffer from inadequate redress mechanisms in cross-border 
cases, which places them at a serious disadvantage in accessing the single market, as the 
authors of a report written for the Commission suggest: 
The results of the ... study on the Cost of Judicial 
Barriers for Consumers in the 
Single Market could be summarised as a non-existent single legal market for 
consumers... A rational actor would not pursue a cross-border consumer claim 
within Europe in court. (Feldtmann, Von Freyhold & Vial : 1998: 1) 
The authors attribute the inaccessibility of judicial redress for both end-consumers and, 
small to medium enterprises (SMEs) to the costs and to the time that cross-border cases 
take to resolve. They observe that the cross-border judicial redress mechanisms are 
particularly ill-suited to the types of low-cost transactions that end-consumers and SMEs 
tend to engage in (Feldtmann, Von Freyhold. & Vial : 1998: 279). The second problem 
that faces consumers across borders is that of the limitations to the jurisdiction of national 
legal systems and legal bodies. The two sets of problems are examined in some detail 
below. 
Consumer organisations by and large are not prepared to help in international cases and 
except for a few regional institutions created for consumers to support them in cross- 
border cases, consumers have to rely on the existing legal structures of the member states 
to pursue claims (Gessner: 1998, Weatherill: 1999). This may be due to the fact that 
consumers lack the resources to undertake such tasks, or because they do not have the 
legal basis to act in this kind of capacity. Weatherill (1999: 719) comments: " Cross 
border consumers are likely to be deterred by an unfamiliar legal system; representative 
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agencies in the state where loss is suffered typically lack capacity to take legal action 
because they are not the national bodies of the offending country; agencies in the state 
whence the practice originated typically lack an interest in pursuing the matter since 
'their' consumers are unaffected". These obstacles present increasingly significant threats 
to consumer confidence in the viability of the integrated market. Consumers pursuing 
cross-border claims usually have no prior experience of such an undertaking and are 
faced with unfamiliar legal and court proceedings. The Commission 1993 Green Paper 
on Consumers Access to Justice (1993a: 59) concurs with the above analysis and notes the 
further complications posed by the submission of documents which must cross borders; 
for instance, problems posed by the translation of documents and the enforcement of 
judgements. 
Even if consumers were to attempt to enlist the aid of a lawyer in order to pursue a cross- 
border consumer court-case, they would still encounter significant barriers. Most lawyers 
refuse to take on international cases and those that do deal with business disputes, 
because they are more lucrative. Few lawyers have experience of cross-border consumer 
claims either because they refuse to deal with them or because few consumers have 
brought such cases before lawyers (Gessner: 1998). Moreover, lawyers' fees are too 
expensive for the majority of consumers to justify pursuing a cross-border court case. 
The costs of pursuing a legal claim for 2,000 Ecu vary across the states. Consumers can 
pay anything from 980-6,600 Ecu (Gessner: 1998). Given that even a successful 
plaintiff would have to pay a portion of the costs, the cost of litigation generally 
outweighs the benefits that might accrue from a successful court-case. 
The time factor presents another element to the problem posed by cross-border consumer 
litigation. Gessner (1998: 335) estimates that: "Whereas some member states offer 
proceedings which take a year or less, the courts with jurisdiction over small claims in 
Ireland and in Italy, in particular, need several years to resolve a dispute. The average 
duration of a cross-border civil suit in Europe is almost two years at the defendant's 
residence and six months at the plaintiffs residence. " 
Although the creation of the Rome (1980) and Brussels (1968) Legal Conventions were 
intended to iron out problems posed by differing legal traditions and jurisdictions, their 
impact for consumers has been patchy and limited. The Rome Convention deals with the 
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area of conflict of laws and is an instrument of international law. It helps to make 
decisions regarding the correct applicable law in cases of conflict of laws. However, 
there are exceptions and the Convention does not cover all situations; for example, 
certain areas of conflict in contractual relations such as consumer credit are not covered. 
The Brussels Convention deals with issues arising from the jurisdiction and execution of 
judgements in civil and commercial matters. According to the European Consumer Law 
Group (ECLG: 1998: 316): 
It [the Brussels Convention] also contains certain consumer protection rules in Art 
13-15 
. The Protocols accompanying the Convention give national courts of 
appellate level the possibility to refer questions of interpretation to the European 
Court of Justice: thereby some legal problems have been settled or will be settled 
with particular importance to consumer cases... 
The European Consumer Law Group (ECLG: 1998: 318) claims that the one of the most 
ineffective mechanisms for consumers in cross-border cases is the "exequatur" procedure 
provided for in the Brussels Convention. This procedure normally only has positive 
economic benefits for consumers in litigation cases of over 2,000 Ecu; for the majority of 
consumer purchases which fall below this threshold, cross-border litigation falls outside 
of the remit of the Brussels Convention. The ECLG (1998: 318) view this as a denial of 
justice for everyday consumer matters. They note moreover, that the Convention in this 
respect contrasts with Art 6 (1) of the Convention on Human Rights to which the EU is 
indirectly bound by Art F (2) of the Maastricht Treaty and Art 6 (2) of the Amsterdam 
Treaty. The ECLG (1998: 318) argues that: 
... traders may, due to the increasing internationalisation of the legal profession 
which has been intensively promoted by the Commission, easily take consumers to 
court in whatever country best suits their interests, provided the Court is competent 
according to the jurisdiction rules of the Brussels convention. Law enforcement is 
therefore highly asymmetrical in consumer matters - quite in contrast to the 
objectives of the Internal market and consumer policies of the Union. 
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Gessner (1998: 336) comes to the following conclusions with regard to the Brussels 
Convention: 
A theoretical assessment leads to the conclusion that conventions like the Brussels 
Convention are ineffective tools for accomplishing the harmonisation of law and 
legal cultures in Europe. Only exceptionally, legal certainty can be reached 
through legislative action alone. In most legal cultures, legal actors do not base 
their confidence in fulfilment of legal obligations on a programme, but rather on 
persons (relational contract) or on roles and institutions. European law has largely 
neglected these levels of providing legal certainty. In the context of cross-border 
claims, little has been done to foster access to foreign lawyers and to foreign courts. 
And courts are insufficiently equipped to deal with international cases... 
The problem of the geographical barriers posed by legal jurisdictions is also mentioned in 
the Commission's Green Paper on Access of Consumers to Justice (1993a: 67). The 
Paper describes the situation facing those engaged in cross-border litigation in the 
following manner and notes the inadequacies of the Brussels Convention in providing an 
effective remedy, in particular the problem of the non-portability of legal instruments: 
At present we are faced with the following paradox: the organisations/authorities 
of the place where the harm occurs do not have the capacity to act (the locus standi 
being reserved under the lex fori to the national organisations); the 
organisations/authorities of the place where the measure is to be enforced do not 
have an interest (in the legal sense) in bringing an action (the interests of national 
"consumers" are not affected by a practice addressed to "foreign" consumers). 
Rebus sic stantibus, it is enough to shift the locus of unlawful practices beyond the 
border represented by lex fori, to be virtually out of reach of any action for an 
injunction. The purpose of the Brussels Convention (Article 24) is perverted and 
the principle of non-discrimination (Article 7 of the Treaty) would appear to be 
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jeopardised, in so far as the lex fori reserves the right of action to "national" 
organisations. 
Gessner (1998: 335) estimates that consumers suffer from considerable adverse macro- 
economic effects as a result of the uncertainties posed by cross-border consumer redress. 
He argues that because consumers are deterred from making significant cross-border 
purchases by the prospect of difficulties that they might encounter in case of cross-border 
litigation, international trade within the internal market is significantly lower and the 
price level for goods and services is consequently higher. This analysis is also supported 
by similar conclusions arrived at by the Commission's Extended Impact Assessment on 
Unfair Consumer Practices attached to the proposed Directive on Unfair Commercial 
Practices of 18th June 2003 (EC: 2003d: 2). 
In his socio-legal study into the current state of cross-border consumer redress, Gessner 
and a team of researchers based at Bremen University, financed by the EU Commission, 
concluded that existing mechanisms for handling cross-border complaints and litigation 
have been "highly ineffective and unsatisfactory from an internal market and a consumer 
protection point of view" (1998: 317-318). Gessner (1998: 335) continues: "A single 
market will not become reality without trustworthy, accessible and effective legal 
institutions. The structures offered for cross-border civil litigation are far from showing 
these qualities. " 
Consumer Inertia and the Commission's Response 
Evidence from Studies and Working Parties 
The Commission has collected a large body of evidence as a result of green papers, 
commissioned research studies and from expert working groups which support the idea 
that effective consumer enforcement and access to redress are integral to the success of 
the Single Market. Research in this field dates back to the early 1990s and was first dealt 
with in the Commission's 1993 Green Paper on Access to Justice (COM (93)576 Final). 
Subsequent documents, the Commission Green Paper of 1996 on Consumers' Access to 
Justice (COM (1996) 13 Final), the 2001 Cardiff Report (COM (2001)736 Final), the 
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2001 Green Paper on Consumer Protection (COM(2001)531 Final), the Commission's 
Response to the Green Paper (COM(2002)289 Final) and the impact assessment research 
reports connected with the proposed Directive on Unfair Commercial Practices (2003), 
further explain and justify the Commission's rationale for improving monitoring and 
enforcement of consumer policy at EU level. The results of these documents are 
discussed in some detail below. 
In the 1993 Green Paper, the Commission recognised the need for action to improve 
consumer redress and enforcement on a number of grounds: first, on the legal grounds 
that in a system of governance based on the rule of law, citizens acting in whatever 
capacity (including the consumer capacity) have the right to access effective legal redress 
mechanisms. According to the Green Paper (1993a: 5): "Access to justice is at once a 
human right and a prerequisite for an effective legal order - any legal order, including the 
Community one. " 
Second, the Green Paper (1993a: 6) also recognised that the Community faced particular 
problems with regard to providing its citizens with effective civil law protection, 
especially in the realm of consumer protection. Whilst acknowledging the non- 
discriminatory principle that EU citizens have the right to access to justice anywhere in 
the EU, the paper notes the practical problems to this posed by the geographical 
limitations of national legal jurisdictions and legal procedures (1993a: 12). 
The Economic and Social Committee (EC, 1993a: 12) also concurred with this analysis in 
its Opinion on Consumer Protection and Completion of the Internal Market (adopted 26 
September 1991). The Opinion affirms: 
The problems of access to the courts, which the creation of a European area will 
pose are far from having been resolved. If there is a dispute, the single market will 
be replaced by 12 - or even more - legal systems, all jealous of their independence 
and sovereignty. 
Furthermore, the Green Paper (1993a: 7) recognised the need for effective remedies in 
cross-border consumer protection cases on the grounds that access to effective redress 
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mechanisms was likely to have a long-term beneficial effect on the functioning of the 
Single Market and the EU economy by deterring future offenders. 
This point is also taken up in the Commission's 2001 Communication on "Widening 
Consumer Access to Alternative Dispute Resolution" (COM (2001)161 final). Here, the 
Commission specifically argues the case for improved consumer access to alternative 
resolution dispute procedures in the following terms: 
The possibility of using alternative mechanisms to the courts can also prevent 
disputes from arising by providing an incentive for parties to settle before the need 
to formalise their problems with a third party. Thus the mere presence of these 
procedures may motivate the prevention of problems. This is not just a question of 
promoting consumer confidence but also ensuring there is effective competition 
and access to the Internal Market for business, especially SMEs. (EC: 2001g: 3) 
During interviews with some officials of the Commission, it was made clear that, in their 
view, the acid test of the success of the Single Market is not whether large numbers of 
European consumers make a habit of physically trading across frontiers, but whether they 
are able to access goods and services at comparable prices and under similar conditions 
of sale as consumers in other parts of the market. However, evidence from the Cardiff 
Report indicates that this is not generally the case in that the market continued to show 
significant internal price differences, due to 'economic' not 'geographical' causes. On 
average, price differentials were between 30-40% and this order of difference cannot 
simply be explained in terms of the cost of transport. For certain products the figure was 
much higher, for example, the maximum price difference for Gillette shaving foam gel 
was 132%, the maximum difference for Ajax surface cleaners was 281% and the 
maximum price difference for Evian mineral water was 328% (GFA: 2002: 44). The 
Commission concluded that the continuation of these price divergences would clearly 
benefit certain companies which may well resist increased transparency and competition 
(EC: 2002g). One of the Commission's arguments in favour of improving consumer 
access to justice and redress mechanisms across borders has rested on the notion that an 
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improvement in the situation regarding the enforcement of consumer rights would boost 
consumer confidence to engage in cross-border shopping activities. This would in turn 
help to reduce price differences across the member states by reducing the potential for 
businesses to segment the market across state boundaries: offering significantly different 
prices and conditions of sale to nationals of one state as opposed to another. Effective 
consumer enforcement and redress have therefore been identified by the Commission as 
key mechanisms for ensuring the successful functioning of the Single Market. 
Given the general propensity of businesses to shield themselves from competition and to 
disregard, where possible, uncomfortable pressures from consumers, it is difficult to 
understand which mechanisms would promote price convergence unless it be the market 
force exerted by consumers who 'shop around' and who make the time and effort to seek 
out the best price. In the context of a Single European Market, this means consumers 
who actually do cross frontiers in search of a 'good deal'. In reality, 'economic safaris' 
may only be worthwhile in the case of significant purchases, but the increasing use of the 
internet as a market space provides a mechanism for'shopping around' across frontiers at 
little cost. Evidence of consumer awareness of price differentials does not guarantee that 
suppliers will bring about a convergence of asking prices; evidence of changing patterns 
of consumer behaviour is usually necessary in order to promote price convergence. 
There is no logic to the notion that prices will converge in the Single Market unless 
consumers have the power to shop across borders with confidence. They will not do so 
readily unless there are effective enforcement mechanisms and regulatory market 
mechanisms to protect them. It would be sufficient for the mechanisms to exist and for 
businesses to be aware that consumers could and would use them in order for businesses 
to become more circumspect in their treatment of price differences across borders. 
Evidence from Euro-barometer Opinion Surveys and European Consumer Centres 
It is important to note that the Commission's evidence was not simply based on expert 
analyses. The Commission also based its rationale for action on evidence that filtered 
upwards - from the experience of the consumers themselves and from the European 
consumer centres, although it is true that this information was still collected and 
interpreted by the Commission. DG SANCO (the Consumer DG) commissioned a 
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number of independent studies in preparation for the proposal for the Directive on Unfair 
Commercial Practices (EC: 2003d). One of these - undertaken by GFA Management 
(2002: 31) - studied cross-border shopping trends based on evidence from a number of 
Euro-barometer polls on cross-border consumer shopping habits. The report appears to 
provide confirmation of many of the suspicions upon which the Commission had 
previously based its analysis. The report, based on information gathered for Euro- 
barometer 57.2 - 2002 concluded that even after the introduction of the Euro, purchasing 
across borders was still the exception for European consumers. The report claims that 
cross-border shopping by consumers has not been significant so far. It found that 13.3% 
of respondents had bought or ordered products and services for private use from shops or 
sellers in another EU country in 2002 compared with 10.3% in 1991 and the study 
concludes that this figure represents stagnation. However, the evidence from the Euro- 
barometer is not altogether straightforward as it excludes data regarding the purchase of 
travel, accommodation and meals. In view of the fact that the study revealed, 
unsurprisingly, that the majority of consumers engage in cross-border purchases whilst on 
holiday, or whilst visiting for purposes other than shopping, it seems peculiar to disregard 
these categories. It would be safe to assume that if these purchases were taken into 
account, the amount of business to consumer transactions taking place across borders 
would rise considerably. Moreover, if the respondents of the Euro-barometer are to be 
taken as a representative example of the EU population then 13% should not be 
discounted as an insignificant figure. Whilst 13% represents 2.7% net growth, compared 
to 1991, it actually represents comparative growth of 26.2%. Thus over a quarter more 
consumers in 2002 engage in cross-border shopping compared to 1991.13% means that 
1 consumer in 7.6 engages in cross-border shopping (GFA Management: 2002: 31). The 
report appears to bias deliberately the information obtained to minimise the scale of the 
increase in cross-border shopping. This point is significant and has been used as an 
argument both in favour of and against improving enforcement and redress mechanisms 
for consumers across borders. The Commission, for example, has repeatedly argued that 
cross-border shopping should be encouraged as a way of bringing down prices in the EU 
and stimulating economic growth, especially for small to medium enterprises. 
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Another important aspect of the GFA report and a third rationale for action dealt with 
consumer perceptions of obstacles to cross-border shopping. Again, based on evidence 
gathered by the Euro-barometer polls and surveys and gathered during a survey of 
European Consumer Centres, consumers reported a number of areas which they identified 
as obstacles to cross-border trade. In Euro-barometers 35.1 (Spring 1991) and Euro- 
barometer 43.1 (summer 1995) (GFA: 2002: 66-67) consumers were asked what they saw 
as the three main obstacles to buying or selling (transactions) with another EC member 
state. The consumers were allowed to choose their three most important obstacles from a 
list of nine. The results of the Euro-barometers were compared in the report and the 
importance of the obstacles were ranked in order from 1-9 in terms of the most to the 
least important. The results from each were remarkably similar. 
Both questionnaires reported that difficulty in exchanging the product or in getting it 
repaired ranked first as an obstacle to cross-border shopping (53% of respondents named 
this as a major obstacle in 1991 compared to 54% in 1995). The second most important 
obstacle named was language difficulties (39% of respondents in 1991 and 37% in 1995). 
The third most important was difficulty in settling disputes (29% in 1991 and 33% in 
1995) and the fourth was difficulty in obtaining information and advice (27% in 1991 
rising to 29% in 1995). In its interpretation of the evidence, the report distinguished 
between non-policy induced and policy-induced obstacles. It suggested that the first two 
obstacles listed, described as practical problems, related more to distance than cross- 
border problems. Of the second two - relating to conflict settlement, consumer advice 
and the need to reduce consumer uncertainty, the report suggested that these were more 
appropriate problems to be tackled from a policy point of view (GFA: 2002: 68). 
The only Euro-barometer after 1995 to enquire about trends in cross-border shopping was 
EB 57.2 (May/June 2002). In this EB (GFA: 2002: 68-69) both questions and 
methodology differed from the previous ones. This time only respondents less confident 
in buying from a supplier across borders were asked about the reasons for their lack of 
confidence. Respondents were given eight possible reasons for their lack of confidence 
and were asked to rank the reasons from 1-4. In a separate survey (May 2002) 
(GFA: 2002: 70) twelve European Consumer Centres (ECCs) were themselves treated as 
respondents and asked to reply to a similar set of questions. Again, the ECCs were asked 
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to rank the given reasons on a scale of 1-4 (4 = very important, 1= not at all important). 
According to both EB 57.2 and ECC survey (May 2002) the most pressing obstacle was 
the difficult resolution of after sales problems such as complaints, returns, refunds and 
guarantees. Both the EB and the ECC survey ranked this issue as the most important; on 
a scale of 1-4, the EB rated this issue 3.57 and the ECC 3.92. The second most pressing 
obstacle was 'difficulty to take legal action through the courts' - both ranked this as 
second in importance (EB 3.47 and ECC 3.83). The EB rated 'Greater difficulty to ask 
public authorities or consumer associations to intervene on one's behalf as third (3.41), 
whereas the ECC rated 'lack of information about consumer protection laws in other EU 
countries' as third (3.33). Importantly, both the EB and the ECC survey emphasised 
access to justice problems and information problems as the most important obstacles to 
cross-border trade (GFA: 2002: 70). A detailed break-down of the ECC survey revealed 
that the majority - eleven out of twelve ECCs - viewed 'difficult resolution of after-sales 
problems such as complaints, returns, refunds and guarantees' rated 4 (very important). 
And ten out of twelve thought that 'difficulty to take legal action through the courts' also 
rated 4. (GFA: 2002: 72). 
In an earlier Euro-barometer 56.0 (2001), it was revealed that 89% of consumers thought 
that the level of protection afforded consumers should be the same in all member states, 
i. e. harmonised. The report claims that this evidence "has been interpreted [by 
Eurobarometer survey 56.0,2001] as a clear mandate for strengthening consumer 
protection throughout the Union" (GFA: 2002: 74). Support for this view also came from 
the ECCs themselves. In the ECC survey referred to above, consumer advisers were 
presented with three hypothetical scenarios designed to encourage consumers to shop 
across-borders. They were then asked to assess how the willingness of consumers to 
shop across borders would change depending on each of the three scenarios. Scenario A 
consisted of updating EU regulations, no new directives but stronger enforcement. None 
of the ECCs thought that this strategy would have any impact on the status quo. Scenario 
B advocated a form of minimum harmonisation of EU legislation with new sector 
specific directives and stronger enforcement. Three of the ECCs thought that this would 
lead to higher cross-border consumer participation, two thought it would lead to lower 
participation and six thought there would be no change. The last scenario (C) suggested 
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full harmonisation of EU legislation based on a general clause on fair commercial 
practices, plus sector specific directives and stronger enforcement. All of the ECCs 
thought that this would lead to higher cross-border consumer participation (GFA: 
2002: 77). The evidence demonstrates a high level of support for a significant 
strengthening of the Commission's strategy on cross-border consumer protection. 
In addition to the documents examined above, a number of events organised by the 
Commission (and involving a wide sweep of interested parties) promoted and supported 
the idea of making consumer redress and enforcement easier across frontiers. Towards 
the late 1990s the use of alternative dispute resolution bodies was increasingly widely 
supported as an alternative to court procedures. For example, the Commission 
Communication on "Widening Consumer Access to Alternative Dispute Resolution" 
refers to the support of the participants of the Internal Market Forum (28-29 November 
2000) for improved Alternative Dispute Resolution procedures: 
The importance of confidence, both for consumers and business was highlighted at 
the Internal Market Forum organised jointly by the Commission, the French 
Presidency and the European Parliament on 28-29 November 2000. Attended by 
over 4000 participants there were loud calls for out-of-court measures for resolving 
disputes which worked as the courts were seen as too expensive and time 
consuming (EC: 2001g: 2). 
Working groups were also convened on the promotion of consumer confidence, 
particularly with respect to forms of alternative dispute resolution mechanisms for e- 
commerce. These reunions included the Commission Hearing 4-5 November 1999 on 
"Electronic Commerce: Jurisdiction and Applicable Law" and the Commission workshop 
on Out-of-Court Settlement Systems for E-Commerce 21 March 2000 (EC: 2001g: 5). 
Thus, as the above section demonstrates, in prioritising the enforcement of consumers' 
economic interests across borders, the Commission was reacting to strong evidence from 
a variety of sources stressing the need to build consumer confidence in the internal 
market. 
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Evidence of Political Support for Action in Consumer Redress and Enforcement 
Evidence of political support from the Council of Ministers and the member states 
themselves presents a confusing and mixed picture, particularly during the earlier years 
of the development of EU consumer policy as the passages below demonstrate. On the 
one hand, the Council produced a range of Resolutions recognising the need for 
improvements in this capacity. The earliest Resolution to recognise the significance of 
barriers to consumer redress in the cross-border context was issued in April 1975 as the 
"preliminary programme of the European Economic Community for a Consumer 
protection and Information Policy" (Council: 1975). The recognition of these barriers 
was reiterated in subsequent Council Resolutions in 1981 (Council: 1981) on the occasion 
of the second EEC consumer protection and information policy programme, in 1986 in 
'Future guidelines for Community policy for the protection and Promotion of Consumer 
Interests" (Council: 1986), and in 1989 in "Future priorities for re-launching consumer 
protection policy" (Council: 1989). A further Council Resolution (1987) expressly 
concerned with consumer redress came belatedly in response to Communications from 
the Commission on the subject. The Commission initially sent a Communication to the 
Council in 1985 (COM (84)692 final), which was followed by a Resolution in the 
European Parliament (EP: 1987) and, finally, a supplementary Commission 
Communication on 7th May 1987. It might be viewed as significant that the Council 
response came in a Resolution dated 25 June 1987 -a delay of over two years from the 
first Commission Communication on the subject matter, and clearly prompted by the 
Commission's supplementary Communication. The Resolution invited the Commission 
to complete its analysis of the problem taking into account the enlargement of the 
Community to include Spain, Portugal and Greece. On the other hand, evidence of actual 
improvements to this area of policy-making was slow to materialise at ground level. For 
example, despite the existence of international legal conventions aimed at harmonising 
the field of civil disputes across frontiers (Brussels 1968, Rome 1980, the Hague 
Convention 1965 and the Hague Convention 1970), by 1993 none of these conventions 
were in force in all of the member-states (Commission, 1993: 59). The Brussels 
Convention was delayed because four of the signatory states had not ratified it. The 
extension of the Rome Convention to Spain and Portugal was delayed because by 1993 
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the Netherlands was the only state which had ratified it. The Hague Convention (on the 
service abroad of judicial and extra judicial documents in civil and commercial matters) 
was signed by all the member-states, but by 1993 not ratified by any of them. Finally the 
Hague Convention of 1970 (regarding the taking of evidence across borders in civil or 
commercial matters) was only ratified by eight member-states. 
However, further evidence of renewed support for improved co-operation in civil and 
commercial justice may be seen in the inclusion in the Treaty establishing the European 
Community of Article 61(c) which provides for the Council to adopt measures relating to 
judicial co-operation in civil matters. Article 65 (c) of the Treaty specifically mentions 
that these measures should aim to eliminate obstacles to the good functioning of civil 
procedures. The Treaty of Amsterdam also lent further support to the creation of a 
European legal space. Furthermore, numerous European Councils have reaffirmed their 
commitment to the improvement of alternative dispute resolution (ADR) systems, for 
example in Vienna, in December 1998, and in Tampere, October 1999. 
The Tampere Council (devoted to the establishment of an area of freedom, security and 
justice in the EU) was also highly significant in other important respects with regard to 
achieving concrete improvements in the EU legal system. For example it led to the 
adoption of a Council Regulation (EC No 44/2001) which replaced the Brussels 
Convention, and helped to simplify jurisdiction problems in legal cases spanning the EU 
borders. Moreover, the adoption of a Regulation solved the problem of ratification and 
incorporation by the member states because it applied to the states directly. The Tampere 
Council also led to improvements in the co-operation of national enforcement bodies by 
establishing a network of national authorities with responsibility for civil and commercial 
law (a European legal network). The network consists of representatives of the states' 
judicial and administration authorities who meet several times during the year in order to 
exchange information and experience. The Tampere Council was also key to the 
establishment of minimum standards to ensure an adequate level of legal aid in cross- 
border cases throughout the Union (Commission: 2002: 2). Thus, the Commission's 
preoccupation with improving cross-border consumer redress and enforcement 
mechanisms may be viewed as being in line with a more general determination within the 
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Community to improve the legal situation in the EU, particularly with respect to legal 
problems across borders. 
This chapter thus far has attempted to explain the rationale underpinning the 
Commission's increased preoccupation with cross-border redress and enforcement since 
the 1990s. Evidence from reports and studies, as well as evidence filtering upwards from 
consumers themselves combined gradually to persuade the Commission (particularly the 
Consumer DG) of the need for action. Political support from the member states for 
improved enforcement and redress presents a mixed picture during the 1980s and early 
1990s, although the European summits in Vienna and Tampere demonstrate a greater and 
clearer commitment to improving the functioning of a European legal space, especially 
with respect to legal problems which cut across borders. In response to mounting 
evidence of cross-border consumer problems, the DG for Consumer Affairs began to take 
action, devising a range of decentralised legislative and non-legislative measures aimed at 
reinforcing the ability of consumers to enforce their Community economic rights. The 
second part of this chapter examines a number of these key cross-border initiatives in 
order to provide some evaluation as to how effective the Commission's strategy has been, 
in this respect. These illustrate some of the ways in which the Commission has attempted 
to overcome the institutional constraints under which it has been obliged to operate in this 
field. 
Commission Initiatives 
Overview of the Consumer and Health Policy Directorate's Strategy 
The Commission began its strategy of developing easier and less expensive redress 
mechanisms for consumers across borders by initially supporting national projects for 
small claims procedures during the late 1980s and early 1990s - for example, the small 
claims courts in Dundee, Scotland, and Lisbon, Portugal. These were complemented 
during the early 1990s with the embryonic system of European Consumer Centres - 
providing information, advice and assistance to consumers engaged in cross-border 
activities. This system was refined and developed over the course of the decade 
especially towards the late 1990s and was supported by the development of co-ordinated 
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systems for the exchange of information on ADR mechanisms available at national level. 
The late 1990s also witnessed the increased reliance of the Commission on directives 
(with the objective of enforcement), which have an in-built cross-border dimension to 
them such as the Injunctions Directive 1998 (98/27/EC) and the Directive on Guarantees 
1999 (1999/44/EC). The initiatives analysed below are divided into non-legislative and 
legislative measures and, within these two categories, are examined in chronological 
order. 
European Consumer Centres (EuroRuichets) 
In 1991 DG SANCO (then DG XXIV) began to establish a pilot programme of cross- 
border information projects for consumers, primarily in border regions. Initially, centres 
were established in Lille (France), Gronau (Germany), Luxembourg, Mons (Belgium), 
and Barcelona (Spain), and were co-funded by the Commission. By the end of 1996,17 
centres were operating in the EU in addition to those already mentioned. These 
comprised: Bilbao (Spain), Bolzano (Italy), Dublin (Ireland), Flensburg (Germany), 
Guimaraes (Portugal), Kortrijk (Belgium), Montpellier (France), Patras (Greece), 
Santiago di Compostela (Spain), Torino (Italy), and Veurne (Belgium). In the light of an 
evaluation of the centres conducted in 1997 by Wilhelm Consulting (1997), an 
organisation working on behalf of the Commission, four of the centres closed and a 
number of other adjustments were made to the operation of the ECCs designed to 
improve the highlighted defects. Many of the centres were relocated to more central 
locations and the remit of the centres was also broadened so that it dealt with European 
consumer issues more generally, rather than just trans-border issues. In 2001, there were 
11 ECCs - Vienna (Austria), Helsinki (Finland), Lille (France), Gronau (Germany), Kiel 
(Germany), Dublin (Ireland), Howald (Luxembourg), Lisbon (Portugal), Barcelona 
(Spain), Vitoria (Spain) and London (UK). By 2002 this number had risen to 14, with a 
centre opened in Stockholm (Sweden) and another opened in Rome (Italy). 
The ECC project was designed to provide consumers with information about cross-border 
consumer issues and consumer protection, to respond to queries and requests from 
consumers about such issues and to provide, where necessary, assistance and legal advice 
in settling cross-border disputes between consumers and businesses. The centres were 
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also mandated to co-operate with each other and to carry out cross-border comparisons 
on consumer related issues. The project was underpinned by a well-defined political 
rationale, namely to connect the citizen-consumer with the single market project. This is 
clearly stated in the 1997 evaluation report (Wilhelm Consulting: 1997: 10): 
The key issue for the increasing participation of consumers in the single market is 
awareness building. The public image of the Single Market is to a wide extent still 
that of the Single Market for European Producers. National trade policies and 
Community support programmes for the promotion of international business 
corporations at the EU level have successfully established the European dimension 
in trade and commerce. Further progress in the development of the Single Market, 
however, will also need the active participation of the consumers in the European- 
wide exchange of goods and services. This requires improved consumers' 
awareness of potentials in the Single Market. The pilot projects have been 
successful in contributing to this target in an efficient way. 
Although the ECCs in existence in 2003 may largely be viewed as having successfully 
contributed to the information and knowledge of EU citizens, particularly across borders 
- (for example, in 2002 the centres were contacted more than 102,000 times, which 
represents an increase of 8% on the figure published in 2001(ECC: 2002: 9)) - this was 
not entirely the case in 1997 at the time of the first evaluation report. A number of 
factors have affected and continue to affect the success of the project as a whole, as an 
examination of the 1997 evaluation report and annual activities report of 2001 and 2002 
reveal. 
The starting point for this discussion should be a brief outline of the outcome of the 1997 
evaluation report as this gives an immediate insight as to the level of success achieved by 
the ECCs by 1997. The centres were assessed according to a detailed evaluation check 
list of 15 criteria4 (Wilhelm Consulting: 1997: 5). For each of the criteria, the centres were 
4 "Location, infrastructure and available resources: 
Regional location, Local support (quality of premises), Political support, Technical equipment, 
Communication facilities, Quality of man-power resources, Capacity of available man-power, Available 
working languages.. . (cont. over page) 
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evaluated on the basis of their own individual merits. The centres were marked on a 
points system - each criterion carried a maximum of 2 points and a minimum of minus 2 
- thus the maximum score possible was 30 and the minimum minus 30. Of the 17 
projects only 8 were evaluated as successful: Lille (27), Luxembourg (26), Bolzano (21) 
Gronau (21), Dublin (20), Barcelona (20), Montpellier (16) and Patras (16). 5 were 
deemed partially successful: Bilbao (15), Flensburg (10), Kortrijk (9), Torino (7) and 
Guimeraes (6). Further Commission funding was to be with-held until improvement or 
re-organisation of the project. Finally, four centres failed the evaluation and the 
Commission withdrew their funding; these were: Santiago di Compostella (1), 
Pontevedra (-7), Mons (-10) and Veurne (-13). 
The report cited a variety of reasons as to why a number of the centres had either fully or 
partially failed the evaluation. For example, lack of financial and manpower capacities 
were cited in the case of Flensburg, Guimaraes, Kortijk and Torino; concentrating on 
activities that were too narrow, "neglecting a large variety of complementary measures 
for the dissemination of European Consumer Information" (Wilhelm Consulting: 1997: 6) 
was attributed to the centres in Torino, Bilbao and Guimaraes. Other factors cited 
included "low operational capacity as well as the local horizon of activities performed by 
the Antennas in Santiago di Compostella, Pontevedra, Mons and Veume" (Wilhelm 
Consulting: 1997: 6). 
Although in some instances (Santiago di Compostella, Pontevedra, Mons, Veume and 
Guimaraes) peripheral location was cited as one of the factors in the failure or partial 
failure of some of the centres, the majority of the criticisms centred on poor management 
or poor operation of the centres. More general criticisms of the project as a whole 
suggest deficiencies not simply in the way in which individual centres or countries 
managed their projects, but in the way in which the Commission set-up and managed the 
projects. 
Achieved results and the effectiveness of operation: 
Management of the project, Action planning and performance, Public relations, Acceptance among 
consumers, General impact, Transborder dimension (co-operation schemes), European dimension (co- 
operation schemes)" (Wilhelm Consulting: 1997: 5): 
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The general criticisms are noted in the following terms (Wilhelm Consulting: 1997: 8): 
1. Co-operation within the network of pilot projects is still weak and is left to 
the individual initiative of the project managers and the involved experts. 
2. A common European-wide project - or network identity is missing. The 
Centres use various project names and logos which do not show any relation 
between these projects to the public. 
3. The continuity of the project operation could not be guaranteed because of 
delays occurring in concluding annual project contracts, reporting to and 
payment from DG 24. 
4. Vagueness of strategic pre-conditions and operational scopes misled some 
of the pilot-projects. 
5. Operational co-ordination and monitoring of performed actions were often 
missing. 
6. The same subjects (e. g. car purchase, time-share) were sometimes dealt with 
by several projects independently of each other. 
One inference that may be drawn from the above criticisms is that the Commission 
allowed the projects to develop on a basis which was too ad-hoc and did not give enough 
clear centralised direction to the centres at the outset. Another possible explanation (and 
one which is suggested by the criticisms) might be that not enough monitoring of the 
operation of the centres was taking place, either by national bodies or by the 
Commission, and/or that communication in the monitoring process between the different 
levels was inadequate. 
Evidence from the ECC's Annual Activities Reports in 2001 and 2002 confirms that the 
success of the centres depends primarily (apart from adequate funding and good location) 
on good management of the centres and adequate monitoring. The case of the UK ECC 
in the 2001 report would appear to offer a prime example of this. Both the 2001 and 
2002 reports are organised on the basis of a resume of activities offered by each ECC in 
which their main activities - projects, publications, publicity efforts, number of 
complaints dealt with and categories of complaints - are documented. There is also a 
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table of compiled statistics showing a breakdown of complaint categories. The only 
country to provide no statistical evidence for the table in either the 2001 or 2002 report 
was the UK. (It should be mentioned at this point that, unlike ECCs in other member 
states, the UK ECC is housed and integrated within the existing system of the Citizens 
Advice Bureau - CAB). Furthermore, the UK ECC report of 2001 differs significantly 
from those of other countries and would appear to demonstrate both a lack of good will in 
executing the requirements of the report, and a lack of coherent management in the 
collection of relevant data and lack of interest in publicising the UK ECC. In contrast to 
the very detailed evidence presented by the ECCs in other countries, the UK offered very 
little specific information as to its role as an ECC other than to report rather opaquely on 
the number of enquiries and cases that it had dealt with. Much of the information 
provided seemed mixed up and indistinguishable from the activities and tasks performed 
by the CAB in its national capacity - although significant information was provided 
about that. There were no details of actions specifically undertaken by the UK ECC in its 
role as an ECC, the list of publications and press releases demonstrated an entirely 
national slant and there were no details regarding efforts to publicise the UK ECC. 
Moreover, the opening lines of the report state: "The UK does not provide direct access 
for individual consumers but [there] is a help desk for 15,000 Citizen Advice Bureaux 
and other consumer advice bodies" (UK ECC: 2001: 1). 
In contrast to the other ECCs, the UK ECC does not provide the consumer with its own 
web-site. Access to the ECC facility is provided through the CAB system - via 
telephone, e-mail, drop-in centres and the CAB web-site. However, there is no indication 
on the CAB web-site that CAB offers the ECC facility. Even if the consumer were well 
informed enough to search for the UK ECC on the web (and this would involve his/her 
being aware of the title of the facility) they would reach a dead-end once connected to the 
CAB site. 
The UK ECC contribution to the 2002 activities report did appear more conventional and 
did explain its activities and dealings with individual consumers with greater clarity. It 
also gave some details as to projects that had been carried out in respect of its role as an 
ECC (ECC: 2002: 43). 
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The example of the UK ECC raises continuing questions as to the monitoring capacity of 
the Commission with regard to the ECCs and also the EEJ-NET (discussed below). 
According to evidence collected during an interview with an official of DG SANCO 
(25/6/2003 see p. 254), the Commission engages in regular monitoring activities of the 
ECCs. There is a system of reporting whereby the ECCs have to send a financial report 
and a report of their activities to the Commission. According to the official, the 
Commission engages in daily contact with all partners in the network. It also organises 
seminars and work-shops to discuss particular problems and conducts on the spot checks 
of the centres to ensure that they meet the correct standards. Nevertheless, as the 
example of the UK ECC clearly demonstrates, monitoring alone may be insufficient 
unless the Commission is able to enforce its decisions - this point is further examined in 
the passage on the EEJ-Net below. 
European Complaints Form 
One of the potentially significant mechanisms, which the ECCs piloted, was the 
European Complaints Form. This initiative was developed as a result of the Commission 
"Communication on the Out of Court Settlement of Disputes" (EC: 1998a) itself part of 
the drive towards creating effective ADR mechanisms for use across borders, and 
launched by the Commission as a pilot project between May 1999 and August 2000. The 
countries participating in the project were Austria, Belgium, Finland, France, Italy, 
Luxembourg, Netherlands, Portugal, Spain and Sweden. Consumer defence 
organisations in each of the countries acted as co-contractors and took responsibility for 
the management of the project. This involved monitoring a specified number of cases 
handled using the complaints form through to the closure of the case and preparing a file 
for each form. It also involved encouraging consumers to use the form and showing them 
how to use it correctly. The co-contractors also attempted to use the form as much as 
possible to deal with complaints passed on by consumers, making every effort to obtain a 
response from professionals who did not automatically react to the complaints form in an 
attempt to reach an agreement (Commission: "Evaluation of the Pilot Project on the Use 
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of the European Consumer Complaints Form for Consumer Disputes": 
http: //europa. eu. int/comm/consumers/redress/compl/acce_just en. pdf) 
The results passed on to the Commission showed a mixed outcome, particularly with 
regard to the frequently poor supply-side response to the consumers' requests. A 
breakdown of the responses obtained demonstrated that 46% of suppliers did not reply at 
all to the complaints form, 9% rejected the complaint outright and 7% referred the 
complaint to a non judicial body. Therefore, it can be calculated that in 62% of the cases 
monitored, the consumer either encountered a negative or at best an uncertain outcome. 
Of the remaining 38%, the complaint was accepted outright by just 26% of professionals, 
the complaint was partially accepted by 7% and 5% of professionals made some kind of 
commercial gesture toward the consumer. It is, however, interesting to compare the 
mixed outcome of the form's success with the interpretation of the evidence according to 
the Commission's evaluation form. By focusing exclusively on those companies that did 
reply, the Commission is able to paint a rosier picture than the whole body of evidence 
would justify. The Commission's evaluation claims that: 
According to the results, over half the professionals (54%) replied to the consumer 
using the form. The replies can be seen as positive in that professionals quite often 
accepted the consumer's request in full or in part (33%) and rarely rejected it (9%). 
Referral of the dispute to an extra judicial body was also not infrequent 7% and 
there was significant showing of commercial gestures (discounts, rebates) (5%)" 
(Commission: "Evaluation of the Pilot Project on the Use of the European 
Consumer Complaints Form for Consumer Disputes: 7: 
http: //europa. eu. int/comm/consumers/redress/compl/acce_just en. pdf) 
Nevertheless, during the course of an interview with an official of the Bureau Europeen 
de 1'Union des Consommateurs (BEUC - 19/6/2003), the view was expressed that the 
European Complaints form represented a potentially useful tool for the resolution of 
cross-border disputes but that its existence was not widely known and that the initiative 
had been insufficiently publicised. Indeed, the Commission evaluation report, itself 
claims that according to the results of Eurobarometer survey 52.1, only 7% of consumers 
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participating in the survey had either heard or seen the form (Commission: "Evaluation of 
the Pilot Project on the Use of the European Consumer Complaints Form for Consumer 
Disputes": 12: http: //europa. eu. int/comm/consumers/redress/compl/accejust_en. pdf). 
Lack of public awareness was also a problem common to the EEJ-NET, as the evidence 
below suggests - the position of both of these initiatives with regards to publicity 
contrasts with the apparent success of the Internal Market DG's initiative - the SOLVIT 
network. SOLVIT was created by the internal market DG as a result of a Commission 
communication in 2001 (COM(2001)0702(02)) in order to serve both citizens and 
business in the event of a cross-border problem concerning the states' administrations. 
Contact points were set up in each member state in order to facilitate the exchange of 
information and the co-ordination of solutions to problems between the member states. 
In practice though, the main beneficiaries of this network have been businesses who are 
generally better informed of the existence of such facilities in contrast to individual 
citizens. According to the BEUC official, information about the SOLVIT network was 
more widely disseminated; it was suggested that the explanation for this lies partly with 
the fact that the Internal Market DG is older and more powerful than DG SANCO, and 
enjoys greater resources. This analysis strongly supports findings regarding the low 
status of the Consumer DG in Chapter Two. It is again symptomatic of the supply-side 
bias inherent in the EU's approach to market integration that initiatives to help consumers 
should be disadvantaged because of an in-built institutional imbalance. 
EEJ-Net Initiative 
Inception 
As with the European Complaints Form, the origins of the EEJ-Net initiative may be 
traced back to the adoption by the Commission of the "Communication on the Out-of 
Court Settlement of Consumer Disputes" (EC: 1998a). This communication was 
designed to promote the use of easily accessible and relatively inexpensive forms of 
consumer dispute resolution (such as alternative dispute resolution bodies - ADRs which 
make greater use of arbitration methods) to assist consumers caught in cross-border 
disputes. It was recognised that cross-border consumer disputes in particular merited this 
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type of aid because of the costs and complexity of pursuing a cross-border consumer 
legal case relative to the usually small sums of money at stake in the dispute. The 
Communication also included the Recommendation on the Principles Applicable to Out- 
of-court Procedures for the Settlement of Consumer Dispute (98/257/EC OJ L 115 
17.04.98 p1-34), which set out broad guidelines for the quality criteria of acceptable 
ADR bodies. Member states were requested to send lists of appropriate national ADR 
bodies (based on the Commission's quality criteria) to the Commission, where they would 
be made publicly accessible in order to improve the transparency of the ADR system for 
EU consumers. Subsequent to this development, as mentioned earlier, a European 
Summit meeting in Tampere (15th-16th October 1999), concentrating on improving 
access to justice, mutual recognition of judicial decisions and increasing convergence in 
procedural law, provided an added impetus to the Commission's general policy direction 
on ADR by calling on the member states to create alternative extra judicial procedures. 
As a result of this, the Commission published a Working Paper on the establishment of a 
European Extra Judicial Network (EC: 2000a) which acted as the blueprint for the future 
EEJ-Net. The proposal was approved by a Resolution of the Council of the European 
Union in May 2000 (Council: 2000) and put into action during a conference on the EEJ- 
Net in Lisbon May 2000, organised by the Commission in partnership with the 
Portuguese presidency, and attended by policy actors from national authorities, out of 
court bodies, consumer organisations and Commission officials. 
Modus Operandi 
The European Extra judicial Network was set up in order to improve the information, 
knowledge and access of consumers to ADR mechanisms, particularly in cross-border 
situations, where ADR is often faster and cheaper than ordinary legal procedures. The 
network is a consumer support and information structure consisting of seventeen national 
contact points (or clearing houses) located in each member state, plus Iceland and 
Norway. The pilot phase was launched on 16th October 2002 with eight member states 
participating (Austria, Belgium, Denmark, Finland, Luxembourg, Portugal, Sweden, and 
the UK) as well as Norway and Iceland; the other seven EU states were integrated during 
2002 (France, Germany, Greece, Italy, Ireland, Netherlands, and Spain). Because the 
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work of the European Consumer Centres and the Clearing Houses are closely connected, 
nine of the countries have in fact lodged the facilities in a shared locality (Austria, 
Belgium, France, Ireland, Italy, Luxembourg, Portugal, Sweden, and the UK) (EC: 2003: 4 
- Conference Papers) The Clearing Houses are co-funded by the Commission and the 
relevant member state in which the clearing-house is located; each party provides 50% of 
the funding. 
Before examining the effectiveness of the clearing-houses, it is first important to have a 
clear understanding of how they are intended to work. The clearing houses exist to assist 
consumers who experience problems as a result of having made a transaction with a 
business across borders in the EU and who, after initial attempts to obtain redress from 
the business itself, either individually or through an intermediary, such as a consumer 
organisation or a European Consumer Centre, have been unsuccessful. The clearing 
houses assist consumers by acting as intermediaries - offering advice, and trying to 
resolve the problem by contacting the supplier. Usually a consumer faced with a cross- 
border problem that they cannot resolve would contact their national clearing house 
which would try to resolve the dispute by offering advice and contacting the supplier on 
the consumer's behalf. If these avenues are insufficient to resolve the dispute, the next 
stage is for the national clearing house to contact its counter-part in the state where the 
problem occurred and to ask its assistance in raising the problem with the business. If 
this fails, they can then forward the complaint to a relevant ADR body. They also help 
the consumer to overcome initial problems posed by the language barrier - some clearing 
houses offer translation services to help with the translation of relevant documents. The 
clearing houses further have a role in monitoring and recording the progress of a 
consumer complaint through the ADR process and may provide assistance should the 
consumer experience difficulties with the ADR body. 
Evaluation of EEJ-Net: General 
The preliminary evaluation report on the functioning of the EEJ-Net suggested that, as it 
became more widely known, the system was delivering increasingly promising results in 
terms of receiving and handling increasing numbers of complaints and also in terms of 
resolving cross-border consumer disputes. For example, an interim report (EC: 2003: 4 - 
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Conference Papers) evaluating the activity of the clearing houses prepared by the 
Commission in 2002 revealed that 1,100 complaints had been dealt with. By the end of 
March 2003 that number had risen by 100% to 2,182. Furthermore, the clearing houses 
appear to have been relatively successful in procuring successful outcomes for 
consumers. Although the statistics reveal that only 7% of cases were resolved by using 
ADR mechanisms, 44% were resolved without having to recourse to ADR, which 
suggests that businesses become more amenable to reaching a solution once the consumer 
has pursued their complaint as far as the clearing house. Thus over 50% of cases were 
successfully resolved. 
The EEJ-Net system is a new phenomenon and as such it is difficult to offer a 
comprehensive assessment of its successes and weaknesses. As policy actors have 
pointed out repeatedly during the course of interviews conducted for this research, 
'teething problems' are symptomatic of any new venture, and a degree of tolerance ought 
to be exercised. Nevertheless, it is possible, from examination of the evidence so far, to 
provide an indication of the problem areas that are already undermining the venture and 
that are likely to continue to do so unless they are tackled. 
Evaluation of EEJ-Net: Publicity Problems 
One complaint that the BEUC put forward was that one of the problems with evaluating 
the success of both the EEJ-Net and the FIN-Net initiatives was the general lack of 
awareness on the part of consumers as to their existence. The BEUC (2002: 3) concluded 
that this clearly demonstrates that "the Commission and the member states should invest 
more means into the marketing and promotion of the network. This will be the only way 
to increase consumers' awareness of the existence of these initiatives. " 
Lack of publicity and lack of public awareness as to the existence of the schemes was one 
of the principal findings of the EEJ-Net conference (Brussels, 10-11th June 2003) and is 
an issue that was emphasised by several key actors at the conference (for example, Diana 
Wallis UK MEP: 2003 - (spokes-person from the Legal Affairs and Internal Market 
Committee, European Parliament) during her speech at the conference: Carina Tornblom: 
2003 - DG SANCO, Jim Murray: 2003 - director of the BEUC). In order to highlight 
the need for greater publicity, Diana Wallis in her speech mentioned an anecdote in 
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which the question 'has anyone heard of the EEJ-NET? ' was posed at a meeting in the UK 
of the Council of bar lawyers - no-one present had heard of the initiative. 
In her opening speech, Carina Tomblom suggested that member states were reluctant to 
publicise the EEJ-NET in its pilot phase because they were concerned that the system 
might not be able to live up to consumers' expectations where those expectations had 
been raised by, for example, a high-profile publicity campaign. Tornblom explains: 
There is a clear need to promote the network via publicity. Members of the 
network, especially those who did not already have an ECC, were reluctant to 
publicise the EEJ-Net when the pilot phase was first started. Now that the pilot 
phase is well under way, it is important for member-states to promote actively the 
network through publicity to raise its public profile and raise consumer awareness 
of ADR. It is up to each state to see how this can best be done. 
(Tomblom: 2003) 
Certainly, this attitude towards publicising the national clearing-houses was confirmed 
during an interview with two officials of the UK Department of Trade and Industry 
(interview 16/6/2003 - see p. 254) who had been anxious not to over-publicise the UK 
clearing-house for fear of a backlash from disappointed citizens. The attitude of officials 
at the DTI also demonstrated that they did not favour a high-profile approach to 
publicising the initiative. They took the view that consumers only needed to be aware of 
the initiative when they experience a cross-border problem; informing them of the 
initiative in advance might be a waste of resources, since consumers would be unlikely to 
retain this information. The problem with this attitude is, as an official of the BEUC 
(interview 19/6/2003 - see p. 254) pointed out, that consumers need a residual knowledge 
of these initiatives in advance, so that they can have recourse to the initiative as soon as a 
problem is experienced. 
The problem posed by the variations in the member states' commitment to publicising the 
EEJ-Net was also highlighted in the evaluation report on the functioning of the initiative 
(Commission: 2003: 3- Conference Papers). This report, which was partly based on a 
questionnaire sent to the clearing-houses, stated that: " The questionnaire shows that 
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some Clearing Houses have conducted wide-scale national publicity campaigns whilst 
others have used more modest publicity. More publicity by some Clearing Houses would 
probably have increased consumer awareness and consequently increased the number of 
complaints. " 
The question'whose role is it to publicise the initiatives? ' also raises pertinent issues. 
Although the Commission emphasised the importance of publicity at the conference, it 
became evident during the course of interviews with officials of DG SANCO (interview 
25/6/2003 see p. 254) that they did not view the task of publicising the initiatives as a 
function that should be carried out by the Commission. The prevailing view was that the 
Commission was not a PR company and publicising the initiative at Commission level 
was, in any case, not a priority owing to scant resources. The officials expressed the 
view that they felt that publicity would be more effective if undertaken at a more local 
level, closer to the citizen. They also explained that as the clearing houses and European 
Consumer Centres were co-funded by the Commission and the member states, it was the 
clearing houses themselves that should assume the task of publicising the initiative. This 
view was clearly supported by officials in the DTI (interview: 16/6/2003 - see p. 254) 
who appeared unperturbed by the call for increased publicity, certainly at the national 
level. Their strategy revealed a reluctance to publicise at national level - although, in the 
light of the conference's findings, they suggested that UK ministers might henceforth be 
permitted to begin to refer to the EEJ-Net during public speeches. Nevertheless, the 
devolution of action to the lowest level, in line with the principle of subsidiarity, needs to 
be closely monitored if it is to function properly, as the example below demonstrates. 
Evaluation of EEJ-Net: Monitoring 
Although the Commission does undertake monitoring exercises of the functioning of the 
EEJ-Net, there is a certain question as to the effectiveness of its capacity adequately to 
enforce at ground level the directions it issues from above. Ultimately, the only weapon 
that the Commission can wield at an ECC or a clearing house that fails to comply with 
Commission requests is to withdraw funding. However, as interviews with DG SANCO 
officials revealed, such action is viewed as undesirable and only to be undertaken as a last 
resort. Their view was that systems such as the EEJ-Net work on the basis of the good 
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will and co-operation of the participants - threatening to withdraw funding upsets 
relations between the Commission and the relevant member state and creates a bad 
atmosphere. However, the case of the UK ECC-EEJ-Net clearing house, provides an 
example of the limitations to this approach. 
The principal mechanism open for citizens to access the ECCs or EEJ-Net clearing house 
facilities is via the internet. Investigation has revealed that the existence of ECCs and 
EEJ-Net clearing houses in other member states is clearly indicated on their web-sites 
(for example, Austria, Belgium and Finland), which on the whole provide clear hyper- 
links to the relevant sections. The UK, however, has a rather unique set-up in that the 
ECC and EEJ-Net clearing house has been located within the existing network of the 
Citizens Advice Bureau, as outlined earlier. To a large extent it is entirely logical for 
these facilities to be integrated into a citizen's information system which is already well 
known and broadly based throughout the UK. However, the Citizens Advice web-site 
provides no information of these facilities and no hyper-link to the centres - in short, as 
far as the uninformed consumer is concerned, the facilities might as well not exist at all. 
There is a separate web-site for the UK EEJ-Net where citizens can obtain information 
about how the system operates. However, the citizen would already have to know the 
name of the initiative in order to produce effective results during an internet search - and 
as the EEJ-Net conference clearly revealed, the vast majority of EU citizens are blissfully 
unaware of the existence of this system. 
Other avenues for reaching the web-sites, including information provided by the 
Commission on its own web-site (and this strategy, of course, depends on the citizen 
having the knowledge, the initiative and the material resources to access the Europa web- 
site) simply point the citizen back in the direction of the Citizens Advice Bureau. This 
forces consumers round in circles, effectively locked into a closed loop. 
An interview with the DTI officials (16/6/2003) revealed that they were unaware of this 
problem. A further interview with officials at DG SANCO (25/6/2003) revealed that the 
Commission was aware of the problem and had tried to resolve it by numerous phone 
calls and letters to the UK centre. However, the officials admitted that enforcing 
Commission requests could be problematic - and in view of the fact that the situation in 
the UK has existed for months and continues to date (July 2003), this approach appears to 
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have been singularly ineffective. It seems surprising that Commission officials should be 
aware of the lack of direct interface between the citizen and the UK ECC and EEJ-Net 
centre via the CAB network when officials at the DTI were not. This fact might be 
interpreted as evidence of a break in the communication and monitoring systems between 
the different levels of governance that are supposedly delivering effective policy 
solutions to problems experienced by consumers at the ground level. 
One fundamental conclusion that may be drawn from the above examples is that, whilst it 
may be understandable for a new initiative to experience teething problems - making 
policy actors reluctant to invest too much time and energy in publicising it or in ensuring 
the existence of adequate monitoring and enforcement arrangements by not putting these 
arrangements in place adequately at the outset - the success of the venture is likely to be 
undermined. 
As the example above demonstrates, the success of the EEJ-Net system relies to a 
significant degree on the good will of those responsible for implementing it. However, 
further evidence of tardy implementation by particular member states or ineffective 
management on the part of some of the ECCs and clearing houses, indicates that, to a 
certain extent, the system may be developing unevenly. Once again, this example 
highlights the problems of the EU's delegated system of implementation and enforcement 
explored in Chapter Three. 
There even seems to have been confusion about the date of the launch of the initiative. 
According to the Commission Green Paper on ADR, the EEJ-Net was officially launched 
on 16 October 2001. The Paper predicted that it would run as a one-year pilot project on 
which the Commission would write an evaluation report in the autumn of 2002 
(Commission: 2002f: 17). However, in writing its response to the Commission's Green 
Paper on ADR, the BEUC expressed the following opinion: 
... more than two years after the formal launching of the EEJ-Net 
in May 2000, it 
still is impossible to evaluate whether this initiative can live up to its promises or 
not. This is mainly due to the fact that, on the one hand, there are as yet not very 
many consumers contracting cross-border, and, on the other hand, to the fact that 
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member-states took a long time to set up their national clearing houses and only 
very recently could the last country be added to the EEJ-Net. (BEUC: 2002: 2-3) 
In fact the last clearing houses were only added in 2003 (Greece and Italy). The Italian 
clearing house had in fact opened earlier and had closed because of management 
difficulties. Originally the Italian clearing house had been managed by a board of 
interested parties including a number of Italian consumer organisations; however, due to 
problems created by the lack of agreement amongst the parties, the centre did not operate 
effectively. It appears that the nature of the disagreements was general - according to an 
official in DG SANCO (interview 25/6/2003 - see p. 254) the interested parties could not 
agree on anything. This is not to suggest that the Italian experience was replicated 
elsewhere, nevertheless, the lack of urgency with which the centres have been set up 
might be taken as an indication of the level of priority accorded to this project by the 
member states. 
Evaluation of EEJ-Net: Variations in Effectiveness 
Further evidence of the variation in the effective operation of the houses came to light 
during the EEJ-Net conference ("Review of the European Extra Judicial Network and 
Future Perspectives for Improved EU Consumer Assistance" Brussels 10-11/6/2003). At 
one point, an employee of the Spanish EEJ-Net clearing house complained about the 
variation in the level of work undertaken by certain clearing-houses and specifically 
named the Italian clearing-house in this context. This comment was immediately 
followed by a response from an employee of the Greek clearing-house who complained 
about the lack of action taken by the Spanish clearing house in relation to a request for 
help by its Greek counterpart. During the course of an interview an official of the BEUC 
(Brussels 19/6/2003) also suggested that, in her opinion, the problem of variations in 
work commitment across the network was likely to be a problem. 
Examined clearing house by clearing house, statistics in the preliminary evaluation report 
reveal that the number of complaints received varies enormously, although it is difficult 
to interpret the variations accurately since they may be explained by many factors other 
than the diligence of those operating the centres. For example, the number of complaints 
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received partly depends on the length of time for which the clearing house has been 
operational. It may also depend on factors such as population, geographical locality (for 
instance, whether the country has many border regions), the number of ADR bodies 
available to deal with the problems, and even the manner in which the complaints were 
compiled. For example, some houses included all of the complaints that they received, 
others only included those which led to a dispute which had to be referred to an ADR. 
Nevertheless, the discrepancies are worth mentioning, as they may at least give some 
indication as to variations in the level of effectiveness of these centress. 
Other factors affecting the success of the EEJ-Net relate specifically to the coverage, 
quality and working comparability of the ADR bodies upon which the EEJ-Net system is 
fundamentally based. There are approximately 400 ADR bodies which the member 
states have put forward as meeting the qualitative criteria set out in the Commission's two 
recommendations on principles applicable to bodies responsible for out-of-court 
settlement of consumer disputes: Commission Recommendation 1998/257 and 
Commission Recommendation 2001/31. However, the issue of patchy coverage of ADR 
has been raised as a significant issue by a number of different sources. For example, in 
its report on the functioning of ADR systems across the EU, the Nordic Council of 
Ministers (2002) confirms patchy coverage as a particular problem for the successful 
functioning of the system both in terms of unevenness of coverage across market sectors 
and across countries and regions. Their findings were also commensurate with those of 
the Commission's preliminary evaluation report on the functioning of the EEJ-Net. 
Based partly on the Nordic report, the conclusions of Giles Buckenham , the rapporteur 
of the EEJ-NET conference second workshop on ADR, (11/6/2003) identified a number 
of sectors where the coverage of ADR bodies is significantly incomplete across the 
network. For example, the workshop report concluded that in the timeshare sector, 11 out 
of 17 countries in the EEJ-NET do not have ADR bodies dealing with time-share 
problems. In the travel sector only 13 countries out of 17 have ADR bodies. The vehicle 
sector was described as "very incoherent as even where schemes exist [they] only deal 
S First wave of Clearing Houses (2001): Sweden (37), Finland (39), Portugal (223), UK (529), Austria 
(28), Belgium (108), Denmark (31), Luxembourg (122), Iceland (8), Norway (119). Second wave of 
clearing houses (2002): Ireland (48), Germany (841), France (89), Italy (20), Spain (206), Netherlands 
(61), Greece (14). 
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with some but not all possible complaints arising from this sector" (Buckenham : 2003: 1). 
In the e-commerce sector, only 10 out of 17 countries had ADR bodies and in the 
expensive goods sector only 8 out of 17 countries had ADR bodies. 
These findings were further confirmed by David Byrne (Commissioner for Health and 
Consumer Affairs) and Carina Tornblom in their opening speeches (Brussels 10- 
11/6/2003). There is already evidence that the lack of ADR bodies in these sectors is 
generating difficulties for the clearing houses. For example, a number of countries, 
including specifically Sweden, experienced problems relating to time-shares in Spain; 
however there are insufficient numbers of ADR bodies in Spain to deal with these 
problems which, in fact, account for 29% of all the complaints received by the EEJ-Net 
(Tornblom: 2003). 
The number of ADRs also varies widely across the member states; for example, there are 
relatively few ADR schemes in France, Austria, Luxembourg and the Nordic countries 
and over 200 in Germany (Buckenham: 2003, Nordic Council of Ministers: 2002). 
The adequate vetting of the ADR bodies has also been raised as an issue likely to affect 
the functioning of the EEJ-Net system as a whole. Further reservations expressed by the 
BEUC came as a result of comments from their members (the national consumer 
organisations). They complained that in some countries, consumer organisations had not 
been sufficiently integrated into the setting up of the clearing houses. Other members 
expressed concerns about the fact that, in their countries, the ADR bodies notified to the 
Commission for inclusion in the EEJ-Net did not meet the qualitative criteria set out in 
the Commission's recommendations concerning ADR bodies. This problem stems from 
the fact that a recommendation is simply that, a recommendation, i. e. it is not legally 
binding. The Commission has neither the powers nor the resources to monitor the vetting 
of the ADR bodies recommended to it by the member states. Moreover, it became clear 
during the course of an interview with two officials from DG SANCO (25/6/2003) that 
the Commission does not view this task as a major part of its role. The officials referred 
to the importance of trusting the member states to implement the Commission's requests 
properly. Furthermore, they indicated that they viewed their role in terms of inventors of 
the EEJ-Net system - once created, the operation of the system should be devolved down 
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to the member states to manage and the Commission should only be lightly involved in 
its regulation. During the EEJ-Net conference in Brussels (10-11/6/ 2003), Jim Murray 
(Director of the BEUC) expressed further concerns about the reliability of the ADR 
bodies recommended to the Commission. In particular, he commented on the doubtful 
reliability of national measures for assessing the bodies and he claimed that, in some 
instances, national consumer organisations had not even heard of some of the national 
bodies posted on the Commission's web-site list; this assertion was also reiterated during 
the course of an interview with a BEUC official (19/6/2003). 
Another conclusion that was reached by the Nordic Council of Ministers in its report on 
the functioning of ADR bodies in Europe, confirming earlier findings regarding the ECCs 
and the European Complaints Form, was the lack of public awareness of ADR schemes. 
The report claims that this is a problem in Germany where "a wide range of ADR 
schemes exist on paper, but ... are never used 
in practice" (Nordic Council of 
Ministers: 2002: 49). The problem of lack of public awareness was particularly noted in 
states that ran a system of less centralised ADR systems such as the UK, Austria or 
Germany, where there is a more individual and unregulated approach. The Council of 
Ministers concluded that in those states, the result was an "incoherent, ADR system" 
(Nordic Council of Ministers: 2002: 50). 
The Commission's non-legislative measures have been complemented by a series of 
legislative initiatives designed to have a cross-border impact. In general these are 
broader in their effect and some may be described as framework directives in that they 
establish a legal model within which specific measures may be located. 
Directive on Injunctions for the protection of consumers interests (98/27/EC) 
The Injunctions Directive finds its origins in the discussions that took place following the 
1993 Commission Green Paper on Access to Justice (EC: 1993a) and the 1996 follow-up 
Communication "Action Plan on Consumer Access to Justice" (EC: 1996a). Both of 
these documents emphasised the need for legal tools that were capable of dealing with the 
legal and jurisdictional barriers caused by state frontiers - the 1993 paper in particular 
explored the merits of using injunctions for the protection of consumers' collective 
interests. 
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The Commission's proposal for the directive was issued in 1998. The purpose of an 
injunctions action is to put an end to illegal behaviour on the part of a trader, which 
affects consumers adversely. The directive provides for member states to put forward 
national bodies that are designated as capable of pursuing an injunctive action on behalf 
of the collective interests of consumers. The directive also allows for actions to be 
pursued across borders against traders located in other EU member states - thus, under 
limited circumstances (elaborated below) the barriers to effective enforcement caused by 
the different legal jurisdictions in the EU can now be broken down. However, the 
Injunctions Directive is not a universal tool and is restricted in its application to particular 
EU directives6. Nevertheless, as the list demonstrates, many of the directives included 
deal with problems that have a logical potential for creating cross-border disputes. In 
addition to these, the injunctions directive was amended in 2003 and significantly 
extended7. 
To date (July 2003) the UK enforcement authorities would appear to provide the best 
example in terms of their proactivity in using the injunctions directive. By their own 
assertion they are regarded by both the Commission and other member states as the 
'leading light' on this particular directive -a situation which contrasts with their attitude 
towards the EEJ-Net (interview, OFT Officials, 3/7/2003). Moreover, as an official of 
DG SANCO admitted (interview 25/6/2003), on the basis of the restricted feedback he 
had received so far, experience of the directive appeared to be limited. Other than the 
OFT, the only authority to his knowledge that was using the directive was Tests Achats in 
Belgium who were pursuing a case (June 2003). 
The OFT was the first enforcement body to pursue an injunctions case - against a Dutch 
company called 'Royal Consulting' who were sending unsolicited first aid kits to 
6 Directive 89/450/EEC (Misleading Advertising), Directive 85/577/EEC (Contracts Negotiated Away from 
Business Premises), Directive 87/102/EEC et seq. (Consumer Credit), Directive 89/552/EEC et seq. 
(Pursuit of Television Broadcasting Activities), Directive 90/314/EEC (Package Travel, Package Holidays 
and Package Tours), Directive 92/28/EEC (Medicinal Products Advertising), Directive 93/13/EEC (Unfair 
Terms in Consumer Contracts), Directive 94/47/EEC (Time-Shares) and Directive 97/97/EEC (Distance 
Time-shares). 
Directive 97/7/EC (Protection of Consumers in Respect of Distance Contracts) 
Directive 1999/44/EC (Sale of Consumer Goods and Associated Guarantees) 
Directive 2000/31/EC (Electronic Commerce) 
Directive 2001/83/EC (Community Code Relating to Medicinal Products for Human Use) and 
Directive 2002/65/EC (Distance Marketing of Consumer Financial Services) 
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consumers in Britain and requesting payment for them. The request for payment of 
unsolicited goods is illegal under Regulation 24 of the Distance Selling Regulations. The 
OFT co-operated with Consumentenbond (the Dutch Consumers Association) in order to 
bring the practice to a close. Further monitoring of the situation is being undertaken by 
the OFT, which will react to evidence of future complaints and which is empowered to 
take further court action against the trader. In such a case, court action would be 
undertaken and would be enforced by a Dutch court. This is the only case that the OFT 
has brought using the directive where there has been a visible outcome. However, it is in 
the process of taking a number of injunctions cases (details of the cases were not 
available for discussion) and has used the directive on numerous occasions as a deterrent 
against traders engaging in dubious practices - reputedly to some effect. As an official of 
the OFT explained (OFT interview: 3/7/03): 
... 
if you look at the bare statistics, the "Stop Now" actions that we've taken, doesn't 
look very many. There's only been a couple of orders, one contempt hearing. But 
in the scheme of things, the number of undertakings we've obtained, then you 
actually see that it's working; it's mostly the threat of an injunction case that works 
rather than going through the injunctions... 
Most of the issues that the OFT has investigated with regard to the Injunctions Directive 
have related to misleading advertising, misleading mail and to holiday clubs (which have 
apparently set up certain practices designed to circumvent the requirements of the Time- 
Share Directive). The Injunctions Directive, therefore, appears to be particularly useful 
in these respects. The general consensus within the OFT was that the Injunctions 
Directive had proven to be a useful tool. The Injunctions Directive appears to have the 
potential to be a useful legal instrument in helping to prevent rogue traders from taking 
advantage of consumers across borders. However, there are a number of factors that may 
affect the success of the directive, particularly in the first few years of its operation. 
The first factor is the length of time that some countries have taken to make the directive 
operational in national law. The transposition period was supposed to have been 
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completed by 2001 and yet, by June 2003, Luxembourg for example still had not notified 
the Commission of its transposition arrangements. Another factor delaying the use of the 
directive stemmed from the fact that enforcement bodies could not begin to use the 
directive until the Commission had published, in the Official Journal on 2 February 2002, 
a list of'qualified entities' (i. e. bodies that the states had put forward as qualified to take 
actions). 
Much of the success of the Injunctions Directive relies on the pro-activity of those bodies 
empowered to carry out actions as well as their capacity to co-operate with their 
counterparts across borders. There appeared to be some evidence (during the course of 
the OFT interview), that the enforcers were not always as pro-active as they might be in 
pursuing potential cases using the directive. For example, the OFT officials stated many 
times over that their capacity actively to monitor sections of the market was limited by 
available time and resources. They admitted that they were a complaints-driven 
organisation - and reacted to evidence of actual consumer detriment, rather than potential 
(and even probable) detriment based on, for example, dubious contract clauses. Using the 
injunctions directive across borders is not always straightforward as the bodies 
empowered to take action across borders are not always comparable enforcement entities 
- thus procedures for pursuing a case vary from country to country. (This was the 
situation faced by the OFT in the Royal Consulting case (2002)). The enforcement 
agencies themselves are in the position of having to develop co-operation mechanisms 
'on the job', which gives the system a slightly ad-hoc appearance (interview with an 
official of DG SANCO: 25/6/2003). Nevertheless, as an interview with OFT officials 
(3/7/2003) revealed, this does not present an insurmountable barrier and ways and means 
are found to cope with administrative differences. 
An official of DG SANCO (interview: 25/6/2003) further confirmed that there were other 
teething problems with the directive. For example, in some countries the notion of an 
injunctions instrument is completely new to their legal cultures (e. g. Spain). There are, 
predictably, also problems to be tackled at the level of the language barrier and 
familiarisation with the law. 
Although in the UK the system of pursuing an injunctions case across borders is 
centralised, other countries, such as Germany and France, have many entities that are 
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capable of pursuing injunctions cases. Not all of these are empowered to take action on 
the basis of the entire range of directives and maybe limited in their scope of action; such 
is the case in Germany. Within and across the EU there are no centralised systems for 
collecting data on cases pursued between the enforcement agencies across borders. There 
is no obligation for one qualified entity to contact or operate with the co-operation of 
their counterpart in a state where an action is being pursued (OFT interview 3/7/2003). 
Thus for the purposes of monitoring the effectiveness of the directive, the lack of co- 
ordination would seem to present certain drawbacks. 
There is no routine obligation on the member states to inform the Commission of 
progress (successes or failures) with regard to the utilisation of the directive (Commission 
Official DG SANCO: interview: 25/6/2003), although the directive itself states that the 
Commission shall write a report on its application and present it to the European 
Parliament by2Ist July 2003 at the latest. In fact, the report was in the process of being 
written at the time of the interview. From then on, the Commission is mandated with the 
task of writing a report on the directive every three years. 
The monitoring arrangements at national level also vary from country to country; for 
example, OFT officials (interview: 3/7/2003) claimed that it does not have to report to the 
DTI on the application of the directive. The monitoring arrangements for the directive 
therefore do not appear to be either particularly uniform or particularly stringent. In any 
case, the Commission has no power to oblige the national enforcement authorities to 
adopt a more pro-active line in their use of the directive - that is a matter for the proper 
monitoring of the member states. The only powers that the Commission currently 
possesses are in respect of obliging the states to comply with the requirements of 
transposing the directive into national law. Ultimately, if a state refuses or drags its feet 
beyond the set time limit, the Commission may ask the European Court of Justice to 
begin infringement proceedings. 
Directive 1999/44/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council - of 25th May 
1999 on Certain Aspects of the Sale of Consumer Goods and Associated Guarantees 
A brief passage on this directive is included here because a popular misconception 
regarding the use of this directive to facilitate cross-border trade is that it provides EU 
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consumers with a cross-border EU guarantee. That is to say that it would lead the citizen 
to believe that, when they buy goods in a member state other than their own, they would 
be covered by the guarantee pertaining to the product in their member-state. This is not 
the case. The directive enables the supplier to limit the application of the guarantee, not 
only in terms of the time limit but also in terms of its territorial scope. Article 6.2. of the 
directive states: 
The guarantee shall... set out in plain language the contents of the guarantee and the 
essential particulars necessary for making claims under the guarantee, notably the 
duration and territorial scope of the guarantee as well as the name and address of 
the guarantor. 
This misconception is certainly fuelled by the rhetoric preceding the scope and 
definitions of the directive, which focuses heavily on facilitating cross-border trade. For 
example: 
... whereas consumers who are keen to benefit 
from the large market by purchasing 
goods in member states other than their state of residence play a fundamental role 
in the completion of the internal market; whereas the artificial reconstruction of 
frontiers and the compartmentalisation of markets should be prevented; whereas the 
opportunities available to consumers have been greatly broadened by new 
communication technologies which allow ready access to distribution systems in 
other member states or in third countries; whereas in the absence of minimum 
harmonisation of the rules governing the sale of consumer goods, the development 
of the sale of goods through the medium of new distance communication 
technologies risks being impeded... (EP & Council: 1999b) 
The purpose of the guarantee, therefore, is to create a base legal framework of minimum 
quality characteristics to which all EU guarantees will conform - thus making the format 
of EU guarantees at least predictable to EU consumers as they shop across borders. How 
useful this might be in obtaining cross-border redress is difficult to imagine. 
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In 2003, however, the Commission published two complementary proposals - the Unfair 
Commercial Practices Directive (COM (2003) 536 Final) and the Regulation on 
Consumer Protection Co-operation (COM (2003) 443 Final). In many respects both the 
directive and the regulation, discussed below, may be viewed as extensions of the process 
begun by the Injunctions Directive, that is, to provide a surer and more comprehensive 
approach to providing consumer protection for citizen-consumers across borders, 
particularly with respect to enforcement provisions. The proposals adopt a framework 
rather than sectoral approach to the problem of cross-border enforcement; this represents 
a significant break with strategies adopted by the Commission until this moment (2003). 
Proposal for an Unfair Commercial Practices Directive (COM(2003)536 Final) 
The proposal for an Unfair Commercial Practices Directive came into existence as a 
result of an extended consultation process initiated by the Commission in the 2001 Green 
Paper on Consumer Protection (EC: 2001b). The main thrust of the Green Paper was the 
need to reform EU consumer protection legislation in order to address barriers to 
consumers' access to goods and services across borders. 
Apart from `natural' barriers to consumer access to goods and services (e. g. language or 
distance) the proposal identified a range of unfair commercial practices likely to deter 
consumers significantly from making cross-border purchases (Commission: 2003d: 4). 
These practices were viewed as penalising not only consumers but also legitimate 
business interests who would pay the price for the loss of consumer confidence 
(Commission: 2003d: 4). The ex-ante impact assessment (GFA: 2002) compiled as a 
corollary to the Green Paper (EC: 2001b) concluded that the best approach to dealing 
with these practices was to create a "framework directive setting out general principles 
supplemented by specific sectoral legislation" (Commission: 2003d: 6). The proposal for 
the directive sets out to explain and describe the commercial conditions deemed by the 
Commission to be unfair and includes a short black-list of definitive malpractices in the 
annex. Thus the principal objective of the directive is to harmonise EU requirements 
relating to unfair business to consumer commercial practices across the internal market. 
This approach is intended to produce a number of benefits: first, it establishes a common 
approach to this aspect of consumer protection thus extending protection to EU 
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consumers outside of their national jurisdictions; second, it simplifies existing legal 
arrangements; and third, it helps to dismantle barriers to trade caused by divergent 
national provisions on unfair commercial practices. 
0 
Proposed Regulation of the European Parliament and the Council on Cooperation 
Between the National Authorities Responsible for the Enforcement of Consumer 
Protection Laws ("the Regulation on Consumer Protection Co-operation 
(COM(2003)443 Final) 
The proposed Regulation on Consumer Protection Co-operation was devised as a result 
of the Green Paper on Consumer Protection (EC: 2001b), and was in fact intended to 
complement the Unfair Commercial Practices Directive by providing a framework of co- 
operation between national enforcement bodies for the practical realisation of that 
directive. Support for the proposed regulation also came as a result of the Commission's 
Internal Market Strategy 2003-2006 which argued in favour of improved enforcement 
mechanisms in order to ensure consumer confidence in the Single Market and marked the 
regulation as a particular priority. Once again the rationale for prioritising this directive 
makes the connection between the effective enforcement of consumer protection laws 
and citizen-consumer support for the internal market. 
The proposal notes that, in their current state, the member states' systems of domestic 
enforcement are inadequate to deal with the demands of the internal market, particularly 
with respect to cross-border infringements. Although some mechanisms have already 
been developed to promote cross-border enforcement, for example the Injunctions 
Directive, some bilateral mutual assistance agreements between the member states as 
well as informal biannual meetings of enforcement authorities within the framework of 
the International Marketing Supervision Network (IMSN, described in Chapter Two) and 
their EU sub-group, the proposed regulation deemed these arrangements to be 
"insufficient" (EC: 2003f: 5). 
The enforcement framework is only intended to apply to intra-Community cross-border 
infringements thus member states' domestic enforcement arrangements remain 
unaffected. The regulation aims to create a framework for cross-border co-operation 
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between the national enforcement authorities based on reciprocal mutual assistance rights 
and obligations and is designed to work in the following way: 
The proposal puts in place a system of exchange on request.. . If the 
information 
exchanged confirms the existence of an intra-Community infringement, the 
proposal requires that competent authorities act to bring about cessation of the 
infringement without delay. The requested authority is free to determine the most 
effective and efficient way to achieve this. (EC: 2003f: 9) 
Thus, the regulation aims to circumvent a number of practical problems posed by the 
existing system. Examples of these practical problems would include jurisdictional 
limitations to national enforcement authorities' scope for action (based on powers or 
resources), the lack of an adequate rationale to act on behalf of foreign consumers, the 
absence in some member states (notably Germany, the Netherlands, and Luxembourg) of 
comparable enforcement authorities and the absence, in some instances, of bilateral 
arrangements between countries (EC: 2003f: 6). 
Conclusions 
The primary concern of the Commission in creating and pursuing its strategy of 
initiatives to help consumers to access their economic rights across borders has been to 
improve consumer confidence in the internal market. The emphasis placed on practical 
co-operation and administrative partnership to achieve improvements for consumers in 
the enforcement of their rights, heavily emphasised by the 1992 Sutherland Report, has 
begun to be translated by the policy actors into concrete mechanisms, as analysis of the 
Commission's initiatives demonstrates (Weatherill: 1999: 717). 
The Commission has adopted a mixed approach towards consumer protection in cross- 
border situations. Some initiatives are based on legal instruments - such as the 
Injunctions Directive or the Cross-border Directive on Guarantees. Other initiatives, 
however, are mainly based on information and advice with some attempt to bolster and 
co-ordinate the use of ADR mechanisms across the member-states. As Chapter Three on 
enforcement has already revealed, the Commission is in a peculiar position with regard to 
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the enforcement, implementation and monitoring of its policy initiatives. Whilst it is the 
Commission's task to propose, develop and devise policy ideas and strategies, it is the 
member states who are very largely responsible for realising these plans at ground level. 
Indeed, the Commission's competencies are restricted and defined by the treaties 
themselves and also by the principle of subsidiarity. This principle helps to maintain the 
fragmentation of the EU governance system by giving the member states justification for 
restricting the Commission's role in the policy process. This benefits the member states 
by allowing them to safeguard their sovereignty to a greater degree. On the other hand, it 
also helps to maintain a disjointed pattern in respect of the policy cycle; the dangers 
inherent in this approach are that it provides for sub-optimal monitoring, evaluation and 
co-ordination between the EU level and that of the member states. The examples drawn 
from examination of the selected initiatives have strongly suggested that this is the case. 
The Consumer DG has suffered from the lack of powers to monitor, co-ordinate or 
enforce its strategies at national level, furthermore, it suffers from a lack of both human 
and financial resources with which to carry out its work. 
Unable to create a super-structure of civil and commercial redress mechanisms at EU 
level and in the absence of regular co-ordination and feedback systems for the proper 
monitoring of the translation of EU policies at national level, the Commission's strategy 
has been to use the member states as trusted implementation agents, whilst engaging in 
some limited monitoring activities of its own. The co-financing of the European 
Consumer Centres and EEJ-Net initiative, for example, has given the Commission some 
justification for more direct intervention. 
159 
CHAPTER 6 
CASE STUDY ON THE EU MARKET IN CARS 
Introduction 
This chapter examines the particular case of car distribution in the light of European 
Commission initiatives to help consumers to access the best deals across borders in the 
Single Market. A principal aim underpinning the empirical aspect of the research design 
was to examine ways in which the Commission has attempted to compensate for the 
institutional constraints imposed upon its capacity to supervise proper enforcement at 
member state level in the domain of consumers' economic rights and to assess the success 
of these strategies. The intention was to do this by taking two contrasting case-studies, 
one a product, the other a service; both containing a cross-border dimension and 
examining their specific peculiarities in the light of the Commission's approach to 
consumer protection in these market sectors. A further dimension to the research design 
was to seek indications of the successful application of Commission initiatives examined 
in Chapter Five, where appropriate, relative to the case study chapters. In simple terms, 
the plan was to form a preliminary assessment of whether these initiatives were actually 
helping consumers assert their economic rights in these cases. Given the recent 
appearance of many of these initiatives and the incompleteness of their implementation, it 
seemed premature to attempt a more detailed assessment. This strategy is in line with the 
design of a plausibility probe, suggested by Eckstein (2000). The case of car distribution 
suggested itself because of the obvious and well-publicised problems surrounding the car 
industry's penchant for discriminatory pricing across the member states and for 
attempting to prevent parallel imports. The case thus involved a clear cross-border 
dimension. 
This chapter is organised into a number of sections. The first, 'Description of the Case- 
study Field', aims to describe the principal regulatory mechanism governing the structure 
of car distribution in the EU (the block exemption regulation). The second section, 
'Effects of the Block Exemption', gives an account of its operation and significance. The 
third section, 'Reform of the Block Exemption - Rationale', explores the political context, 
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which led to the decision of the European Commission to finally alter the block 
exemption in 2002. The fourth section, 'The Reform Process', explains how the block 
exemption was reformed, including an account of the responses of the European 
Parliament to the Commission's reform proposals and an account of the Commission's 
final decision. Finally, the last section draws inferences from the case in the light of the 
research questions contained in Chapter One. 
Description of the Case-study Field 
Any examination of the problems that face consumers in attempting to exercise and 
enforce their rights when buying motor vehicles in the Single Market must take into 
account the particular impact of the distribution system for the sale of new cars. The 
structure of the motor vehicle market is pre-determined by the distribution system and 
consumers are inevitably obliged to work within the artificial boundaries created by this 
system. The system is characterised by a series of agreements between manufacturers 
and dealers and is sanctioned by the EU in spite of its potentially anti-competitive nature. 
The system itself creates certain artificial patterns of advantages and disadvantages for 
consumers and dealers as well as advantages for manufacturers. An appraisal of the 
basic situation in which consumers have to operate is a prerequisite to an understanding 
of the particular problems that they may experience when attempting to exercise their 
economic rights to access the best deals in the field. 
The ensuing passages aim to describe how the distribution system works and why it has 
been organised in this way. It includes a description of the putative advantages that have 
been used to justify the maintenance of the present system and an appraisal of its 
disadvantages and special problems. 
Structure of Car Distribution 
Dealer networks are the principal mechanism used in the motor industry for the 
distribution of motor vehicles to the public. These networks are governed by a 
combination of exclusive and selective agreements. The rationale for adopting this 
method of distribution for motor vehicles lies in the nature of the product itself. The sale 
of motor vehicles has a number of characteristics which, although not unique, are specific 
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to the industry. For example, motor vehicles have certain technical requirements; they 
require that certain standards in after-care services should be met, and that certain levels 
of safety should be ensured as well as protecting the brand image of the manufacturer in 
the sales-room. Exclusive and selective agreements between manufacturers and dealers 
are intended to ensure that these conditions are met. Selectivity means that 
manufacturers can set certain criteria when selecting dealers. The criteria used can be 
both of a qualitative and quantitative nature. Qualitative criteria might typically include 
an obligation on the dealer to train and employ specialists or to meet certain standards in 
the provision of after-care services, to design the car show-room according to particular 
specifications or to comply with specific stock requirements or standards for advertising. 
Dealers belonging to the network are not allowed to sell cars on to other resellers outside 
of the network. Selective distribution systems exclude enterprises not meeting the set 
requirements. On the other hand, manufacturers are obliged to incorporate into their 
network all dealers meeting these requirements. Consequently, manufacturers limit their 
number through a further process of quantitative selection. Quantitative selection might, 
for example, seek to limit the number of dealers operating in the same territory or it 
might set quantitative sales targets on the dealer. Dealers are not permitted to open 
outlets or appoint sub-dealers outside of the contract territory. However, manufacturers 
do not have the right to prevent, by agreement, the entry of other vehicle manufacturers 
into their exclusive sales territories; i. e., they may not partition the market and assign 
sales territories within that market exclusively to their dealers. 
Structure of Car Distribution in the EU 
What is the block exemption? 
The block exemption on motor vehicle distribution and servicing agreements is the 
principal competition mechanism constraining the structuring of the car industry's 
arrangement for getting cars from the manufacturer to the dealer and on to the final 
consumer and has been described as the car industry's own "highway code" (Monti: 
2000). Although the EC treaty provision Article 81 (1) prohibits restrictive agreements 
and concerted practices in the field of vertical restrictions, EU competition policy Article 
81 (3) in effect provides for a derogation from this arrangement. However, such an 
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exemption may only be obtained where the overall economic benefits (for all interested 
parties, including consumers) outweigh the disadvantages for competition. According to 
the Commission's Report on the evaluation of Regulation (EC) No 1475/95, an 
exemption "under Article 81(3) is possible if an agreement contains only indispensable 
restrictions, does not eliminate competition and promotes production, distribution or 
technical improvements, while granting a fair share of the gains to consumers. " (EC: 
2000d: 8) 
The block exemption on selective and quantitative distribution had its origins in the block 
exemption regulation 67/67 of 22nd March 1967 (governing the application of article 85 
(3) of the Treaty of Rome to certain categories of exclusive dealing agreements amended 
by regulation EEC 259/72 (8 December 1972) and EEC Regulation 3577/82 (23 
December 1982)). However, exemption 67/67 was a general regulation and did not 
specifically cover agreements in the field of motor vehicle distribution. The first 
exemption decision in this sector was taken by the Commission in 1974 and involved 
BMW. The "BMW" case was intended to serve as a landmark decision and the 
Commission hoped that manufacturers would use it as a guide and adjust their 
distribution systems in accordance with the principles agreed in the decision. However, 
manufacturers continued to notify their agreements to the Commission in order to obtain 
individual exemptions. In order to deal with the problem of mass individual 
notifications, the Commission in 1985 adopted the first block exemption in the motor 
vehicle distribution sector along the lines of the BMW case: Regulation 123/85. The 
Regulation was in effect a form of administrative rationalisation. 
Regulation 123/85 ran for a period of ten years and covered both selective and exclusive 
distribution and servicing agreements. Amongst the obligations imposed on dealers, 
manufacturers were allowed to control to whom their dealers sold contract goods - for 
example, dealers could not sell to independent resellers. Manufacturers could restrict 
dealers to selling only to end-users and to dealers within the manufacturer's distribution 
system. Manufacturers could prevent dealers from selling spare parts to independent 
resellers who might need the parts for maintenance and repairs - thus restricting 
competition in both sales and after-sales services, although wholesalers of spare parts 
163 
were exempted from this. In addition, manufacturers could oblige dealers to offer after- 
sales services, thus tying together two types of commercial activity. At the time the 
Commission felt that tying together the sale of new cars and the obligation to offer after- 
sales services would be more efficient and beneficial to consumers because of the 
technical complexity of motor vehicles and the need for close co-operation between 
manufacturers and dealers on technical matters with regard to maintenance and servicing. 
For the same reasons, the Commission approved of manufacturers limiting the number of 
dealers and repairers to their networks. Further restrictions were placed on dealers to 
concentrate on particular sales territories. Dealers were not allowed to maintain branches 
or depots or even to advertise actively outside their own territories. The rationale behind 
these obligations resided in the notion that they would encourage dealers to engage in 
more intensive distribution and servicing efforts, enable them to gain a more in-depth 
knowledge of the local market and that this would lead to a more demand-oriented 
supply. (EC: 2000d: 16-17) Dealers were, however, allowed to sell to customers who 
came from anywhere outside of their territory and dealers had the right to order 
'corresponding vehicles', i. e. vehicles with slightly different technical specifications (e. g. 
RH drive), from the manufacturers. Manufacturers were allowed to prevent their dealers 
from selling other makes of new vehicles, from selling spare parts which did not match 
the quality of spare parts of the product range, or from selling vehicles made by the same 
manufacturer but which were outside of the dealer's product range. Again the 
Commission's rationale for allowing these practices was so that dealers would 
concentrate on the products supplied by the manufacturer thus ensuring better distribution 
and servicing for the consumer. 
In 1995, Regulation 123/85 expired and was replaced by another block exemption EC 
Regulation 1475/95, which allowed for the continuation of both qualitative and 
quantitative distribution agreements between motor vehicle manufacturers and dealers. 
Although the basic principles of regulation 123/85 remained the same, the rules under the 
renewed block exemption were modified in order to stimulate competition and improve 
the functioning of the Single Market with a view to re-balancing the interests of 
manufacturers, dealers and consumers (UK Competition Commission: 2001). For 
example, the new regulation allowed dealers to distribute other vehicle makes providing 
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that they did so in separate premises under separate management. It was also made clear 
that dealers' remuneration should not depend on the final destination of a vehicle - this 
was an attempt to protect both the rights of the consumer to buy and of the dealer to sell 
cars from his/her establishment to consumers from anywhere in the EU. The rules 
governing the dealer's right to advertise outside of his/her territory were also relaxed. 
There were other changes aimed at providing dealers with greater economic certainty 
with regard to the manufacturers. 
This revised block exemption was due to expire on 30th September 2002, and as the 
regulation provides that the Commission should at regular intervals evaluate its 
effectiveness, the Commission undertook to write such a report by the end of December 
2000. The report aimed to equip EU policy-makers with the necessary information in 
order to make a judgement as to whether the regulation should be renewed in its present 
form, modified, or allowed to become obsolete. 
Effects of the Block Exemption 
Before turning to an examination of the reform process itself, a necessary pre-requisite to 
an understanding of its significance is the appreciation of the effects of regulation 
1475/95. The following section thus aims to provide a summary of the practical effects 
of the block exemption on the distribution structure, on the market structure, and on 
consumers. 
On the Distribution Structure of the Industry: 
The block exemption has in fact legitimised and ossified the system of vertical 
restrictions - selective and exclusive distribution agreements, which have characterised 
the car industry. The system has considerable advantages for manufacturers. It has 
enabled them to tailor the system for distributing and servicing their vehicles to their own 
specifications. They have also been able to ensure a certain level of geographical 
representation for their vehicles and servicing throughout the EU and have been able to 
control the density of the distribution system. 
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This method of distribution has also allowed manufacturers largely to avoid the economic 
costs and financial risks of distribution, whilst affording them considerable control over 
the performance of their dealers. The latest EU evaluation report argues: 
"manufacturers have a right to closely monitor their distributions activities and 
performance through sales targets for e. g. the sale of new vehicles and spare parts, or as 
regards requirements on stocks of contract goods. " (EC: 2000d: 1. Annex II). For the 
dealers themselves, the block exemption offers a mixed balance sheet. There are certain 
benefits. By allocating dealers an exclusive territory within which to operate, the system 
provides dealers with a certain amount of protection from intra-brand competition. This 
enables the dealers (largely SMEs) to earn a reasonable return on their investment more 
securely. 
The dealer contract is itself intended as a form of protection in so far as the dealer's 
investment is guaranteed for a certain period of time. Either contracts have to be 
concluded for five years or, if the time period set is unlimited, manufacturers have to give 
the dealer two years notice before ending the contract without a reason or one year's 
notice in case of network reorganisation. In addition to these benefits, manufacturers 
guarantee dealers with a supply of contract goods and offer a range of support services. 
However, dealers have argued that the power ratio in the distribution structure under both 
Regulation 123/85 and 1475/95 has been weighted firmly in favour of the manufacturer. 
Certain dealers (for example, Pendragon, Nottingham, UK) have complained that 
allowing manufacturers the freedom to give only one or two year's notice, severely 
curtails the dealer's independence to engage in pro-competitive practices (Pendragon 
Letter 2002). This assessment is supported by the Consumers in Europe Group (CEG) 
who, at the time of the review of Regulation 123/85, commented: 
The proposal, if adopted in its current form will continue to impose a straight jacket 
on dealers which will stifle their ability to respond to changing consumer needs 
over the next decade. The draft proposal does not go far enough to bring about a 
single market or to develop a flexible and efficient distribution system for cars and 
spare parts. CEG emphasises that even the limited benefits of the draft proposal 
will not be achieved without a vigorous programme of monitoring, review and 
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enforcement by the Commission. One of the fundamental weaknesses of the 
current Regulation has been, on the one hand, the ability of manufacturers openly to 
flout the conditions on which the block exemption was granted, and on the other, 
the unwillingness of the European Commission to apply any sort of sanctions 
(CEG : 1994: 2). 
On Market Structures in the EU 
As for its impact on the single market, the block exemptions have served to restrict the 
number and type of sales outlets selling new cars. For example, the regulation enables 
manufacturers to close their sales networks by restricting sales of new vehicles to 
independent retailers operating outside of the regulation. Also, to a large extent, the 
regulation has excluded the creation of multi-brand sales outlets by tying dealers to 
supplying cars from one manufacturer. The evaluation report observes: 
"selling a make produced by a different manufacturer is only permissible where the seller 
is a separate legal entity run by separate management and where the sale is made in 
separate premises. " (EC : 2000d: 10) 
The block exemptions (Regulations 123/85 and 1475/95) have also allowed 
manufacturers to divide the market into exclusive sales territories. On the other hand, it 
has been claimed that this model of distribution ensures the effective geographical 
distribution of new vehicles and enables manufacturers to tailor the supply of vehicles to 
local demand. However, the effect of the agreements significantly distorts the structure 
of the market by preventing the elimination of high-cost distribution outlets. Because 
dealers operate under similar conditions across the EU, their out-going costs tend to be 
broadly comparable and, consequently, the price of their vehicles also bears significant 
similarities within a given country, particularly with regard to intra-brand trade. 
However, the picture alters significantly when intra-brand car prices are compared across 
national boundaries, where comparisons demonstrate significant price differentials (See 
annex1 table of car prices). These differentials appear to show an artificial geographical 
basis and do not seem related to largely economic considerations, such as transport costs. 
For example, Finland and Greece are two of the markets the furthest away from 
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manufacturing centres, but enjoy some of the lowest prices across a wide range of brands 
in the EU. Moreover regulation 1475/95 actually obliges manufacturers to require their 
dealers to provide after-sales service thus, in the majority of cases, tying the sale of new 
cars to car servicing. This practice has had the effect of reducing competition both in the 
car servicing and repairs industry. 
The activities of manufacturers have actually led to the reduction of parallel imports - for 
example, by reducing the discount available to consumers wanting to import cars from 
abroad. They have done this in a number of legitimate ways: for instance, by raising, in 
the case of parallel imports, the pre-tax price charged for new cars in countries with high 
taxation regimes to the same as that charged in countries with low taxation regimes. 
They have charged consumers a supplement for supplying right-hand drive cars. The 
block regulation allows for this because right-hand drive cars have to be manufactured to 
particular specifications and the demand for such cars on the continent is low. As the EU 
evaluation report explains: 
... the text of the notice clearly specifies that this supplement 
is a "further" 
supplement... this text can be understood as meaning that the supplier can charge 
this supplement only if he is already entitled to charge another supplement for the 
relevant car, such as the so-called "corresponding car". If this interpretation were 
correct, and some car manufacturers take the view that it is, this clause would 
permit considerable price discrimination in cross-border sales of right-hand -drive 
cars as against purchases of left-hand-drive cars. Such an interpretation is clearly 
in contradiction with the basic principles of the Regulation, i. e. to give all European 
consumers the right to take full advantage of the single market and to purchase a 
car wherever prices are most advantageous. (EC: 2000d: 102) 
According to this scenario, the manufacturer (or the manufacturer's importer) might claim 
the right to charge twice. The first charge would be for the special supplement (e. g. for a 
right-hand drive vehicle) and the second for exporting cars from high tax regimes (i. e. 
where vehicles have a lower pre-tax price) to countries with low tax regimes. Thus, 
manufacturers are regaining the pre-tax price of vehicles when moving them from a high 
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tax country to a low tax country. This regulation allows price supplements only where 
vehicle modification (e. g., right hand drive) already imposes an initial price supplement. 
Thus right hand drive consumers are open to discrimination not suffered by other EU 
consumers. In its report, the Commission concludes that this practice is discriminatory. 
The report states: 
High car taxes have a clear impact on car prices and contribute to increased price 
differentials within the single market. Under the notice on Regulation 123/85, a 
further supplement may be charged in countries where car taxes are above 100%. 
This would be discriminatory: it would allow manufacturers to make an additional 
surcharge for exports of - in practice - right-hand-drive cars which are purchased in 
these countries. With this surcharge manufacturers could increase prices for such 
cars to the price level in the cheapest country where car taxes are below 100% of 
the net car price. The maintenance of such a provision which allows price 
increases in view of the tax regime in a certain member state for export sales of 
- in practice - right-hand-drive cars does not appear to be justified. (EC: 
2000d: 103, my emphasis) 
Furthermore, parallel trade has been reduced specifically in the UK due to the fact that 
car manufacturers have failed to pass on to UK consumers the financial benefits of the 
cheaper production costs of cars manufactured in continental Europe. Manufacturers 
have also imposed strict sales quotas on their dealers and have tailored the supply of cars 
to dealers on the basis of local demand. Consequently, dealers have tended to favour 
consumers from their own member state and have adversely discriminated against foreign 
buyers. For example, dealers have discouraged foreign buyers by quoting long periods 
for delivery of a vehicle or by refusing to supply. Even though refusal to supply is 
classed as an abuse of the regulation, experts from consumer organisations have 
suggested that many foreign consumers do not know their rights well enough to question 
the veracity of the dealers' explanations and therefore do not pursue the matter. 
Moreover, even in such circumstances where consumers do know their rights, it does not 
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follow that they are able to exercise them. When faced with an entrenched institutional 
abuse, individual consumers rarely have the will or resources to challenge that abuse. 
The question of price differentiation across borders is confused by both tax and currency 
issues. Manufacturers and suppliers have consistently argued that differences in car 
prices across borders are the result of tax differences and currency fluctuation. The 
evaluation report recognises this: 
Car taxation is a factor which is outside the control of the motor vehicle industry. 
The Commission recognises this and in its notice on Regulation 123/85 stated that 
it will not investigate price differentials if they can be attributed to taxes, charges or 
fees amounting in total to more than 100% of the net price of a car, as is the case in 
Denmark, Finland and Greece. (EC: 2000d: 96) 
However, it is perhaps worth pointing out that the Commission's explanations are 
ambiguous and open to misinterpretation by the uninitiated reader. It is true, for 
example, that car taxation is outside the control of the motor vehicle industry, and prices 
can be attributed to tax differentials. However, the wording of the passage would lead 
the reader to draw the conclusion that the higher prices were in no way attributable to the 
pricing policy of the manufacturers. In fact, the manufacturers are responsible for 
differentials in the pre-tax pricing policy of vehicles across the member states, and in 
countries with very high tax regimes, such as Denmark, manufacturers choose to lower 
the pre-tax price of vehicles to make them more affordable. 
The manufacturers' practice of reducing net prices to high tax countries (such as Finland 
and Denmark) means that they have operated a systematic pattern of cross-border price 
subsidies to the detriment of consumers in low-tax countries. The purpose of the parallel 
import supplement is to prevent arbitrage. 
Regulations 123/85 and 1475/95 state that the Commission can suspend the block 
exemption in cases where there is evidence of significant price differentials. In practice, it 
has, however, never used this power. Moreover the effects of such drastic action might 
be so extensive and complex as to make this sanction unusable. For instance, one official 
in the Competition DG (interview: 27/6/2002) has compared it to the nuclear deterrent. 
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The Commission provided its own interpretation of the regulation. According to its 
interpretation, the Commission recommended that retail prices in general should not 
exceed 12% of the lowest price for any specific model of car within the Single Market, 
i. e. price differentials across the EU should not exceed 12%. 
However, the report continues to explain that even if Denmark, Finland and Greece 
(countries with the highest tax regimes) are not taken into account, the price differentials 
amongst the remaining twelve states still exceeded 12% for the period of November 1996 
to November 1998. Technically, therefore, the Commission could have opened 
investigations (EC: 2000d: 96). The reason the report gives for the Commission's 
inaction, is that the level of price differentials is affected by countries with special tax 
regimes. However, the diagram clearly demonstrates that countries with special car tax 
regimes were not even included in the main part of the survey. Their statistics were only 
included in the diagram from May 1999 onwards. Consequently, the level of price 
differentials cannot be attributed to high tax regimes. 
Currency fluctuations were also identified by car manufacturers and the Commission as 
being a major contributor to price differentials. In its report, the Commission claimed 
that prices in the UK had been particularly high because of exchange rate fluctuations. 
They based the proof of this assertion on a chart (see Diagram 18, EC: 2000d: 103) which 
showed how UK car prices rose closely in line with the rise in the exchange rate between 
the pound and the Euro. As Mario Monti (Competition Commissioner) commented: 
A recent test case for the functioning of the internal market is the case of the United 
Kingdom. Prices for domestic buyers are, as you know, very high in this Member 
State if converted into Euros, compared to other markets with similar car taxes. 
Reasons for the price differential between UK prices and prices on the continent 
include, on the one hand, the appreciation of the pound sterling against the Euro 
and on the other, the fact that right-hand drive vehicles are more expensive because 
the numbers of such cars are smaller than the numbers of similar left-hand drive 
cars. (Monti: 2000) 
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However, this argument is illogical. The effect of an appreciation of the £ against the 
Euro should be to reduce the price within the UK of cars imported from countries in the 
eurozone. 
Both Monti and the EU report criticised UK car prices on these grounds, attributing the 
high prices to insufficient amounts of parallel trade. The report explained: 
... one would also have expected another element [the strength of the £ sterling] to 
play a role in promoting downward pressure on prices in the United Kingdom... 
despite the strength of the pound, car prices in the United Kingdom have, since 
1997, generally not decreased. Assuming that trade should become lucrative if 
price differentials are above 12% significant trade should indeed take place and 
should have exerted a downward pressure on car prices. The fact that producers 
can obviously ignore the impact of parallel imports on prices in the United 
Kingdom implies that trade is very limited and that competition does not fully play 
its role. (EC: 2000d: 104) 
At this point, it appears that the authors of the report recognise that an appreciation of 
sterling should lead directly to a reduction in the price of cars imported into the UK. 
Nonetheless, the report concluded with a worrying confusion about the impact of rises in 
the value of sterling: 
The car price differentials calculated in ECU/euro within the 8 countries with 
low taxes on cars show that the rise in value of the pound sterling after 1996 
has automatically increased the magnitude of differentials between these 
countries: UK car prices increased nearly in parallel with the rise in value of 
the pound. However, the rise in value of the pound cannot, on its own, completely 
justify the level of prices in the UK since other factors (increase in parallel trade, 
action on car manufacturers producing in the euro zone) should have exerted 
downward pressure on prices. These factors, which are to be expected in a market 
on which there is competition did not materialise. (EC: 2000d: 99) (My emphasis. ) 
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However, this logic only applies to vehicles manufactured and sold in the UK In the case 
where vehicles are manufactured on the continent and sold in the UK, precisely the 
opposite applies. The effect of a rise in the value of the pound sterling should be to 
reduce car prices expressed in pounds in the UK. This reversal of the logic of exchange 
rate fluctuations frequently appears in debates on this topic. It is particularly disturbing 
to find it in an EU evaluation report. 
Mario Monti concurred with the report's analysis and explained that the paucity of 
parallel trade could also be attributed, in part, to the pressure exerted by the 
manufacturers on dealers. According to Monti, manufacturers have been in the habit of 
using the regulation to justify allocating new vehicles in a rigid way, such that dealers' 
stocks have been focussed on local demand in their territories (Monti: 2000). 
On Consumer Choice: 
Price differentials for cars across the member states are important because, as the 
Commission report evaluating the block exemption explains, price differentials can be an 
indication of market partitioning. In view of the fact that one of the objectives of the 
single market is to promote market integration, evidence of market partitioning should, 
according to the Commission, be carefully monitored (EC: 2000d: 92) 
For the consumer, the block exemption means that there are few real alternatives to 
buying a new car other than going through the dealer networks (EC: 2000d: 11). The 
dealer networks restrict the sale of new cars to independent resellers, which restricts the 
entry of new players into the market for selling new cars. This restricts competition in 
the car distribution sector, which might otherwise put downward pressure on the price of 
cars. Intra-brand competition is therefore restricted, consequently prices are not as low as 
they might be were other would-be entrants to the market allowed to compete effectively. 
The activities of manufacturers (largely legitimised by the block exemption) have also 
created considerable obstacles for consumers who attempt to purchase cars across 
borders. For example, the Regulation effectively legitimises the practice of charging 
higher prices for cars in lower tax regimes to those in higher tax regimes. Thus, the 
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benefit of discounts that might have been expected to accrue to consumers prepared to 
shop around in the Single Market are less than might be expected. 
Reform of the Block Exemption: Rationale 
Why was the block exemption retained for so IonR without significant alteration? 
In view of the above assessment, the first question that naturally arises is why was the 
block exemption retained in a similar form for so long? Apart from the arguments 
offered by the Commission at the time to the effect that this system offered the best and 
most efficient method of distribution (assertions which have been strongly contested, as 
the above critique has demonstrated), the reason for the retention of the 1985 and 1995 
block exemptions focus around one central theme - the corporate influence of 
manufacturers on politicians, on political parties, on member state governments and on 
the EU. McLaughlin (1993) and Holmes and McGowan (1997) all note the importance 
of the car industry to the member states' manufacturing and employment policies. For 
example, Holmes and McGowan comment: 
The car industry in Europe is politically visible and sensitive. It is estimated that 
value added in the automobile and component industry itself is just under 2 per cent 
of EU... (GNP). EU car producers employed around 1.13 million workers in 1990, 
with another 900,000 in the components industry. If all indirect suppliers are added 
in, it is estimated that about 4.5 million workers, or 15 per cent of industrial 
employment is involved in the industry. (Holmes & McGowan: 1997: 160) 
The importance of the car sector to the member states' industrial policy has in the past led 
some member states to adopt protective strategies towards the car manufacturers. 
McLaughlin comments: 
The car industry has, in the past, been plagued by crises and a poor industrial 
relations record. Moreover, because of its pivotal role in the manufacturing sector, 
its under-performance has led to repeated government intervention. The European 
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industry is therefore dominated by national champions which have come to rely 
heavily on domestic sales. (McLaughlin: 1993: 196) 
Holmes and McGowan further note that the industry was badly hit during the early 1990s 
due to the recession and that member states were also anxious to protect both domestic 
and EU car manufacturers from the impact of Japanese imports. They describe the 
protective strategies adopted by certain member states towards car manufacturers. 
Taking the UK, France and Italy as examples, Holmes and McGowan explain the 
economic impact of these strategies on the EU car market: 
The UK government, believing the industry to be viable but in need of radical 
overhaul, encouraged inward investment. It allowed manufacturers to collude to 
restrict Japanese imports and to set prices high in the UK market, such that the UK 
consumer would in effect subsidise domestic and foreign producers alike. The 
French government with Renault... chose to subsidise local producers directly, while 
keeping prices lower, restricting imports by direct administrative controls that had 
no legal base and discouraging inward investment. From the 1960's, the Italian 
government maintained more or less legal and very restrictive import quotas (not 
contested by the Commission) leaving prices high and allowing no inward 
investment to compete with Fiat. (Holmes & McGowan: 1997: 161/162) 
The strength of the car industry's lobbying powers is acknowledged by a range of 
sources. McLaughlin describes the industry's 'multi-level' strategies at some length, 
noting the presence of the car manufacturers at national and EU level. According to 
McLaughlin, manufacturers have used a variety of lobbying tactics; lobbying directly at 
both national and EU level, setting up their own offices in Brussels, lobbying via national 
and European interest associations as well as employing professional lobbyists. This 
assessment has also been confirmed by members of the Consumer's Association (CA) 
(3/7/2002), by MEPs (25/5/2002) and the Competition DG (27/6/2002) during the course 
of interviewing. For example, a principal policy adviser from the CA commented: "The 
reason why the block exemption remained for so long is it is there for the car industry. 
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The industry has incredible power - huge economic power. " (Interview: 3/7/2002). Eric 
Van Ginderachter, head of the competition DG's unit on car distribution and other forms 
of transport offered the following comments regarding the first regulation 123/85: 
At the time, the exemption [regulation 123/85] was based on the specific characters 
of the motor vehicle industry advanced by the manufacturers in order to permit this 
system of distribution which is, it is to be underlined, the most restrictive one can 
imagine from the competition point of view. (Van Ginderachter : 2000) 
The continuation of the system in 1995 with only minor adjustments may be attributed to 
the power of the manufacturer's corporate lobbying and their importance to the industrial 
policies of the member states, as Holmes and McGowan indicate: 
The producers succeeded in persuading the Commission to renew with only a few 
minor modifications the Block exemption on motor vehicle distribution in 1995, 
despite opposition from BEUC and the new member states. (Holmes & McGowan: 
1997: 168) 
As Holmes and McGowan comment above, it is interesting to note the lack of action 
taken by the Commission to correct the collusive practices of the manufacturers at this 
time. In view of the fact that these practices were largely condoned by the member- 
states themselves, the Commission's politically sensitive task of pursuing corporate 
miscreants cannot have been easy. Nevertheless, the first infringement of competition 
rules taken by the Commission against any car manufacturer documented below came as 
late as 1998. 
Why Did the Commission Decide to Redefine the Block Exemption? 
In view of the fact that the Commission changed only marginally the substance of 
Regulation 123/85 in 1995, one question that suggests itself is: why did the Commission 
suggest such a radical overhaul of the block exemption regulation by 2002? One part of 
the answer lies in the fact that Regulation 1475/95 was due to expire on 30th September 
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2002 anyway and contained a clause committing the Commission to publishing an 
evaluation of its effectiveness by the end of 2000 (Article 11.3 Regulation 1475/95). In 
the event, the evaluation was highly critical of the effectiveness of the exemption. The 
proposed new draft was based on the findings of the report as well as on information 
gathered through a variety of consultations with interested parties, questionnaires and 
commissioned studies. The importance of the evaluation as an instrument for change is 
clearly stated in Annex 1 of the new draft exemption, which also contains a summary of 
the key reasons prompting this. The annex states: 
A renewal of the existing motor vehicle block exemption Regulation (EC) No 
1475/95 is not a real option... The evaluation report adopted by the Commission on 
15 November 2000 concluded that Regulation (EC) No 1475/95 did not achieve 
certain of its principal aims. (EC: 2002d: annex 1) 
The key failures of regulation 1475/95 were identified as follows: 
1. The regulation had a 'straight-jacket' effect, since all motor vehicles were distributed 
in a similar way. 
2. Parallel trade between member states remained marginal as demonstrated by the 
Commission's six monthly car price surveys. The amount of parallel trade was not 
significant enough to put downward pressure on manufacturer's prices. Studies 
commissioned by the Competition DG showed that price differentials were not simply 
due to taxation or to currency fluctuations but could be attributed to the pricing strategies 
adopted by the manufacturers. 
3. Regulation 1475/95 made it difficult for new market entrants such as internet suppliers 
or multi-brand dealers to establish themselves. 
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4. The report concluded that the link between the sale of new cars and after sales services 
was not 'natural', that it did not pose safety problems and that it constituted a restriction of 
competition. 
5. Although approximately 80% of spare parts are not made by the manufacturers, the 
dealers were encouraged by the manufacturers to source the majority of their spare parts 
via the vehicle manufacturers instead of via the original producers. 
6. Dealer independence had not been significantly strengthened by Regulation 1475/95 
in spite of the changes made in 1995. Moreover, the annex contained the following 
assessment: 
Although regulation (EC) No 1475/95 is very generous to the automobile industry, 
car manufacturers have often not respected its terms, obliging the Commission to 
adopt four decisions involving the imposition of fines. On 28 January 1998, 
Volkswagen was fined EUR 102 million for impeding parallel trade in Italy 
(reduced by the CFI to EUR 90 million). On 20 September 2000 the Commission 
fined Opel Nederland EUR 43 million for restricting parallel trade in the 
Netherlands. On 30 May 2001, Volkswagen was fined a second time for price 
fixing in Germany, this time involving the VW Passat (fine EUR 30,96 million) and 
on 10 October 2001 DaimlerChrysler was fined EUR 71,825 million for impeding 
parallel trade in Germany, restricting sales to leasing companies and engaging in 
price fixing in Belgium. (EC: 2002d: Annex) 
During the course of this research, members of the Competition DG (interview 
27/6/2002) and the European Parliament (25/5/2002) have explained that the successes 
that the Competition DG had in prosecuting the car manufacturers lent further weight to 
the case for redefining the car block exemption. These were by no means the only 
instances of infringement. In a speech delivered to at the European Competition Day 
during the panel on car distribution (Lisbon 9/6/2000), Eric Van Ginderachter (head of 
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the Competition DG's unit on Motor vehicles and other means of transport) commented 
that apart from the first case involving VW: 
Other possible cases of similar infringements made by other manufactures, which 
are still being examined reveal that, as soon as parallel imports reach a figure of 
about 3% of sales in a state, a percentage which represents all in all a low figure, 
restrictive measures aiming to block them are taken. In one of these cases, the 
restrictions observed concern the parallel trade between Spain and Portugal. The 
prices were higher in Portugal than in Spain for certain models of that manufacturer 
and parallel trade was taking place. The car manufacturer apparently decided then 
to reduce the vehicle allocation in respect of those Spanish dealers who had been 
selling cars to Portugal and cars awaiting distribution to dealers were not delivered. 
Other measures to halt the export of cars to Portugal were also taken. The result 
was a steep decline of sales to Portugal compared with the previous years. (Van 
Ginderachter : 2000) 
Jim Murray, director of the BEUC (Bureau Europeene de 1'Union des Consommateurs - 
European Consumer's Group) also confirmed the recalcitrance of the manufacturers' to 
comply with the regulation during the Commission's hearing on 13/14th February 2001 
on Regulation 1475/95 (Murray: 2001). 
In addition to the EU evaluation report, two member-states - Denmark and the UK - also 
produced reports on the block exemption. The UK report - April 2000, (UK Competition 
Commission 2000) - appeared in advance of the EU report and seems to have had some 
influence on it (Monti: 2000). The report recommended the abolition of the system of 
exclusive territories and suggested that manufacturers should be forbidden to refuse to 
supply new cars to any retailer. It also recommended that tying the sale of new cars to 
after sales servicing should be abandoned and that dealers should not be obliged to offer 
the full range of the manufacturer's models. In brief, the report recommended that the 
regulation should not be renewed. In the spring of 2001, the Danish competition 
authority also published a report 'Agreements and prices in the car sector' in which it 
found that regulation 1475/95 was responsible for the absence of competition between 
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members of the same network for new cars and spare parts. It recommended that any 
future regulation should not be based on quantitative or exclusive criteria but on certain 
qualitative criteria. 
Further pressure to change the block exemption came from the sheer number of consumer 
complaints that the Commission received as a result of regulation 1475/95. The level of 
complaints intensified both prior to and during the consultation process for the new draft 
exemption. The significance of consumer lobbying is noted in the annex of the new draft 
regulation (Commission: 2000d). In his speech'Who will be in the driver's seat? ' Mario 
Monti, the Competition Commissioner, specifically commented on the importance of the 
UK consumer lobby in this respect (Monti: 2000). 
The importance of the consumer lobbying was also cited during interviews with members 
of the Competition DG (27/6/2002), the EP (25/5/2002) and the CA (3/7/2002). Other 
consumer organisations also brought pressure to bear on the Commission, for example at 
the Competition DG's hearing on 13/14th February 2001, Jim Murray, director of the 
European Consumer's group, offered the following assessment: 
We do not say there is no competition in the car market. We say there is not 
enough, and that the block exemption is a major factor in facilitating unreasonable 
unjustified and unnecessary restrictions on competition. (Murray: 2001) 
The Competition DG's bi-annual price surveys which demonstrated continued market 
segmentation in the sale of new cars also supported the Commission's decision to 
overhaul regulation 1475/95. 
Impetus for change also came from the car manufacturers themselves, who, after having 
sought to obtain cost savings from the suppliers of car components, began to seek further 
economies by rationalising their distribution systems. This trend was confirmed by 
Mario Monti who cited the changes as an additional reason for carefully evaluating the 
operational effectiveness of regulation 1475/95 in an altered environment (Monti : 2000). 
The dedication of Mario Monti, himself a professor of economics, to the reform of the 
exemption, also gave support to the process. Moreover, it is clear from an examination of 
Prodi's speeches that, since becoming EU Commission President, he has been very 
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concerned to improve the relationship between the EU citizen and the EU institutions. 
The circumstances under which Prodi became Commission President, shortly after the 
resignation of the disgraced Santer Commission, had an obvious impact on his priorities. 
His speeches show a high level of concern regarding the disillusionment of EU citizens 
with the EU institutions and with the integration process. He repeatedly refers to a 
greater commitment to issues of concern to citizens, such as social, environmental, health 
and consumer issues, as Chapter Four demonstrated. 
Reforming the governance process, democratising and improving the functioning of both 
the decision-making process and the implementation and enforcement of policies are also 
prioritised (Prodi.: 23/11/2000,13/2/2001,10/7/2001,4/9/2001,11/10/2001,5/10/2001). 
The phrase he used is 'making Europe work better; it is possible to draw links between 
the context provided by these general priorities -a context which is generally more 
sympathetic to issues of concern both to citizens and to citizens as consumers and the 
reform of the block exemption regulation. A principal policy adviser at the UK 
Consumers' Association also suggested that the Commission was worried about the way 
in which citizens viewed the EU. He commented: 
The EU is bloody worried about how citizens view the EU - they're worried about 
bad publicity due to corruption and how citizens view the EU institutions in the 
light of this corruption. They're worried about their legitimacy - they're aware of 
low turn-out figures for EU elections, of the rise of the right wing, EU scandals. 
They want to prove that they are worthy because without legitimacy you have no 
power. (Interview: 3/7/2002) 
Finally, members of the Competition DG, themselves aware of the perceived failure of 
the Commission to bring about adequate changes to the block exemption in 1995 or 
adequately to ensure the proper functioning of the market for the sale of new cars, were 
anxious to redeem the image of the Competition DG in the eyes of the citizens. An 
official of the Competition DG admitted that the evaluation report, which showed 
evidence of a marked change in attitude to the block exemption, effectively represented 
an admission that the competition DG had made a mistake in not reforming the regulation 
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governing the distribution system earlier in 1995 (Interview: 27/6/2002). A principal 
policy adviser in the CA also confirmed this: 
The Competition DG decided that it had not done the job properly last time and 
they decided to do the job properly this time. They also got fed up of the car 
industry throwing its weight around and basically treating them with contempt. 
They wanted to move away from the image of corruption that had grown up during 
the Santer Commission - there was a desire to put things right. The new president 
of the EU Prodi had a clear vision - he wanted to make EU policy closer to the 
citizen and Monti was the same. (Interview: 3/7/2002) 
The Reform Process 
In the wake of the conclusions of the evaluation report, the Commission began a period 
of informal consultation. A range of interested actors were consulted and invited to 
comment or submit evidence to support their opinions during a number of hearings and 
debates organised by the Commission, the EP and the Economic and Social Committee 
(ECOSOC). These hearings were complemented by a series of studies commissioned by 
the Competition DG (The sales service link' by Autopolis (2000), 'Price Differentials in 
the EU: an Economic Analysis' by Prof Verboven and Degryse (2000), 'Customer 
Preferences for Existing and Potential Sales and Servicing Alternatives in Automotive 
Distribution by Dr. Ladermann & Partner (2001)). 
As a result of this, the Commission decided that it would not renew regulation 1475/95 in 
a similar form, but would significantly alter its substance and form. The Competition DG 
consequently composed a new draft regulation, which it presented on 5th February 2002. 
It was considerably stricter on the manufacturers than the previous regulations and was 
intended to increase competition in the sale of new cars and after sales services and 
strengthen the position of the dealers in respect of the manufacturers. The draft contained 
a number of innovations. For example, it did not prescribe a single kind of distribution 
system as previously but allowed manufacturers the choice between running a selective 
or exclusive system. (An exclusive system is where each dealer approved by the 
manufacturer is given a sales territory but may sell to other resellers outside of the 
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manufacturer's network. In a selective system manufacturers again choose their dealers 
according to qualitative criteria but do not allocate specific sales territories and are not 
allowed to sell to other retailers operating outside of the manufacturer's network). The 
link between the sale of new cars and after-sales servicing was loosened; the new draft 
gives dealers the choice as to whether to carry out after sales services themselves or to 
sub-contract them. In addition, the practice of allocating dealers an exclusive territory and 
obliging them not to engage in active sales outside of their territory - the 'location' clause 
- was to be prohibited and dealers were to be allowed to establish themselves in other 
member states. In the draft, additional restrictions were removed from dealers wishing to 
sell multi-brand vehicles. Dealers would be allowed to sell multiple car brands without 
being obliged by the manufacturer to display the full range of motor vehicles if this 
constituted an unreasonable restriction on the dealers' financial ability to multi-brand, and 
dealers were to be allowed to service competing makes of car. However, manufacturers 
were to be allowed to insist that their cars should be displayed under certain specific 
showroom conditions. 
In addition to these changes, the draft exemption contained an extended list of 'black 
practices' which was also intended specifically to remedy the failures of the previous 
regulations. As well as the conditions outlined above, the black list contained clauses 
referring to the prohibition of manufacturers to set re-sale prices for distributors, although 
recommended prices would be permitted. In addition, manufacturers would be prohibited 
from restricting dealers' territories or access to customers, except under very specific 
conditions compatible with the regulation. Many of the clauses were intended to prevent 
manufacturers from restricting the sale of spare parts to independent repairers, or from 
preventing dealers access to the cheapest spare parts. Other clauses referred to the 
ability of the Commission to withdraw the benefits of the block exemption where "prices 
or conditions of supply for contract goods or for corresponding goods differ substantially 
between geographic markets; or ... where 
discriminatory prices or sales conditions are 
applied within a geographic market. " These conditions were specifically aimed at 
reducing the problems of parallel imports. 
The prospect of reform met with considerable opposition from both the car manufacturers 
and from key national politicians. For example, Gerhardt Schroder (German Chancellor) 
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has been accused of bullying member of the Commission in defence of the German car 
manufacturers; a principal policy adviser at the CA offered the following comments 
about the German chancellor: 
Gerhardt Schroder is on the VW car industry advisory board, every German and 
French MEP backed the car industry, they are lobbied endlessly, the industry camps 
out at their door. Schroder threw his weight around at the competition DG 
endlessly and shamelessly. (Interview: 3/7/2002) 
The Response of the European Parliament. 
The draft exemption was sent out for comment to the member states and also to the other 
institutions of the EU - the European Parliament and ECOSOC. Both the Parliament and 
ECOSOC drew up their own reports on the Commission's draft exemption. Although the 
Parliament had recourse to neither the co-operation nor the co-decision procedures, its 
opinion nonetheless was significant for the success of the Commission's draft proposal. 
Although the Parliament 'welcomed' the Commission's efforts to increase competition in 
the car sector, it offered a number of alterations, which were clearly intended to weaken 
the liberal effect of the new draft. It is interesting to note, for example, that in the initial 
justification for the proposed changes, none of the explanations refer to the position of 
the consumer, but address the position of the dealers, distributors and other SMEs. The 
most damaging changes concerned the elevation of the percentage level of the 
manufacturer's market share before investigation by the Commission and the delay on the 
ban of the location clause. The Parliament proposed raising the market share level at 
which manufacturer's vertical agreements should be investigated from '30% or up to 40% 
in case of quantitative selective distribution for the sale of new motor vehicles', as 
proposed by the Commission, to a flat 40% for all vertical agreements. The Commission's 
suggestion was already enormously generous and amounted to permission to maintain 
oligopolistic practices. 
The Parliament also suggested delaying the abandonment of the 'location clause', the 
ability of distributors to set up showrooms and repair/maintenance workshops anywhere 
in the EU. Under the Commission's draft proposal, enterprises benefiting from the 
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current regulation on 30th September 2002 were to be allowed a year to adjust before the 
new rules should apply. The Parliament suggested that the introduction of this clause 
should be delayed until 2005, when a review of the operation of the exemption should be 
undertaken, with a view to establishing whether or not it would really be necessary to 
adopt this practice in order to meet the criteria set out in Article 81(3). The review itself 
would take a number of months to complete, thus delaying even further the freedom of 
distributors to establish themselves anywhere in the EU. At the end of the review, the 
possibility still remained that the location clause would not be abandoned thus, in the 
meantime, prolonging regulatory uncertainty for all concerned. The importance of the 
clause to the Commission's success in liberalising the car sector was underlined by 
Commissioner Monti in his submission to the EP's plenary debate. Monti comments: 
One of the most important elements of our new system is the prohibition of use of 
the location clause. This is the linchpin of the system and it is necessary for the 
other measures to be effective too. The abolition of this clause applying to vehicle 
sales, which will allow dealers to open secondary sales and delivery outlets in other 
areas, including in other member states, is essential to facilitate consumer access to 
vehicles sold by dealers from other Member States at lower prices. This will 
increase competition between dealers selling the same brand of car and encourage 
market integration, making multi-brand sales possible too. (Monti : 2002 a) 
The EP's position is difficult to reconcile with the evaluation reports. In spite of technical 
advice or the weight of consumer dissatisfaction, the EP sought to block reform, 
suggesting that MEPs were subject to powerful lobbying by the manufacturers. This was 
subsequently confirmed both as a result of a debate that took place in the Parliament on 
29th May 2002 and also as a result of a vote that the EP took on whether to adopt the 
proposed parliamentary amendments. It was also confirmed individually by an MEP 
(interview: 25/5/2002), by members of the UK Consumer's Association (3/7/2002) and 
by a senior official in the Commission's Competition DG during the course of interview 
(27/6/2002). 
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The debate involved submissions by seventeen MEPs on the subject of the Commission's 
proposed draft block exemption. The crux of the submissions centred on the question of 
the location clause: whether to accept the Commission's ban or whether to extend the 
transition period for the clauses with a review in 2005. The submissions were clearly 
divided in opinion along national lines and reflected the importance of national lobbying 
from home industries. It must be remembered that the German and French manufacturers 
are particularly important to their respective governments' economies and that, for both 
countries, the redrafting of the block exemption occurred during an election year. 
Lobbying of national and European politicians was therefore intense. Seven MEPs 
favoured extending the location clause with a review in 2005, three of these were 
German, two French, one Spanish, and one Italian. One Spanish and one Portuguese 
MEP favoured an extension of the transition phase with no review and four MEPs 
favoured banning the location clauses altogether; three were British and one was Danish. 
The Danish MEP (Riis-Jorgensen) offered the following comments on the impact of the 
car manufacturers' lobbying tactics on a variety of the MEPs during the period of the 
draft exemption review. She states: 
.. the car manufacturers' view of what is in their own best interests does not 
coincide with what is beneficial for consumers. We have clearly seen this in the 
form of the massive lobbying that has gone on everywhere in recent weeks and 
months in order to prevent a genuine internal market for car sales being 
established... (Riffs-Jorgensen: 2002) 
On 30th May 2002, the Parliament voted overwhelmingly in favour of adopting the 
European Parliament's amendments, extending the inclusion of the location clause until 
2005 with a subsequent review. 
The Commission's Decision 
On 17th July 2002, after taking into account the opinion of the European Parliament, the 
Commission published its final version of the new block exemption. The new regulation 
took into account fully or partly 18 of the 29 modifications suggested by the EP. Its 
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commitment to offering manufacturers a choice between a selective or exclusive network 
remained unchanged. Dealers belonging to selective systems will be able to engage in 
active sales techniques, i. e. they may actively advertise anywhere in the EU. Dealers 
belonging to exclusive systems will be able to sell actively to independent resellers 
within the exclusive territory. This practice is banned by the current regulation. The 
clause on availability - i. e. the right of buyers wishing to purchase corresponding 
vehicles and the right of dealers to supply those vehicles - was also reconfirmed. 
However, the decision on banning the location clause was delayed until 2005. This 
represents a partial success on the part of the EP (and particularly on the part of the 
manufacturers) in gaining two more years of protection from the full force of 
competition. However, contrary to the EP's proposal, the working of the block 
exemption will not be re-evaluated but will definitely be banned as of the 15t October 
2005. The effects of the clauses on multi-branding, as described in the draft exemption, 
remain the same. Existing restrictions on operators acting on behalf of consumers are to 
be removed, in the future, so called 'intermediaries' will only need to show a mandate 
from the consumer; thus making cross-border purchases theoretically easier. The link 
between the sale of new cars and after sales service is to be loosened, as the draft 
exemption intended. Dealers are to be allowed to choose whether to carry out service 
operations or subcontract them to an authorised repairer in the manufacturer's network. 
The new regulation also provides that as long as they meet the correct quality standards, 
car dealers and independent repairers can become part of a manufacturer's network 
without being obliged to sell new cars. The manufacturer may not limit the number of 
repairers, and repairers can service a variety of car makes. 
Conclusions 
This chapter set out, in the context of the EU market for cars, to examine ways in which 
the Commission has attempted to compensate for the institutional constraints imposed 
upon its capacity to supervise proper enforcement at member-state level in the domain of 
consumers' economic rights and to assess the success of these strategies. 
In many respects, the case-study amply demonstrates the limitations of the Commission's 
approach towards consumer protection. The approach adopted by the Commission in this 
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field substantially rested on attempts to amend the block exemption on cars, so as to 
increase consumers' capacities to exercise their economic rights. The case has revealed 
that a significant characteristic of this market sector is that many of the problems 
experienced by consumers occur prior to purchase - for instance, refusal to supply, 
restriction of supply, application of multiple price supplements for parallel imports. 
Problems of this type cannot be addressed by means of redress mechanisms. However, 
many of the direct consumer protection measures currently in force are designed to 
provide for consumer redress as Chapter Five demonstrated - as such they may be 
considered to have been largely inappropriate and inadequate. In these circumstances, 
the Commission has turned to competition policy and, in particular, the revision of the 
block exemption as a means to achieve its policy goals. However, its attempts to 
strengthen the consumer's hand by altering the balance of power of the regulatory 
framework in their favour met with profound opposition from politicians and 
manufacturers, whose interests were often closely interrelated. Consequently the reforms 
did not go as far as consumer interest groups had hoped or expected. It is particularly 
interesting to note that the institution responsible for weakening the Commission's bid to 
reinforce consumer power was the European Parliament, the supposed protector of 
citizens' interests. In this way, the case-study clearly demonstrates the dilemma posed by 
Tallberg's P-S-A model - that as principals, the member states agreed to the creation of a 
common regulatory structure which they delegated to the Commission to supervise and 
enforce. However, when faced with the application of economic pressure by the car 
manufacturers, many politicians worried about the adverse economic and political fall- 
out that might result from the reaction of the manufacturers to the revised regulatory 
structure, themselves pressurised the Commission to water down the effects of some of 
the more liberal clauses. Although the analogy with this model is not exact - in 
competition policy, the states delegate both the task of supervisor and agent to the 
Commission - member states' politicians are still in the position of reacting to the 
application of the rules. Cut out of the loop, as they are in the application of competition 
policy rules, member states' politicians used political pressure, both directly on the 
Competition DG and through the European Parliament, to oppose regulations which they 
perceived to be damaging to their party political interests. The success of the 
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manufacturers and politicians in watering down the revised block exemption also clearly 
demonstrated the limitations on the Commission's attempts to promote citizen-consumer 
support for the Single Market by increasing their ability to access its full economic 
benefits. 
Nonetheless, the new block exemption would seem to represent some progress on the old 
regulations. As the above analysis has demonstrated, the Commission has worked hard 
to increase competition in the car sector and to curb the power of the manufacturers. The 
extension on keeping the location clause represents a not insignificant victory for the 
manufacturers, although, ultimately, the Commission's desire for reform has prevailed. 
Nevertheless, it remains to be seen whether the new regulation will succeed in making a 
practical difference to the car market. Recent EU car price surveys (22/7/2002) show that 
substantial price differences persist across the member states. The Commission will still 
be responsible for the supervision and enforcement of the regulation. Its ability to do so 
effectively will still be hampered by a lack of resources and by the limited political will 
of some of the member states. Its ultimate weapon, the withdrawal of the block 
exemption remains, to all intents and purposes, unusable. The Commission can continue 
to fine car manufacturers, but the fines appear to have only a limited impact; 
manufacturers continue to engage in 'black practices', even after substantial fines, as the 
VW case clearly demonstrates. However, by attacking the root of the problem, rather 
than by aiming to redress the after-effects, and in this way, circumventing the difficulties 
posed by the enforcement loop, the Commission may in the long term have taken a step 
towards putting the consumer back in the driver's seat. 
Prior to the publication of the Commission's evaluation report of regulation 1475/95, 
Commissioner Monti made a speech on the future of the car distribution system at the 
end of which he summarised his view of the then prevailing system: 
The manufacturer is in the back seat of the car and gives instructions to his 
chauffeur, the dealer, on how to drive down the distribution highway to the 
consumer, who buys the car. The manufacturer finally manages to bring the car to 
the consumer, who buys the car, but not always, it seems in the fastest, most 
economic and smoothest way possible: moreover, all too often the manufacturer 
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appears to instruct the dealer, who should really be the one responsible for driving 
the car, to do things which are outside the "highway code". In addition, according 
to consumers' expectations, the European "highway code" seems not in all respects 
the best possible solution to bring the car to the consumer. (Monti: 2000) 
A year after the adoption of the new block exemption the changes to the regulatory 
framework appear to have had only a modest impact on the car sector. The car market 
2003 annual EU Car Price Report (1.5.2003) indicates a modest overall reduction in car 
price differences of 2%, although price differentials between the cheapest and dearest 
member-states remain substantial. The report reveals that prices of popular models have 
remained unjustifiably divergent. The largest differential found in the survey, applied to 
the Fiat Seicento which cost 45.5% more in Austria than in Spain. Indeed pricing of the 
most popular models shows no marked improvement on previous years and the prices of 
some Peugeot and VW Group models show marked increases compared with 2002. 
Germany remains the most expensive state where a total of 35 models are sold at the 
highest prices in the EU. Prices in Denmark remain the lowest in the Union. 
Commissioner Monti expressed disappointment at the rate of progress (Commission 
Press Release: 25.7.2003: 2): 
This report shows slight though insufficient progress towards a truly single market 
for car distribution... A consumer who buys a car at a lower price in another member 
state should not face any anti-competitive obstacles. 
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CHAPTER 7 
CASE-STUDY: CROSS-BORDER PASSENGER TRANSPORT 
Introduction 
This chapter examines the case of cross-border transport with particular reference to 
cross-Channel passenger transport, principally between the UK and its nearest 
Continental neighbours - France and Belgium. It explores the recent experience of 
consumers in terms of sea and rail transport along a limited number of popular routes, in 
the light of the market strategies adopted by the principal operators. 
In terms of sea-crossings, the case will be mainly restricted to the short cross-Channel 
routes. Some reference will be made to western routes and to the longer North Sea 
routes. In terms of rail travel, the case will be confined to Eurostar routes from London 
to Paris, Lille or Brussels, and to the Eurotunnel shuttle services for motorists from 
Folkestone to La Cocquelles. 
The case is intended to fulfil a number of functions. It will place cross-border transport 
in the wider context of EU policy objectives, especially those relating to the economic 
development of border regions. It will provide, by examining primary data relating to 
travel reservations, evidence to illustrate the increasing limitations on consumer choice 
and will specify the structures and strategies which have brought this about. It will 
explore a variety of forms of discrimination experienced by consumers including cross- 
border discrimination, and it will examine these experiences with reference to selected 
EU policy measures designed to protect the economic interests of consumers. In this way 
it will address one of the research questions central to this study, namely: given the 
institutional constraints imposed upon the Commission's capacity to supervise proper 
enforcement at member state level, how has the Commission attempted to compensate for 
these constraints in the domain of consumer economic rights and to what extent has it 
been successful? 
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From this case of cross-border travel and from the study of the European car market, it is 
intended to draw inferences regarding the impact of measures 'on the ground' to inform 
key issues raised by the study. This case complements the study of the European car 
market by focussing on a service, which is quintessentially cross-border in its nature. 
Moreover, like the cars case, cross-Channel travel has represented an area in which 
interest has been shown by policy actors at both member-state and European Commission 
levels since the mid-1980s. 
The chapter first examines the significance of cross-border travel, outlining the structure 
of the cross-channel market and reviews attempts by European Commission and member- 
state actors to shape market structure; it then examines the present market position and 
explores the effects of market practices on consumers. The final sections deal with 
Commission responses to cross-border consumer problems, and examine these in the 
light of cross-channel passenger transport. 
The Significance of Cross Border Travel 
Inevitably, the EU inherited the economic history and the economic structures of its 
constituent member states. These structures reflected and, to some extent, still reflect the 
shapes etched by the economic and commercial flows of the independent national 
economies which pre-dated the EEC. Apart from the fact that national frontiers were 
themselves frequently defined by geographical barriers, the very political entity of the 
nation-state tended to marginalise these frontier areas by committing resources and 
infrastructure to serve areas more centrally placed. This feature of the economic 
geography of the EU was addressed in the early-1990s by the support of projects 
designed to strengthen cross-border links via the progressive construction of a Trans- 
European Transport Network. In an analysis of the development of the fourteen initial 
Trans-European Network (TEN) projects, van Exel et al stress the importance of this 
policy as a necessary supplement to normal market forces (van Exel et al: 2002: 299). 
The TEN projects are recognised by the European Commission as having an 
important role to play in the process of launching a more dynamic, sustainable 
and job-creating economic growth; in particular by improving the competitiveness 
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of European countries to match or exceed that of other developed or developing 
regions in the world. This should be done by providing peripheral regions - often 
being border regions - of the community with better access to economic centres, 
by improving economic and social cohesion throughout Europe and by enhancing 
the environmental conditions of transport activities. 
In fact, in 1998, the Commission itself specified the main objectives for the TEN 
initiatives. These included the need to improve strategic mobility, to contribute to 
strategic economic improvement, and the implementation of the Single Market. 
Interestingly, it was also intended to enhance the social dimension, with particular 
reference to equity, working conditions and a 'Citizens' Network' (van Exel et al: 2002). 
Apart from its economic role in what was once frontier territory, the case of cross-border 
travel is unusual, perhaps unique, in a number of respects and it is these peculiarities 
which make it especially relevant to this study. First, a journey, be it by train, ferry or 
plane, is not simply a similar experience for consumers, but one actually shared by those 
consumers who happen to have booked the same departure. Moreover, since the 
experience is shared, it may be taken as axiomatic that the operator's unit costs will be 
much the same, irrespective of when or where the booking was made, though clearly, 
different levels of service (First Class), for instance, may involve additional costs and 
accordingly higher prices per unit. A second peculiarity of this case is that it is normal 
for bookings for the same departure to be made by consumers operating from a number 
of different states, speaking different languages and often paying in different currencies. 
A third peculiarity of this case is that the service itself, by necessity, involves delivery in 
two or more states, before the service may be said to be complete; it is, by its very nature, 
international. Only other means of communication, post, freight, telecommunications, 
for instance, seem comparable. A fourth feature is that, owing to the exceptionally wide 
geographical distribution of potential consumers and the differences between them in 
language and culture, it is difficult for consumers themselves to make effective price 
comparisons, even regarding the same supplier, offering an identical service but to 
different consumers in different member-states. These geographical and cultural 
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differences make it possible for suppliers of cross-border travel services to engage in 
discriminatory policies. 
Description of Case-study Field: The Market Structure 
The sea crossings to the near continent operate from ports along the English south coast, 
principally, Dover, Newhaven, Portsmouth, Poole, Plymouth, and Weymouth, to ports 
along the French and Belgian coasts - Ostend, Calais, Dieppe, Le Havre, Cherbourg, St 
Malo and Roscoff. In 2003 the major operators offering regular services on these routes 
were P&0, Brittany Ferries, Seafrance, Hoverspeed and Norfolk Line. Condor Ferries 
were also operating on the Western Channel routes. P&0, Stena and Northsea Ferries 
merged operations in the Channel in October 2002, although Stena Line retains an 
independent service from Harwich to the Hook of Holland. Following the merger, the 
Dover-Zeebrugge route was abandoned by this operator. 
In terms of rail crossings, two main passenger services are available. Eurostar offers 
high speed direct cross channel journeys from termini in London, Brussels, Paris and 
Lille. These connect with other high speed and conventional services across Western 
Europe. 
Eurotunnel offers a vehicle plus passengers service from Folkestone to La Cocqeulles. 
No provision is made for passengers without vehicles other than via Eurostar. In many 
respects, these services represent a unique case in that the tunnel was not simply a 
commercial venture, but a project enjoying the political and economic support of the 
French and British governments. The immense investment involved in the construction 
of the tunnel and, the financing problems it has engendered, place those operators using it 
in a position which is not strictly commercial and which is not shared by other cross- 
Channel operators (see Appendix 2). The significance of these market structures for the 
EU's indirect approach to securing the benefits of single market for the citizen-consumer 
is explored below. 
Indirect Intervention: The Shaping of the Market Structure 
One arm of the EU's policy to secure for consumers the benefits of the Single Market has 
been to monitor market structure with a view to reducing the incidence of 'market failure'. 
194 
A key element of the EU approach has been to rely on the 'normal' forces of a 
competitive market to achieve effectiveness and efficiency on the supply side, whilst 
delivering the benefits of these economic virtues to the demand side of the market. 
Evidence set out in Chapter Four (The Citizen Consumer) suggests that it was only in the 
1990s that consumer dissatisfaction and voter indifference alerted policy actors at 
national and EU levels to the need for a supplementary range of policies more directly 
targeted towards support for consumer interests. Nonetheless, the market in cross- 
Channel travel provides an instructive example of the workings of indirect intervention, 
focussing on the competitive environment of the industry. This particular policy 
approach gave rise to a series of investigations into proposed mergers of cross-channel 
short-sea operators and goes some way towards explaining the present market structure. 
In fact, the structure of this market has been the subject of several enquiries in recent 
years, amongst the more significant of which are the Monopolies and Mergers 
Commission (MMC) Reports of 1986,1989 and 1997. 
The 1986 Report 
In 1986, the Monopolies and Mergers Commission reported on a 'merger situation' 
between P&0 and European Ferries. The investigation covered not only operations on 
the short sea routes to the Continent, but also on the routes from Hull to Zeebrugge and 
Rotterdam, as well as routes to Ireland. The 'situation' arose, not from a complete merger 
or even a merger proposal, but from the acquisition by P&0 of 20.8% of the ordinary 
and convertible preference shares in European Ferries (including Townsend Car Ferries 
Ltd and Thoreson Car Ferries Ltd). 
In their deliberations, the MMC considered, apart from the views of the principal 
companies involved, the views of a range of interested parties. Apart from the 
Automobile Association, perhaps, none of the parties consulted could be said to speak for 
passenger interests. No explicit reference was made to the most popular UK holiday 
crossing, short sea routes to France. No public body concerned with travel or tourism in 
England or on the near continent was consulted and no body explicitly represented the 
end consumer. 
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Although the report was directed at the overall impact of the merger situation, including 
passenger business, analysis largely concentrated on freight and concluded that the 
freight operators were strong enough to drive hard bargains involving heavy discounting. 
Unsurprisingly, given the emphasis on company to company bargaining and a virtual 
neglect of the individual consumer, the report concluded: "We have not found evidence 
therefore that the present merger situation has of itself brought about changes detrimental 
to the public interest or that it may be expected to do so". (MMC: 1986: 50) 
The 1989 Report 
Three years later, the Director of Fair Trading asked the Monopolies and Mergers 
Commission to investigate cross-channel car ferry services between Dover, Folkestone 
and Ramsgate on the English side and Boulogne, Calais and Dunkirk on the French. The 
MMC considered a proposal for P&0 and Sealink to provide a joint service which 
would involve co-ordination of sailings, interchangeable tickets, agreement on fares and 
the pooling of revenue. The service would include Societe National des Chemins de Fer 
Francais (SNCF), which was already Sealink's partner in an existing joint service 
agreement. On this occasion the list of interested parties invited to submit evidence 
included a number which might be said to represent consumers directly, namely the 
Consumer Association, the National Consumer Council, the Caravan Club, the 
Caravanning and Camping Club, the AA and the Royal Automobile Club (RAC). 
Unlike the earlier report, the 1989 enquiry included some pertinent comparisons on price 
and service. The strategies adopted by the main operators was summarised as follows 
(Monopoly and Mergers Commission: 1990: 27): 
Generally the operators aim to set fares according to what the market will bear. 
Sealink and P&0 told us that they needed to be competitive with each other and 
had responded to each other's prices. Sally and Hoverspeed charge different prices, 
possibly reflecting their different market positions. A number of discounts are 
available and, we were told, the operators had difficulty increasing their average 
fares in line with inflation... 
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P&0 EF [P &0 European Ferries] and Sealink have a similar structure of prices. 
... These tariffs are applied to differentiate by season, by day and by time of day. 
Broadly the application of tariff bands reflects the expected pressures on capacity 
and attempts to use pricing signals to match demand to capacity. 
This pattern, at that time, was common across the industry and gave consumers clear 
information on tariffs and services. 
The report contained a price comparison between P&0 and Sealink on the Dover-Calais 
Route covering the period from 1979 to 1990. This indicated not only the existence of an 
identical tariff structure - definition of car-length, identical combined packages (car up to 
4m +2 adults and 2 children), but also a very high level of identity between prices. In all, 
the table shows 60 direct price comparisons between 1979 and 1989. Of these, 22 
showed no difference at all; i. e. in 36.6% of comparisons, prices were identical. In a 
further 20 instances, the difference was £2 or less, i. e. 33% of all comparisons. Thus in 
69.6 % of all comparisons, the difference between P &O and Sealink prices was £2 or 
less. In the report, the companies explained this in terms of their reciprocal responses to 
each other's competitive position. It could equally easily be described as price collusion 
based on a tacit duopoly. The MMC chose to take a benign view of this phenomenon: 
At first sight, similarity of brochure prices might suggest that competition is 
weak. This would be misleading. Because each competitor watches each other's 
prices closely, reprinting its own brochures if necessary, the existence of 
competition has had a real moderating effect on price levels. (MMC: 1990: 79) 
The report concluded: 
... that the proposal to operate a 
joint or co-ordinated service may be expected 
to have the effects adverse to the public interest of reducing competition and 
choice in the period until the tunnel opens, with further adverse effects on price and 
standards of service... We do not believe that there would be offsetting benefits 
to competitions after the tunnel opens to offset the substantial and 
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irremediable detriment to competition in the interim. (MMC: 1990: 83. ) (my 
emphasis) 
The 1997 Report 
Eight years later the question of a proposed merger between P&0 and, on this occasion, 
Stena Line, was again the subject of a Monopolies and Mergers Commission 
investigation (MMC 1997). The MMC considered both freight and passenger business 
and examined the structure of the market, including Eurotunnel services. P&0 and 
Stena claimed that the inception of the shuttle service had placed pressure on their 
operations and that a merger was a necessary step to preserve an effective ferry-based 
alternative to the tunnel. The Commission obtained a detailed comparison of costs 
between the major operators and this led the Commission to anticipate that Eurotunnel's 
cost structure was unlikely to give rise to a significant downward pressure on prices (see 
Appendix 2). They concluded that, if the merger were permitted, an effective duopoly 
over short sea routes would come to prevail and that this market structure would give rise 
to parallel pricing at a level higher than necessary to maintain a sustainable alternative to 
the tunnel (MMC: 1997). 
Whilst accepting that some benefits would accrue, particularly in the creation of a durable 
competitor to Eurotunnel, the report went on to reject the proposed joint venture in the 
clearest terms: 
We believe, however, that the most important benefit, namely the potential 
cost savings, would not flow through to the benefit of the public unless the 
joint venture were operating in a competitive market with other ferry 
operators. We do not consider that this will be the case and we conclude that 
the likely service benefits of the joint venture do not outweigh the detriments 
to the public interest, in the form of higher prices, which it would bring 
about... We have therefore concluded that the joint venture would operate against 
the public interest. (MMC: 1997: 5) (my emphasis) 
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Given the unequivocal nature of this assessment it is therefore surprising to find that the 
MMC nonetheless recommended that the joint venture should be allowed to proceed, 
subject to certain limited conditions. The report recommended as follows: 
We take the view, however, that adjustments of cross-Channel capacity are 
necessary as a result of the opening of the Tunnel and that the joint venture could 
bring other benefits to the public interest given a sufficiently competitive 
environment. The majority of us believe that conditions could be secured under 
which effective competition from ferry companies to the joint venture would be 
preserved. (MMC: 1997: 5) 
The MMC considered what action could be taken to remedy any adverse effects, which 
were expected to flow from the joint venture. These potential remedies covered three 
aspects of the situation: those designed to encourage the development of competitors with 
smaller market shares, those to prevent action to eliminate competitors, and remedies 
designed to limit the joint venture's marketing power. The MMC therefore recommended 
that P&0 and Stena should give undertakings before implementing the joint venture. 
These conditions are listed below: 
1. An undertaking not to introduce fast-craft services on any short sea route, except 
Newhaven-Dieppe where it already existed; 
2. A commitment to introduce interlining arrangements for full fare tickets on the 
Dover-Calais route, where requested to do so by other ferry operators; 
3. A commitment to provide the Director General of Fair Trading with financial 
and other data to enable the OFT to monitor the competitive situation in the market; 
4. A commitment not to negotiate joint arrangements with travel agents or 
aggregate incomes for the purpose of calculating commissions, nor would it enter 
into any exclusive arrangements with travel agents; 
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5. "P &0 and Stena would not advertise the joint venture's services in promotional 
publications, brochures or advertisements which they had produced or 
commissioned" (MMC: 1997: 6) 
6. P&0 and Stena would give up rights to some ticketing facilities at Dover. 
Interestingly, one of the report's authors, Professor Cave, dissented from the majority 
view and concluded that these proposed remedies would not be sufficient to preserve 
effective competition. He argued that the merger should not be permitted (MMC: 1997). 
In themselves, these conditions offered little by way of a barrier to merger, even though 
the report had concluded in clear terms that such a merger would operate against the 
public interest. Nor did they introduce any significant conditions designed to protect 
consumers from uncompetitive pricing, the main fear expressed in the report by Cave. 
The belief that parallel behaviour would emerge in the future is also interesting, since the 
previous MMC report had already concluded that such parallel pricing could be clearly 
detected in the 1979-89 period. 
Parallel behaviour is not, however limited to pricing policies. The market power which a 
duopoly or oligopoly situation affords suppliers means that they are able to engage in a 
variety of market practices designed to segment the market and to profit from effective 
discrimination. These practices were already beginning to emerge before the 1997 MMC 
report and, as the analysis below shows, these practices have progressed unchecked since 
that time. In the event, the joint venture was set up in time to advertise joint operations 
for the beginning of the 1998 season. The following section explores, with detailed 
examples, some of the practices relating to prices and conditions of service on the short- 
sea channel routes and investigates their impact on passengers. 
The Present Position: Market Practices & their Effects on Consumers 
In the case of cross-border transport between the UK, France and Belgium, observation 
of routine market practices during the period of this study suggests that a number of 
restrictive practices were commonly in operation. These strategies took a variety of 
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forms; the most common examples may be located in one of four categories: Information 
Limitation; Characteristic or Status of the Consumer; Constraints on Freedom to Travel; 
and Mode of Reservation or Payment. These four categories are examined below, with 
recent illustrations of the impact of each strategy. 
Information Limitation 
The first category, market manipulation based on information limitation, refers to 
supplier control of key information which would otherwise allow consumers to optimise 
their choices. Typical strategies would include supply of incomplete information, such as 
imprecise pricing ('Prices from... '); pricing based on criteria concealed from the general 
consumer - e. g. failure to publish timetables linked to tariffs and failure to supply 
information about deals offered by the same operator in other countries where the 
distribution of brochures is restricted by language or'country of origin'. 
Examples of such information limitation are not hard to find; P&0 /Stena adopted 
imprecise pricing in their 1999 publicity and since then, this practice has become general. 
In the 2003 season, P&0, Seafrance and Brittany Ferries, adopted the practice of 
imprecise base tariffs ('Prices from... ) with no indication, in most instances, as to where 
and when these minimal tariffs apply. 
For the 2000 season, Brittany Ferries published a brochure completely omitting price 
information. This prompted some protest from regular users, particularly the Brittany 
Ferries Property Owners Club. In a letter, dated January 2000, the company wrote 
justifying the omission: 
Our reasons for omitting prices were ostensibly to avoid any confusion whereby 
brochures, published up to a year in advance, were overtaken by events such as 
changes in fuel prices or general market conditions. Whilst we are able to quote a 
guaranteed price for any departure at any time we cannot, with certainty, say how 
much the quotation for the same departure would be six months hence, for example. 
(Brittany Ferries Letter, January 2000, to members of the Brittany Ferries Property 
Owners Travel Club) 
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The use of the word 'ostensibly' is intriguing, since it implies that other real reasons were 
at work. This policy has since been abandoned. For the 2003 season, Brittany Ferries 
published a standard brochure, though with limited and imprecise price data. 
For many years operators published in their brochures a comprehensive calendar setting 
out tariffs in four or five price bands, attempting to use price signals to match capacity to 
seasonal or weekly patterns of demand, as reported in the 1986 MMC investigation. This 
policy was widely abandoned in the late 1990s, following the 1997 MMC Report. 
Thus, the 2002/3 brochures for P&0 and SeaFrance gave no indications as to which 
sailings attract the lowest fare. The Brittany Ferries brochure has indicated the 
availability of the lowest fare, and this, in itself, is most instructive. In the high season, 
July and August, it amounted to 1 sailing (1 out of 20) per week on the Portmouth routes 
to Caen and Cherbourg, 1 per month (1/31) between Portsmouth and St. Malo and 2 per 
month (2/52) on the Plymouth - Roscoff route. The distribution of return sailings at the 
lowest tariff was similarly sparse. The prices on more than 95% of these sailings, were 
therefore omitted from their published tariff. However, two of the smaller operators, 
Hoverspeed and Condor Ferries continued to publish definitive prices clearly banded 
according to popularity of sailings. This practice gives consumers clear data on which to 
plan their travel, trading off cost against convenience. 
Rail operators have adopted similar strategies. Eurotunnel published no standard 
brochure for the 2003 season. Where prices have been indicated - (in their users' 
magazine'A Vous', for instance) - they are listed in terms of a base tariff only ('Prices 
from.... '. ) Again, there is no indication as to which seasons, days or times attract these 
base tariffs. Moreover, consumers attempting to plan ahead for optimum deals are faced 
with the following disclaimer: "'Prices from' are correct at the time of printing (January 
2002) and are subject to date restriction and alterations at any time. " ("A Vous": Spring 
2002: 16. ). Eurostar does not distribute standard brochures on prices and timetables. 
Travel information is obtainable by telephone, or via the internet. However, it does 
publish package holiday brochures. 
Since no standard 'traditional' brochures are now published by either of these providers, it 
is the case that the only source of open tariff and timetable information is the internet. 
Each web enquiry demands a particular proposed journey date and time; therefore, where 
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journey dates and times are potentially flexible, a straightforward comparison of best 
prices is extremely time-consuming and difficult. 
Status of Consumer 
A second category of discrimination might be defined as market manipulation based on 
definition of the client. Discrimination in this category is usually based on some personal 
characteristic of the consumer. Examples include restrictions based on nationality and 
place of residence. Evidence of manipulation based on a characteristic or status of the 
consumer is to be found in all market sectors, as the following examples demonstrate. 
Some operators include specific exclusions in their promotional literature, based on 
residential status (which applies in fact, largely as a restriction based on nationality). An 
explicit example is to be found in P& O's 2003 material: "Fares (i) All fares offered by 
P&0 Ferries are available only to residents of the country in which they are issued. " (P 
&0 Ferries Brochure: 2003 Edition 1 Terms of Business', para. 3. ) 
Although there is no explicit reference to residential status in the main brochure, the 
SeaFrance Early Booking Offer, 2003, also contains the following condition: "These 
Early Booking Fares are only available to UK residents whose journey commences in 
Dover and they are not available at the port on the day of departure. " (Seafrance: 2002c) 
This condition seems designed to prevent EU nationals and others from exploiting the 
special fares, even if they happen to be in, but not resident in, the UK. 
Constraints on Freedom to Travel 
The third category of market manipulation is based on constraints on freedom to travel. 
Restrictions in this category include contractual terms, imposed by the supplier, limiting 
the traveller's freedom to travel as a condition of supply. Examples would include 
restrictions based on duration of stay along with the introduction of unusual contractual 
terms, in particular so-called Ticket Abuse'. 
Evidence of constraints on freedom to travel may seen in a variety of strategies adopted 
by both sea and rail operators, as is clear in the following examples. Between them, 
operators in 2003 discriminated between 1-day, 3-day, 5-day, 8-day and 10-day tickets. 
Only recently have the prices of short-stay tickets been discounted at less than half the 
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long-stay ticket. For example, in 2003, Seafrance offered 5-day tickets up to 14th July at 
£49 return, compared with a standard return of £115. ("The Times", T2: 2nd June 2003: 
6). P&0 have enforced these terms by introducing the concept of Ticket Abuse'. 
All tickets of restricted duration are only valid where the outward and return 
journeys are completed within the specified time, with the same vehicle and 
passengers and using the same operator... If you fail to travel on one part of your 
booking we may charge you a supplement. That supplement will be the difference 
between the amount you have paid and the price of the standard single fare 
appropriate to the sailing used. This payment will be collected using the credit card 
details provided when paying for the original booking. (P &0 'New Horizons' 
Brochure: Feb. 2003. ) 
Similar, though less draconian, conditions have been introduced by tunnel operators. So 
far their policy has been that only the day-trip ticket is less than half the standard return. 
(Eurotunnel and "A Vous" Brochures 1998-2003. ) Eurotunnel brochures and telephone 
messages contain no reference to 'ticket abuse'; however, its Terms and Conditions 
contain the following attempt to curb travel options: 
Failure to complete both your outward and returnjourney invalidates both outward 
and return tickets. If you fail to complete one of the journeys you will be liable to 
pay for the journey you do complete, the difference between the price paid for your 
ticket and the standard single fare applicable at the time of travel. (Eurotunnel: "A 
Vous" Summer 2002: 16. ) 
Mode of Reservation or Payment 
The fourth category of market manipulation is based on point of reservation or mode of 
payment. Examples in this category would include price-discrimination based on point 
of departure, restricted access to reservations, means of payment and choice of 
reservation medium (e. g. agent, telephone, via internet). 
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Evidence of this type of manipulation is well illustrated in the internet booking samples 
set out in Appendix 1. The examples in Appendix 1 are based on an internet search in 
which identical search criteria were used. The Seafrance example showed that, for 
identical return services, but in the converse direction, travellers from France would pay 
20.5% less than the sum payable by travellers from the UK. Eurostar routinely charged 
different prices for journeys booked at the alternative terminus; that is to say, a journey, 
which is identical in every respect except that the outward leg for reservations at one 
terminus represents the return leg for reservations made at the other. These sample 
bookings simply provide an exemplification of the problem; but it seems clear that they 
represent the operators' general strategy. 
It is interesting that in both the Seafrance and Eurostar sample reservations, a saving of 
approximately 20% is available to travellers beginning their journey on the European 
mainland. These examples strongly suggest that both rail/tunnel and ferry operators are 
effectively segmenting the market so as to generate and sustain a price differential of 
about 20% at the expense of travellers based in the UK. 
The price differences of about 20% noted in the exemplars above might be partially 
explained in terms of currency shifts. However, using the conversion rates of December 
31st, 2002 and 28th March 2003, the maximum difference which could be explained in 
those terms would be in the order of 8.7%, even if all Seafrance costs were sourced in 
Euros and all their revenues were in Pound Sterling, which is clearly not the case. The 
Eurostar price differences, since they are all expressed in Sterling, cannot be explained in 
this way. 8 
Price-discrimination based on means of payment may also be found in operation on some 
routes, irrespective of point of departure. Some operators use the means of payment, 
including choice of currency, as a further hidden form of discrimination. This is revealed 
in the sample internet reservation from Hull to Rotterdam. Here, the only difference is 
the currency, not the point of departure. A search dated 28th March. 2003, conducted on 
the P&0 Ferries Rotterdam-Hull route, showed the following discrimination based on 
the choice of currency and locus of credit card. Although this example is outside the 
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particular focus of the case - the short cross-channel routes - it is significant because it 
relates to a pricing strategy of a company, which is also a major channel operator: 
Rotterdam - Hull Out Ist Sept. / Return 2nd Sept 
Price in Pound Sterling = £279 
Price in Euros = 427 Euros. 9 
Conversion of the Sterling price of £279 at the rate for the day = 390 Euros. 
In this instance, the purchase in Euros costs 37 Euros more than the purchase in Pound 
Sterling. This cannot be explained by currency fluctuations since the price was set after 
the currency movements in the preceding period had led to a fall in the value of the 
Pound. Therefore, on a narrow calculation of currency movements, one would have 
expected the balance of advantage to rest with purchases in Euros rather than Pound 
Sterling (see Appendix 3). 
Price-discrimination may also be based on choice of reservation medium (e. g. agent, 
telephone, via the internet). All Eurotunnel special offers must be booked at least 14 
days in advance and are not available at the termini. As with prices at the port, travellers 
without advance bookings pay a heavy premium for the convenience. This practice is 
quite unrelated to surplus capacity and is simply a means of applying price penalties to 
consumers with short planning horizons. In other words, it is the precise antithesis of the 
free movement envisaged by the authors of the Single Market and the public promoters of 
the Eurotunnel venture. The freedom of movement promised by the opening of the 
tunnel and featured in its early publicity -a 'turn up and go' system - has been replaced 
by reservation restrictions similar to the ferry operators. 
8 The appropriate currency converter for the Pound: Euro on 28th March, 2003 was £1 - 1.40000 Euro. 
Source: http: //www. moneyworld. co. uktrates/currency/converter (Consulted 28.3.2003). The currency rate 
at 31st Dec. 2002 was £1=1.53421 Euro ("Financial Times" 31.12.2002). 
9 On the search date the rate of exchange was 1.4 Euros to the Pound. 
Source: http: //www. moneyworld. co. uktrates/currency/converter (Consulted 28.3.2003) 
Conversion of the Sterling price of £279 at the rate for the day = 390 Euros. 
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Controlline the Consumer: The Interlocking and Interdependent Nature of Market 
Manipulation 
Some cross-channel operators have gone to considerable lengths to establish control over 
the behaviour of consumers by devising a series of interdependent strategies locking the 
consumer into the supplier's definition of the modus operandi. Some forms of price 
discrimination are based on well-understood economic principles, which, by and large, do 
not provoke consumer resentment. These would include discounts for early booking, 
low-season and travel at un-social hours along with higher prices for high or long 
vehicles. Each of these has a clear economic rationale obvious to the consumer. Other 
practices are less easy to defend on straightforward economic grounds. 
Price Discrimination Based on Duration of Stay 
An almost universal practice is to make special offers for short-duration stays - day 
return offers. These are well understood and widely accepted in the travel industry. 
However some ferry operators have adopted a tariff structure which is exceptionally 
biased towards day-trippers. For instance, both Eurotunnel and P&0 offer three 
categories of ticket based on duration of stay: 
P& O* Eurotunnel** 
Day trip for car + up to 5 £25 £47 
passengers 
5-day Flexible Return car + £152 £179 
2 passengers 
Flexible Return car +2 £290 £309 
passengers 
(Sources: *P &O Ferries Brochure, 2003, Edition 1 
**Eurotunnel Magazine "A Vous", Autumn,! Winter 2002) 
This strategy has recently been given a further twist by the adoption of even more 
detailed differentiation; one by SeaFrance in a new promotion in "The Times" 2nd June, 
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2003 and the other by P&0 in a promotion advertised in "The Observer", 29th June 
2003. SeaFrance offers two price bands -a low season (A) and a high season (B) band 
(all prices relate to Dover-Calais): 
Five Day Return Eight Day Return Ten Day Return Standard Return 
From: From: From: From: 
A £49: B£119 A£79: BN/A A £99: BN/A A£115: B£219 
The P&0 offer is strictly proportionate to the time spent abroad: 
Day Return 3-Day Return 6-Day Return 7-Day Return 10-Day Return 
£10 £30 £50 £70 £100 
The significant innovation is the introduction of sharp price difference based on very 
slight differences in the duration of stay on the Continent. This tactic discriminates 
severely against passengers who plan to spend even a little extra time abroad since the 
prices set for 1 and 3-day stays are, as data from Appendix 2 demonstrates, clearly below 
average costs. The longer-stay passenger is effectively cross-subsidising the short-stay 
voyages. The 'product' is shipping space, but its pricing structure is that of a package 
holiday; clearly, the duration of stay involves transport operators in no additional costs. 
The above strategy sets prices to vary by as much as 134% on raw calculation (95% 
averaging upward and downward price comparisons). Although the tariff in itself is not a 
cross-border issue, the discrimination against longer-stay passengers may be seen as a 
cross-border issue since the pricing structure again impedes and distorts free movement 
across the border. Logically, there is no reason to suppose that short-stay travellers are 
more likely to generate increased cross-border economic activity than longer-stay 
passengers. In terms of both work and consumer roles, reason suggests that the reverse is 
likely to be true. If the general aim of EU policy and the specific intention of the TEN 
projects, in particular, is to foster greater cross-border activity, this pricing strategy seems 
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to militate directly against this end. If consumers stay longer they are likely to consume 
more; if workers stay longer they are likely to contribute more to the trans-national 
economy. This seems to be a case where unfair terms of contract, such as those referred 
to in the Council Directive 93/13/eec 5th April 1993 OJ of the EC no. L95,21 April 1993 
might apply. This is examined below in relation to "Ticket Abuse". 
The control exercised by some operators over the options open to consumers is best 
understood by examining the interdependencies between the different condition of 
service introduced in recent years. The significance of the restrictions set out in the 
previous section becomes clearer as their cumulative effect is revealed. 
Price Discrimination Based on Mode of Reservation/Payment 
For instance, in an apparently unrelated shift of strategy, noted above, in recent years P& 
O and other operators began to impose higher charges on tickets purchased at the port of 
departure than those purchased by telephone or over the internet. This practice has 
discouraged purchases at the port and encouraged distance selling of reservations. 
A feature of telephone and internet purchases is that they are paid for by credit cards. 
Such purchases necessarily reveal the identity of the national base of a credit card and the 
banking base of each customer. These categories of price differentiation have been 
facilitated by the abandonment of the practice of publishing specific price commitments, 
thus enabling the operator to reduce the visibility of the premiums imposed at the port. 
Chanze of Terms of Contract: Introduction of 'Ticket Abuse' 
As the previous section showed, in 2003 P&0 explicitly introduced the use of the term 
Ticket Abuse' into their Terms and Conditions. "Ticket abuse' is not a well-defined term. 
Indeed, it seems to be one which has been specifically invented by the travel industry in 
order to enhance operator control over consumers. This condition demands our attention 
for the exceptional level of control it seeks to exert. The P&0 website'virtual booking 
form' contains a condition, to which potential customers are required to assent before 
booking, giving P&0 the right to make additional charges against the credit card used 
for the booking should the traveller fail to undertake the return journey before the 
expiration of the ticket. Telephone bookings involve no such explicit consent. 
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Thus the practice of charging prices for short trips at less than half the standard fare is 
supported by penalties which the operator is able to enforce as a result of having 
introduced a whole series of inter-dependent practices. That is to say, price 
discrimination depends on the form of reservation, the form of payment and the 
collection of data about each and every passenger, down to their individual identity and 
travel history. Under these terms, a new 'offence', namely "ticket abuse", is created and 
the operator becomes legislator, prosecutor, judge, jury and bailiff in these cases. 
The regulation relating to the return journeys being completed within the specified time, 
offers a spurious sense of rationality to the fares structure. However, in the majority of 
other transport contexts, the short-stay trip amounts to a special offer, which is itself of 
limited duration. Its rationale is usually a pattern of surplus capacity, sometimes on a 
seasonal basis, taken up by the unusual offer of a cut-price fare for a limited period. The 
ferry operators provide unusually low short-stay fares throughout the year. The offer 
itself is not of limited duration. It cannot be seen simply as a reasonable commercial 
device to take up surplus capacity during the 'low-season'. Indeed, the 2003 offers 
described above coincided with the onset of the high season. 
Restrictin. ' Market Information 
Underpinning all of these practices are strategies to limit the amount of market 
information available to the consumer. In particular, the refusal to indicate in clear terms 
which sailings attract the lowest prices and which prices apply to those sailings which do 
not attract the lowest tariff - leaves the rational consumer devoid of comparative price 
and service data on which to based choices. The difficulty in accessing brochures in 
other languages, designed for citizens in other member-states of the Union, adds to this 
information shortfall. In effect, a cultural difference, namely language, has been used by 
some operators to obscure price-comparisons and to facilitate market segmentation. This 
practice has more general implications which are explored in the concluding section to 
this chapter. Having explored some of the salient features of the strategies adopted by 
operators to control the consumer's behaviour, it is now appropriate to examine the 
European Commission's position on these issues. 
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EU Position on Restrictive and Discriminatory Practices in the Market 
Evidence of the Commission's perspective on the cross-channel market is mainly to be 
found in their market assessments accompanying its responses to P&0 Stena requests 
for exemption in respect of their merger proposals. 
The European Perspective: Commission Decision on P&0 Stena Joint Venture 
1(999) 
In December 1996, SeaFrance complained to the Commission in respect of the effects of 
the joint venture on its business. In June 1999, having considered the case under Article 
85 of the Treaty, the Commission published its decision. The Commission admitted: 
"... restriction of competition is appreciable. The parties have a high combined market 
share (even if their combined market share on the Short Sea declined following the 
market entry of Eurotunnel. )" (European Commission: 1999b: para 40). Nevertheless, it 
concluded 
The creation of the joint venture will bring about benefits, notably in the improved 
frequency to be offered by the joint venture, continuous loading, and estimated cost 
savings of GBP... million. The overall positive benefits will arise even were the 
joint venture to stop operating on the Newhaven/Dieppe route. 
7.2. Allowing Consumers a fair share of the resulting benefit 
Customers can be expected to benefit from the improved frequency and continuous 
loading. Customers can be expected to benefit from the cost savings to the extent 
that the joint venture will be faced by effective competition. (EC: 1999b: paras 62 
and 63) 
The Commission's Decision continued in optimistic vein: "Firms faced with excess 
capacity will normally have an incentive to cut prices to fill that excess capacity ... Where 
prices are transparent, any price cuts will provoke rapid retaliation. " (EC: 1999b: para 89) 
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The Commission's decision shows a remarkable lack of awareness of market events. By 
the time of its publication in 1999, the Newhaven/Dieppe route had long been abandoned 
and P& O/Stena had already dropped any pretence of price transparency in their 
brochures, as the evidence in the following sections demonstrates. 
The Commission's optimism carried over into its assessment of the risk of a duopoly 
between the joint venture and Eurotunnel: "The Commission considers that the 
characteristics of the market are such that the joint venture and Eurotunnel can be 
expected to compete with each other rather than to act in parallel to raise prices. " (EC: 
1999b: para 127) 
Paragraph 63 carefully qualifies the condition under which benefits will pass to 
consumers -" to the extent that the joint venture will be faced by effective competition. " 
Given that, on its own assessment, (EC: 1999b: Table 9) P&0, Stena and Eurotunnel 
already accounted in 1996 for over 85% of the market and the next largest competitor, 
SeaFrance, under 7%, it is difficult to know where this competition was supposed to 
come from. 
In 2001, P&0 Stena asked for an extension to the exemption for a further twenty years. 
The Commission granted the joint venture a further six-year exemption from the EU's 
competition rules (EC: 2001c). It concluded that the price increases evident since 1998 
were not the result of the inception of the joint venture but were due to 'normal market 
conditions'. 
Particularly relevant to this case was the explanation in the Press Release: "... another 
factor which also partly explains the price increases on the cross-Channel services is the 
introduction by P&0 Stena Line of a yield management system, whereby the ticket 
price is set according to demand, as is done in the airline sector. According to such a 
system, prices change daily and customers 
travelling in peak periods with little flexibility 
usually pay more. " 
This is interesting if only for its naivety. The Commission's own data on cross Channel 
capacity, contained in its decision of January 1999 (EC: 1999b: Table 10 and paras. 89- 
98), revealed that apart from a few weekends in July and August services rarely 
approached capacity, the average utilisation level being below 50%. In such 
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circumstances, claims to be pricing up as capacity tightens amount to little more than a 
planned piece of commercial deception based on sustaining consumer ignorance. 
The European Perspective: Commission Decision on P&0 Stena Merger (2002) 
In July 2002, the Commission was notified that P&0 proposed to acquire full control 
over the joint venture, buying out Stena. In a letter, dated 7`h August 2002 (European 
Commission 2002h: 5-6), the Commission indicated non-opposition to the merger. The 
question considered by the Commission was a narrow one: "The issue to be investigated 
is... whether the sole control of P&0 SL will give P&0 the incentive and ability to 
engage in predatory behaviour with a view to eliminating competition on the Western 
Channel and/or the North Sea. " It concluded, "... this concern does not seem to be 
justified", since the number and strength of competitors made this strategy non-viable. 
Despite its own data (European Commission 2002: Table 1) showing that, on the short 
sea routes, P&0 and Eurotunnel would control about 80% of the passenger market 
(figures were left imprecise for reasons of commercial confidentiality), the Commission 
concluded that there would be no collective dominance of the market between P&0 and 
Eurotunnel. It assured consumers that duopolistic behaviour would be constrained in 
practice by actual or potential competitors and concluded: "The fact that, after the 
merger, P&0 will control the business of P&0& SL alone will not alter this situation" 
(Ibid: para 29). These conclusions suggest that the Commission was unaware of, or 
chose to ignore, the charges of existing duopolistic behaviour already raised by the 
Consumer Association. 
Application of Competition Policy: the UK Position 
Competition policy applies to this case at EU and national levels. For the UK, the OFT 
has produced a series of guidelines regarding the issue of price discrimination as it 
interprets its duties under the Competition Act of 1998. 
The guidance defines price discrimination as follows: 
An undertaking can be said to be discriminating when it applies dissimilar 
conditions to equivalent transactions with other trading parties. The most direct 
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way is through the prices charged to different sets of customers. It can take two 
basic forms: 
" an undertaking might charge different prices to different customers, or 
categories of customers, for the same product - where the differences in 
price do not reflect any differences in relative cost, quantity, quality or 
any other characteristic of the products supplied; 
" an undertaking might charge different customers or categories of 
customers, the same price even though the costs of supplying the product 
are in fact very different. A policy of uniform delivered prices 
throughout the country, for example, could be discriminatory if 
differences in transport costs were significant. (OFT: 1999c: 7-8). 
The guidance also spells out the key conditions necessary for price discrimination to 
operate (OFT: 1999c: 8): "For price discrimination to be feasible, an undertaking not 
only has to be able to segment the market in some way, but also has to be able to enforce 
the segmentation... The term price discrimination ... refers to situations where 
differences 
in prices cannot be justified by differences in costs. " (my emphasis) 
The OFT guidance confirms that price discrimination may be regarded as an abuse under 
the 1998 Competition Act. However, since its powers are derived from a piece of 
legislation designed not directly to protect the consumer, but to strengthen competition, 
whether discrimination is regarded as an abuse under the Act depends, not on its effects 
on consumers, but on its effect on market structure. The guidance (OFT: 1999c: 7) 
explains: "The Director General considers price discrimination to be an abuse only where 
there is evidence that prices were also excessive or that discrimination was used to reduce 
competition significantly... " The application of the legislation, focussing on market 
structure, seems to be in conflict with the principles implied in the definition of price 
discrimination above. 
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The Problem of the Director General of Fair Trading Is Position vis a vis Consumer 
Policy 
The problem arising from action under the Competition Act is that it seeks to improve the 
consumer's position 'at one remove' by seeking to remove imperfections in the structure 
of the market. Once the imperfections are removed, classic economic theory would 
dictate that discrimination will prove impracticable and normal market forces will ensure 
that consumers are able to optimise their economic choices. However, as the MMC 
reports have indicated, in the case of cross channel travel, the market is far from perfect, 
with a mere handful of competitors, two of which (P &0 and Eurotunnel) currently 
dominate the short sea crossing market. Moreover, the OFT approach centres on cost 
comparisons, involving apparently precise calculations of average and marginal costs, but 
which exclude critical components, such as debt repayments on the building of the 
Tunnel. 
In view of the DGFT's commitment to take action only where price discrimination is 
accompanied by excessive prices (verified by evidence of excessive profits) and/or by a 
reduction in competition, the examples of price discrimination in the short sea cross- 
channel market set out above, would seem to fall outside the scope of action he has 
defined for the OFT under the 1998 Competition Act. The position at present (2003) 
seems to be that parallel patterns of market segmentation and price discrimination will 
attract no action so long as the market structure is deemed to be 'competitive'. The 
weakness of the competitive context, although acknowledged in successive MMC 
reports, has not, so far, prompted OFT action on discrimination in this field. This 
assessment is confirmed by the interviews undertaken with OFT officers in June 2003. 
(Interview 03/07/2003) 
This inaction by enforcement bodies leaves the operators free to engage in a series of 
practices, because the impact of these practices on market structure is not sufficiently 
serious to reduce competition even further. It is interesting that the OFT's own guidance 
acknowledges that, in a series of judgements going back to 1978, the European Court of 
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Justice has regarded price discrimination to be an abuse in itself under Article 82 (quoted 
in OFT: 1999 c). '° 
This approach was questioned on 16th September 2002 in the European Parliament by 
Michael Cashman MEP, who asked: 
"When air fares are being booked within the EU (to EU and non-EU destinations), 
the price for the same flight(s) using the same booking facilities, often varies 
according to the country in which the payee is domiciled or in where the booking is 
made. 
When booking with a ferry company in the EU, customers are asked if they are 
resident in the country in which they are making the booking and are sometimes 
asked for an address. 
Could the Commission state whether this practice contravenes EU policy and could 
be classed as a barrier to competition? 
Could the Commission outline what steps are being taken to investigate the legality 
of this practice, how widespread it is within the travel sector and what is being done 
to put an end to it? " (Cashman: Letter 240' September 2002) 
The response of Monti, (P-2205/02EN) on behalf of the Commission is instructive: 
"The pricing practices described by the Honourable Member might, in certain 
specific circumstances, constitute an infringement of European competition rules. 
If a company limited some of its fare offers purely on the basis of a payee's country 
or residence, it would effectively be charging different prices for identical services. 
In certain circumstances, this might be incompatible with European Competition 
rules. This would be the case if the company had a dominant position on the route 
in question, if transport companies had agreed between themselves to apply a 
pricing policy of this type or if a transport company prevented its distributors from 
lo Note: ECJ Judgements on Price Discrimination: 
Case 27/76 United Brands v. Commission [1978] ECR 207 [1978] 1 Common Market Law Review 
(CMLR) 429; Napier Brown/British Sugar OJ 1988 L 284/41, [1990] 4 CMLR 196; Case C-333/94P Tetra 
Pack II [1996] [1997] 4 CMLR 662; Case T-229/94 Deutsche Bahn v. Commission [1998] 4 CMLR 220 
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selling a certain category of ticket outside of the member state in which they were 
based. " 
(Cashman: Letter: 24th September 2002) 
The practice of relying on competition rules to regulate this type of discrimination means 
that unless specific conditions apply, such as a dominant market position, the supplier is 
free to discriminate. This represents a situation in which the consumer is neither 
protected by the competitive market nor by consumer protection regulations. This 
situation illustrates the limitations of an approach to consumer protection based on a 
policy designed to influence the structure of the market. 
Evidence of the Connection Between Market Structure and Market Practices 
The MMC, whilst finding the proposal against the public interest, gave conditional assent 
to the proposed joint venture between P&0 and Stena in its 1997 Report. Accordingly, 
the following year P&0 and Stena announced a joint operation on the short sea routes 
between Dover- Calais and Newhaven-Dieppe. The impact of the merger on market 
practices was immediate. In the 1998 brochures, a number of the restrictions noted above 
made their first appearance, namely: 
1. Abandonment of specific price commitments ("Prices from... ") 
2. More detailed price bands based on duration of stay. The 1998 New Horizons 
Brochure (P &0 Stena Line May 1998) introduced the following restricted bands: 
Days out from £10; 3-Day Return from £48; 6-day Return from £99; 15-day Return 
from £155. 
3. These bands introduced for the first time, short-stay prices, which were less than half 
the long-stay prices, thus making double bookings profitable for consumers. 
4. The Autumn 1998 New Horizons Brochure (P &0 Stena Autumn 1998), introduced 
the condition: "These travel offers are open to UK residents only. " 
217 
5. In an attempt to deter the purchase of double day-tickets in lieu of a standard return, 
the 1999 P&0 Stena Brochure added a new restriction to the existing condition: 
"Day trip tickets are valid only when outward and return travel take place on the same 
calendar day. " To this was added: "Only one item of hand luggage is permitted on day 
trips. " 
Since these tickets were designed for cars with passengers, it is difficult to see how, 
without the right of vehicle search, the operators could enforce this unusual restriction. 
6. A further mechanism to strengthen the operator's ability to monitor and manipulate 
consumer behaviour occurred in 2000 as a by-product of changes in health and safety 
requirements and in immigration procedures. The terms and conditions in the P&0 
Stena 2000 Dover-Calais Brochure spell this out: 
We are required by law to record the names, age-group and gender of all 
passengers, together with (for purposes of an emergency) details of any special care 
or assistance needs. Failure to provide this information will result in permission to 
board being refused. 
(P &0 Stena : 2000: 10. ) 
These innovations were accompanied by a reduction of travel options for travellers on the 
short-sea crossings. In 1998, on the Newhaven-Dieppe Route, P&0 Stena operated five 
sailings per day (some by fast craft), in 1999, two sailings per day with no fast craft, and 
by 2000, the Newhaven-Dieppe operation had been dropped altogether. 
Moreover, credibility of the MMC and European Commission beliefs that a duopoly 
would not emerge was soon put to the test. In December 1998, both P&0 and 
Eurotunnel announced increases in peak summer fares of 25% for the 1999 season. The 
Editor of'Holiday Which' commented in a press release: "There appears to be a cosy- 
duopoly shared by P&0 Stena Line and Eurotunnel, which is carving up the cross- 
channel travel market... Consumer Association predictions about price hikes have come 
true. " (Consumer Association: 1998: 1) 
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A complementary strategy to competition policy is direct measures, with specific targets, 
designed to ensure that 'rogue traders' do not persist in practices which discriminate 
unfairly against consumers and which may well have the effect of undermining the 
effective operation of the Single Market and confidence in it. As Chapter Five 
demonstrated, EU policy has moved in this direction. 
Direct Intervention: Consumer Protection Initiatives in Relation to this Case 
1998 Directive on Price Transparency 
In a Directive of 16th February, 1998 (Directive 98/6/EC of the European Parliament and 
of the Council of 16 February 1998 on consumer protection in the indication of prices of 
products offered to consumers), the EU published a general directive aimed at exactly the 
kind of pricing strategies adopted by the major Cross-Channel operators. This Directive 
was due to be transposed into the law of the Member States by March 2000. The 
Directive seems to be absolutely clear both in its intention and its definition of the 
required practice 
... transparent operation of the market and correct 
information is of benefit to 
consumer protection and healthy competition between enterprises and products 
... consumers must be guaranteed a high level of protection; whereas the 
Community should contribute thereto by specific action which supports and 
supplements the policy pursued by the Member States regarding precise, 
transparent and unambiguous information for consumers on the prices of the 
products offered to them... (European Parliament and Council: 1998: 1) (my 
emphasis 
The Directive is very clear. Articles 1 and 2 state: 
Article 1. The purpose of this directive is to stipulate indication of the selling price 
and the price per unit of measurement of products offered by traders to consumers 
in order to improve consumer information and to facilitate comparison of prices. 
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Article 2. For the purposes of this Directive: 
(a) selling price shall mean the final price for a unit of the product, or a given 
quantity of the product, including VAT and all other taxes; 
(b) unit price shall mean the final price, including VAT and all other taxes for one 
kilogramme, one litre, on metre, one square metre, or one cubic metre of the 
product or a different single unit of quantity which is widely and customarily used 
in the Member State concerned in the marketing of specific products;.... 
(e) consumer shall mean any natural person who buys a product for purposes that 
do not fall within the sphere of his commercial or professional activity. 
It should be noted that the term "product" as defined in some other EU documents refers 
to both goods and services. For instance, the recent 'Proposal for a Directive on Unfair 
Business to Consumer Commercial Practices' makes this clear (Proposal for a Directive 
of the European Parliament and of the Council concerning unfair business-to-consumer 
commercial practices in the Internal Market and amending directive 84/450/EEC, 97/7/EC 
and (98/27/EC (the Unfair Commercial Practices Directive, (page 3 Para 6)) states: "The 
cross-border movement of goods and services ("products') gives consumers access to 
a broader range of products, including innovative products which may not be available in 
their own country. It also provides the pressure for a more efficient and competitively- 
priced supply. " (my emphasis. ) The EU Letter (European Commission: 2002: 3), 
extending the exemption on the P&0 Stena joint venture, actually refers to the ferry 
services in question as "the relevant product". 
Both of these documents make their purpose crystal clear; it is to make the Single Market 
more effective by ensuring that consumers have open access to essential price 
information. The scope of the Directive on price transparency seems to be general; it 
contains no explicit limitation to physical products in its application, though it does not 
define the term 'product'. However, there area number of derogations associated with 
this Directive. 
The DTI Consultation Paper on this Directive (DTI: 1999: 12) states: "This Directive 
applies to products; it does not apply to services. " In view of the importance attached to 
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clear and unambiguous pricing and its importance in promoting informed consumer 
choice, stressed in the Directive's preamble, it seems extraordinary that such a wide 
exception as the whole of the service sector should be permitted. It is even more 
surprising in view of the fact that the legal base for the Prices Directive is Article 129a of 
the Treaty of Rome, which deals with consumer protection compared with similar earlier 
Directives, which were based in Article 100a, dealing with the removal of trade barriers. 
When one reviews the pricing policy of the principal operators in this case, it is difficult 
to square their publicity with the broad intentions of the 1998 Directive. Nonetheless it 
appears not to apply to services based in the UK. However, another EU initiative, the 
Directive on Unfair Contracts, examined below, certainly does apply and has 
underpinned numerous OFT actions in the UK. 
EU Contracts (Unfair Terms) Directive 
In April 1993, the Council of the European Communities promulgated a directive 
describing unfair contractual terms, including lists of illustrative, but not exhaustive 
examples. One of the principal objectives of this directive was that " acquirers of goods 
and services should be protected against the abuse of power by the seller or supplier, in 
particular, against one-sided contracts and the unfair exclusion of essential rights in 
contracts. "(Council: 1993) 
There are aspects of the conditions imposed by cross-channel operators which may merit 
attention under this directive as the analysis below suggests. One of these is the 
monitoring of so-called 'ticket abuse'. Amongst the examples of unfair contractual terms 
set out in the Council Directive 93/13/eec of April 1993, one is particularly relevant to 
this case: 
a condition giving him (the supplier) the exclusive right to interpret any term in the 
contract. 
The condition on'ticket abuse' may amount to such a term, since, although it is a term 
standard in P&0 contracts, it is of recent origin and does not yet appear to have been 
tested in the courts. In the course of interviews with the OFT Consumer Protection 
Team, it became clear that `Ticket Abuse' is a term that might legitimately be 
investigated within the framework of the Unfair Contract Terms Directive, but that so far 
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no action had been taken, since the OFT relies on evidence of consumer detriment to 
justify action. (Interviews OFT 03/07/2003) 
The introduction of computerised reservation systems and the increased demand, for 
security reasons, for accurate information on cross-border travellers, have combined to 
produce a situation in which cross-channel operators carry much more detailed and 
precise information about every reservation and every traveller. Insofar as this 
information is used for legitimate business and security purposes, consumers would have 
little cause for complaint. However, the combination of technical innovations and 
contractual terms is, in this case, principally directed at giving the supplier greater 
freedom to manage the market, by asserting more and more control over the options open 
to the travelling public. 
The main purpose of this restriction seems designed to defend a pricing policy, one in 
which reservations for longer stays cost more than twice the price of a short-stay. It is 
intended to frustrate the normal market workings of arbitrage, which serves to reduce 
price differences in different segments of the market. Since the price differences 
themselves are unrelated to the cost of supplying the product, it is difficult to see why 
they have not been challenged under Chapter II of the 1998 Competition Act. 
For price discrimination to be feasible, an undertaking not only has to be able to 
segment the market in some way, but also has to be able to enforce the 
segmentation... The term price discrimination ... refers to situations where 
differences in prices cannot be justified by differences in costs. (OFT: 1999c: 8) 
Judging from the OFT reports on cases to June 2002 (OFT 2002), the practice of ticket 
monitoring might well constitute "excessive discretion" on the part of the operator and 
the threat to debit further payments against a credit card, might be regarded as an 
example of "onerous right of enforcement". These legal issues have yet to be tested. 
However a proposal for a complementary directive in this area has been suggested by the 
Commission. 
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EU Proposed Directive concerning Unfair Business-to-Consumer Commercial 
Practices in the Internal Market 
Another example of direct EU action to protect consumers and a recent response to the 
Green Paper on EU Consumer Protection, discussed in Chapter Five, is the Commission's 
proposal for a directive on unfair business to consumer practices (European Commission: 
2003d). 
This proposal seeks to establish a general framework for the protection of consumers 
against unfair, in particular misleading and aggressive, commercial practices. It includes 
an interesting section, Article 7, Misleading Omissions, paragraph 3, which is particularly 
relevant to this case: 
For commercial practices before a commercial transaction a misleading omission 
may occur only if a trader makes an invitation to purchase. In the case of an 
invitation to purchase, the following information shall be regarded as material, if 
not already apparent from the context: 
(a) ... the main characteristics of the product;... 
(c) ... the price inclusive of taxes, as well as, where appropriate, all additional 
freight, delivery or postal charges or, where these charges cannot reasonably be 
calculated in advance, the fact that additional charges may be payable... (European 
Commission: 2003d: 25) 
This would reinforce the 1998 Directive on Price Transparency. Annex 1 to the proposed 
Directive also contains an useful list of commercial practices which are in all 
circumstances considered unfair, including one on "bait advertising", which is defined as: 
Making an invitation to purchase products at a specified price if there are 
reasonable grounds for believing that the trader will not be able to offer for supply 
or to procure another trader to supply, those products or equivalent products at that 
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price for a period that is, and in quantities that are reasonable having regard to the 
product and price offered. (European Commission: 2003d: 32) 
This proposal is pertinent to this case, since: 
a. it might be argued that some operators fail to outline the main characteristics of 
the product by failing to publish in a transparent manner, the date and timing of the 
crossings to which particular prices refer; 
b. it might, similarly be argued that Brittany Ferries, by advertising only one return 
crossing per month at the published tariff, are guilty of a combination of bait 
advertising and failure to publish the price of over 95% of their sailings. 
Injunctions Directive 
As Chapter Five has indicated, this initiative is one which might prove useful to 
consumers in this case. However, the consumers in question would have to be citizens of 
other EU member states. The evidence presented above indicates that the bulk of the 
weight of discrimination, with the exception of the Hull-Rotterdam example, operates to 
the disadvantage of reservations made in the UK, it seems unlikely that this facility will 
produce a significant volume of cross-border complaint. 
Conclusions 
General Principles 
As earlier chapters have indicated, EU policy over the last ten years has largely focussed 
on the economic benefits expected to accrue from a single market and a single currency. 
That analysis has shown that some commissioners have openly recognised that, for the 
European enterprise to retain its impetus, the benefits of eradicating market boundaries 
must be seen to flow through to consumers. But, price discrimination depends on 
effective market segmentation, which is the very antithesis of a Single Market. As long 
as segmentation practices are tolerated, a truly single market will not emerge and its 
potential benefits will not impact on the citizen-consumer. 
One way in which the workings of the Single Market can be enhanced is by safeguarding 
freedom of movement for consumers as well as suppliers and by taking action to 
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eliminate market behaviour designed to impede it. The discriminatory practices adopted 
by cross-channel operators involve such huge cost discrepancies for different categories 
of passengers that it can hardly be doubted that there is cross-subsidisation of some 
passengers by others. The pattern of price differences shows both intra- and trans- 
national levels of cross-subsidy, both of which, in different ways, will have the effect of 
distorting the distribution of cross-border travel and thus distorting and very probably 
reducing the general level of cross-border activity. 
It is also difficult to justify differential prices based on different points of departure on 
the same crossing for similar reasons. If a key economic stimulus is to be derived from 
the movement of workers across frontiers, it is unreasonable to suppose that the transport 
costs of a flow of workers in one direction should be subsidised by the now of workers in 
the other. EU harmonisation policies have frequently been designed to move towards a 
'level playing field'; differential travel costs for the same journey starting in different 
member states generate different costs of cross-border labour mobility, thus increasing, 
rather than reducing, the incline of the playing-field. 
Limitations of a Structural Approach 
The limitations of a 'supply side' approach to the support of consumers, the monitoring of 
market structure so as to prevent'market failure', is well exemplified in this case. The 
fact that the 1997 MMC investigation into the proposed P& O/Stena joint-venture clearly 
judged it to be against the public interest, but gave approval, subject to a set a series of 
scarcely disobliging conditions, indicates the sympathy with which the supply-side of the 
market has been treated. Moreover, the weak definition of what counts as a competitive 
market, implied by the MMC report, provides a poor basis on which to build consumer 
confidence. The large number of successful OFT actions against companies seeking to 
impose unfair contractual terms indicates clearly that attempts to disadvantage consumers 
do not necessarily flow from an abuse of a dominant market position. It is anomalous 
that price discrimination should be treated as a characteristic of a flawed market structure, 
thereby placing it in the realm of competition policy. (OFT 2002) 
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The 2001 Report of the Competition DG does not offer much comfort that the structural 
approach is generating a system of adequate monitoring of detailed market behaviour on 
the ground. The Report concluded in respect of the P& O/Stena joint venture: 
... the characteristics of the market are still such that the joint venture and 
Eurotunnel, the main operators on the market, could be expected to continue to 
compete with each other, rather than to act in parallel to raise prices. (European 
Commission : 2001f: 194) 
It will be noted that the inference of this statement was that the two main operators had a 
history of unquestioned competition. This is the exact antithesis of the conclusions of 
earlier MMC reports and of the view of Cave, one of the authors of the 1997 report. The 
evidence of duopolistic behaviour published by the Consumers Association, noted above, 
also weakens confidence in the efficacy of the Commission's judgement. Nonetheless, 
when the three-year exemption of the P&0 Stena joint venture, granted under Article 
81(3) of the EC Treaty, came up for renewal at the end of 2000, the Commission raised 
no serious doubts and renewed it until 2007. 
There are many different forms of commercial practices which have the effect of 
restricting consumer access to optimum travel deals. As the MMC reports indicate, some 
of these arise from artificial limits to competition; others arise from less formal collusion 
between suppliers and yet others may arise simply from the attempts by individual 
suppliers to impose unfair terms on the consumer. Those which arise from cartels and 
mergers are, of course, dealt with in the EU by the Competition DG, but many forms of 
restriction and discrimination fall outside its scope. Some market strategies do not 
require explicit, or even tacit agreements, being the result merely of shared market 
practices; yet these are, nonetheless, capable of distorting the market to the detriment of 
consumers. Where these are operated in a poor competitive climate they are, of course, 
likely to be all the more effective. 
A central feature of this case has been the ability of operators in a monopolistic position 
to combine technical, informational, financial and legal constraints so as to introduce 
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entirely new curbs on market information and limits on consumer behaviour, thus 
facilitating market segmentation and discrimination. 
The introduction of individualised ticketing and price-quotation on a personal basis ("Tell 
me what time you want to travel and I will quote a price") changes the purchase of a 
ticket to travel from a standard to an individualised purchase, allegedly exclusively fitted 
to the customers specifications or needs. Ironically, the DTI Consultation Paper on the 
Price Indications Directive (DTI: 1999: 10) boasts: "UK legislation currently requires that 
products must be price marked before a consumer asks to see them - i. e. the price not 
merely written down when the consumer asks what it is. " Unfortunately, the same 
document makes it clear that, in this context, services do not count as 'products'. 
The advantage to the supplier of this approach to pricing is that, first, it makes price 
comparisons time-consuming and inconvenient and, second, unlimited discrimination is 
possible, since each sale is priced individually. In this model of market behaviour, price 
information is not public, but private. It enables the supplier to raise prices as the market 
clears. In normal market transactions, supply prices are advertised; these prices 
constitute an offer and therefore suppliers are unable to raise the prices of their few 
remaining loaves of bread or baskets of strawberries. As matters stand, cross-channel 
operators appear to have unfettered scope for price individualisation. In a highly 
competitive market this may not prove problematic. In a quasi-monopoly situation where 
there are no close alternatives and where distant alternatives impose severe penalties, the 
consumer is only able to escape the power of the supplier by withdrawal from the market. 
A number of EU initiatives, including those considered in Chapter Five, are designed to 
improve consumer access to market information. The strategies adopted by cross- 
channel operators are working in entirely the contrary direction. 
The situation exemplified by this case again represents one in which the balance of 
market power is weighted against the consumer. Whilst businesses retain unfettered 
cross-border access to consumers, they are simultaneously able to segment the market by 
constructing conditions of their own choosing in order to channel consumer access to 
market information and to the services themselves. In this field, the Single Market has 
helped dismantle market barriers for suppliers, but not for consumers. This danger is 
explicitly recognised in some of the EU Directives, for example Directive 1999/44/EC of 
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the European Parliament and of the Council of 25th May 1999 on "Certain Aspects of the 
Sale of Consumer Goods and Associated Guarantees", which observes in the preamble: 
... whereas consumers who are keen to benefit from the large market by purchasing 
goods in member states other than their state of residence play a fundamental role 
in the completion of the internal market; whereas the artificial reconstruction of 
frontiers and the compartmentalisation of markets should be prevented... (my 
emphasis). 
The market imbalance, evident in earlier periods of the development of the EU, is still 
powerfully evident in this case. 
Having established in this case that the problems facing consumers engaged in cross- 
border travel incorporate both structural and non-structural market characteristics, it is 
reasonable to conclude, therefore, that consumers should be expected to benefit from a 
variety of approaches to market surveillance - surveillance not only aimed at monitoring 
the effects of cartels, mergers and explicit or implicit collusion between suppliers, but 
also at monitoring the detailed workings of specific market practices, whether these are 
the product of market structures or not. The EU Press Release to accompany the renewal 
of the P&0 Stena joint venture promised: "In any case and irrespective of the 
exemption, the Commission will continue to follow developments in cross-Channel 
transport in close contact with consumer organisations and national authorities. " 
(European Commission 2001c) This monitoring does seem to be active. On Yd 
September 2003, officers from both the Competition DG and the OFT raided the offices 
of P&0 and Eurotunnel in London, Dover and Folkestone, seeking, according to the 
Commission spokesperson, evidence of 'suspected cartel agreements and related illegal 
practices concerning fixing of prices' (The Times: 04/09/2003: 1) in relation to both 
passenger and freight businesses. The Commission was seeking to establish whether 
there was any evidence of market-share agreements between the rival operators. A 
Eurotunnel representative commented: "We operate in a fiercely competitive market". 
The attitude of the business commentators to this type of action is well illustrated by the 
observations of The Times' business editor: 
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Holidaymakers and haulage companies may whine about the cost of getting across 
the Channel but it is hard to see how any operator is profiteering. There is no 
evidence of that in recent profit numbers published by P&0... It may not just be the 
lack of a profitable incentive that leads companies away from offering services for 
which there is a public need. The reputational damage caused by investigations of 
this type could be enough. There is a risk that in attempting to ensure that every 
principle is met and every rule is obeyed, the EU creates more damage than it 
manages to prevent. Which would the Eurocrats prefer to see: an industry that exists, 
but is allowed to bend a few rules or a situation where no cross-Channel service can 
be sustained? 
This kind of response is interesting, since it implies that respectable observers and 
companies should have no qualms about 'bending' the competition rules designed to 
protect consumers. This is despite evidence, some contained in The Times's own initial 
report, that cross-Channel crossings are, mile for mile, much more expensive than other 
similar services (The Times: 04/09/2003: 1. The Caravan Club: 2000: 80). 
Whilst this news is re-assuring in the sense that it does suggest that the Commission is 
keeping its promise to continue to monitor the situation, it is less assuring in the sense 
that it undermines confidence in the Commission's judgements that this market represents 
a competitive environment, sufficiently robust to tolerate further merger activity and 
further exemptions. 
Narrow Scope of Legal Instruments 
The 1998 Directive on Price Indication and the 2003 Proposed Directive on Unfair 
Commercial Practices indicate, in their preambles, that the EU sees transparency as an 
essential condition for the effective working of the Single Market. The data produced in 
this chapter shows that, in cross-channel passenger transport, this essential condition is 
notably absent. Five years after the 1998 Price Directive's publication, the whole field of 
service provision has been excluded from its scope in the UK. 
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This illustrates, in graphic form, a core issue of this study: the impact on consumers of 
the narrow scope of direct EU policy instruments for their protection and the wide degree 
of discretion afforded to member states in transposition and implementation. This case 
also illuminates the dilemma set out in Chapter Five and originally identified in the 1993 
Green Paper on Consumers' Access to Justice, which states: 
In a Single Market, where goods and services circulate freely, the principle of'free 
movement' should also apply to legal instruments designed to ensure the 
discontinuation of unlawful practices... (Commission: 1993a) 
The dilemma in the case of cross channel travel is, however, even more perplexing than 
the examples outlined in the Green Paper, which focussed on examples of consumers of 
one nationality suffering at the hands of suppliers of another. Where travel prices vary 
widely from point of departure to point of departure, and where price changes can be 
difficult to detect owing to an absence of clear pricing information, different parties may 
be subject to different patterns of discrimination; some may advantage UK consumers, 
others may advantage non-UK purchasers. All that is certain is that consumers are not 
paying the comparable prices for what is essentially a comparable service. 
Proposed Legislation 
The proposed Directive concerning Unfair Business-to-Consumer Commercial Practices 
in the Internal Market (COM (2003) 356 Final) would seem to offer cross-border 
consumers a stronger legal framework, focusing on their economic interest. 
However, the weakness of a regulatory approach, without provision for systematic cross- 
border monitoring, is that it appears to depend largely on the vigilance and pertinacity of 
the individual consumer. For instance, if a practice is to be judged unfair, the legal tests 
the plaintiff would need to satisfy are three-fold: first, " the practice must be contrary to 
the requirements of professional diligence"; second "the benchmark consumer to be 
considered in assessing the impact of the practice is the 'average' consumer established by 
the ECJ"; and third, "the practice must materially distort or be likely to materially distort 
consumers' economic behaviour. " 
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The concept of professional diligence represents "a measure of care and skill exercised by 
a good businessman, in accordance with generally recognised standards of business 
practice in his particular sector of activity. " (EC: 2003d: 12) It remains to be seen 
whether this legal approach to consumer protection makes much impact on the welfare of 
the individual consumer in the absence of mechanisms of institutional support. The 
existing limitations of that support have been set out in Chapter Five. 
Analogy with Domestic Markets 
The anomalous situation in which cross-channel travellers find themselves becomes 
much clearer if some of the strategies used by Channel operators are applied to a purely 
domestic travel toll. Take the case of differential charging for different points of 
departure. Let us suppose that the Humber Bridge or the Birmingham Relief Road chose 
to charge North-South travellers a higher price than the South-North traveller. To all 
intents and purposes, this would be seen as a privately levied surcharge on travel to the 
south of the country. Whilst such a strategy might conceivably be in the interests of the 
profitability of the operator, it might well be seen as contrary to regional or national 
economic interests in general. Similarly, if either of these undertakings varied their 
charges according to the duration of time before the traveller made a return journey, this 
would undoubtedly be seen as an intolerable interference with freedom of movement. 
Perhaps one reason why such strategies seem to be divorced from economic reality in the 
domestic setting, whilst they are apparently normal in the international setting, is that the 
domestic economy really does constitute a mature Single Market, whereas the European 
setting is that of a Single Market yet to be fully realised. 
If a principal purpose of the TEN initiatives was to weaken the impact of historic borders 
and to strengthen the prospects of economic growth in border regions, it seems 
unfortunate that the private enterprises left to operate these services, should adopt 
strategies which effectively restore some of the gate-keeping effects of the former 
frontiers, essentially, for private business motives. 
This case has focussed directly on the Commission's capacity to supervise proper 
enforcement at member-state level and its attempts to compensate for these constraints in 
the domain of consumer economic rights. In terms of the success of this policy, the case 
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has provided a significant critique of the limitations of the present dual approach adopted 
by the Commission. 
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CHAPTER 8 
CONCLUSIONS 
Introduction 
The study set out to examine consumer protection in the European Union, with particular 
reference to the ability of citizen-consumers to access their economic rights across 
borders. It specifically addressed issues relating to European Commission strategies on 
enforcement and redress, exploring the relationship between policy outputs and policy 
outcomes in this area. The study also focussed on the motivations of the Commission in 
raising the profile of consumer protection policy and especially its use of the rhetoric of 
the 'citizen-consumer'. This chapter first reviews the methodology and conceptual 
frameworks adopted in this study in order to evaluate their validity in the light of our 
analysis before summarising the main findings in relation to each of the key research 
questions. The implications of these findings are then set out and the chapter concludes 
with an outline of options for future research directions. 
Review of Methodology 
In the EU, consumer protection policies emerged relatively late in the development of the 
Union. As previous chapters have sought to explain, in the early stages of the 
development of the EU, consumer protection simply did not exist as a policy area in its 
own right. Strategies to protect consumers depended largely on competition policy; 
consumers were viewed as the ultimate beneficiaries of effective market structures. In 
researching this area, it is therefore difficult to ignore competition policy. There remains 
a degree of overlap and ambiguity between the domains of competition and consumer 
protection policies. This overlap complicates research and represents part of the 
difficulty of defining research problems in this field. 
Researching a Moving Target 
The task of researching fields dealing with contemporary policy issues is beset by a 
number of practical and methodological problems. These stem from an attempt to study 
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phenomena which are taking shape in a moving policy environment and which are 
themselves developing and changing during the period of the study. For example, several 
key regulatory initiatives, supporting the general findings of the study, were published 
very late in the actual research process and certainly too late to have influenced either the 
research foci or the chosen methodology. One aspect of this problem is associated with 
the time-horizons set for the study. At the outset, it was envisaged that the empirical 
study would be completed by September, 2002. However, during 2002 it became clear 
that the pace of progress in the EU policy-making process was affecting the progress of 
the study. Therefore the period of study was extended into 2003, in order to give greater 
weight to the most recent and emerging developments in EU initiatives in this area. 
Merits of methodoloQV and models used 
Search and Review of Secondary Literature 
The search and review of secondary literature, although routine methodology, made a 
particularly useful contribution to the shaping and content of this study. First, it revealed 
how research into this policy area had been neglected. The review also demonstrated 
that other researchers had already identified some of the anomalies which prompted the 
initial formulation of the principal research questions addressed in this study, (for 
example, Tallberg 1999,2000a, 2000b, Previdi 1997, Mendrinou 1996). More 
importantly, the secondary literature suggested one or two pertinent conceptual models, 
particularly the Principal-Supervisor-Agent model and the concept of the citizen- 
consumer, which have helped shape the foregoing analysis. The secondary literature also 
fulfilled an important role in providing an interpretative backdrop against which to 
examine and evaluate the primary evidence. 
Review and Analysis of Primary Literature 
The review and analysis of the primary literature provided not only a wealth of evidence, 
but also offered critical insight into the stated rationale underpinning the perspectives, 
positions and strategies of relevant institutions and policy actors. The official 
documentation provided a rich source of data in relation to both the contextual/conceptual 
and empirical aspects of the study. However, one of the problems encountered in using 
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Commission documentation was that it was not infrequently poorly referenced and 
consequently sometimes difficult to obtain. This was particularly true of documents 
retrieved from the internet; some of the older documents were removed from easy public 
access and placed in the EU archives. However, it was possible to gain access to some of 
these documents through contact with officials in DG SANCO. 
Interviews 
The interviews took place over a fifteen month period and were designed to throw 
particular light on the specific initiatives explored in Chapter Five and on the two 
sectoral-specific case-studies in Chapters Six and Seven. The earlier batch of interviews 
(May-July 2002) concentrated on the cars case (Chapter Six), since the amendment and 
renewal of the block exemption in 2002 made this focus particularly salient at this time. 
The second series of interviews (June-July 2003) concentrated on the selected initiatives 
reviewed in Chapter Five and, to a lesser extent, on the cross-Channel travel case. The 
interviews were characterised by a common purpose based on the search for evidence in 
relation to the third and fourth research questions which are examined in detail below. 
The structure of each set of interviews was driven by a set of common criteria and 
common objectives; however, the emphasis of each interview depended on the particular 
subject target under review and on the nature of the constituency from which 
interviewees were drawn. The interviews were particularly valuable in a variety of ways. 
First, they provided useful guidance, eliciting unpublished and expert evidence, 
privileged insights and access to further information networks. They also provided 
evidence of the differing perspectives of policy actors representing different 
constituencies, and offered invaluable insights into the processes of policy 
implementation and enforcement. One aspect of the interview process that did pose 
certain difficulties was the problem of fitting the interviews into the busy work schedules 
of officials in the Commission. This problem made it necessary to visit Brussels twice in 
June 2003 which proved time-consuming and costly. In retrospect, it would have been 
preferable to have conducted the interviews at an earlier stage. However, the timing of 
the reform of the block exemption for the car sector in 2002 and the time taken for the 
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Commission initiatives to sufficiently mature by 2003 meant that earlier interviews, in all 
likelihood, would have proved less profitable. 
Case-studies 
One problem at the outset of the study was to choose case areas which were likely to 
prove fruitful. In the event, the cases chosen proved particularly valuable in 
demonstrating the limitations of the indirect approach to consumer protection by means 
of competition policy. They were also useful in that they represented different sectors of 
the Single Market illustrating the need for a 'direct approach' using specific initiatives, 
particularly targeting practices impeding the exercise of consumers' cross-border 
economic rights. As vehicles for demonstrating and evaluating the efficacy of direct 
initiatives, the case studies were less illuminating. This was largely due to the fact that 
most of the relevant initiatives were in the early stages of, often belated, implementation 
during the study. Thus in the case-study chapters it was only possible to offer a 
preliminary assessment of their likely impact. 
The method involved what Eckstein (2000) described as a'disciplined-configurative', a 
'heuristic' and a 'plausibility-probe' approach to case-material. The P-S-A model and the 
construct of the 'citizen-consumer' acted both as lenses through which to interpret 
evidence and formative models helping to underpin the structure of the study. In the 
outcome, the study did involve a heuristic element in that it prompted the development of 
the two principal conceptual frameworks by exploring connections between them, as is 
shown below. The plausibility-probe element is to be found in the attempt to relate 
policy outputs in particular market areas to policy outcomes 'on the ground' and as a way 
of assessing the consequences of the balance of policy choices (in this case between 
competition and consumer policy). 
Review of Conceptual Models Used 
The two main configurative frameworks used to structure the study were the concept of 
the citizen-consumer and the P- S- A Model of the relationship between supranational 
institutions and member-states (Tallberg: 1999). 
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Citizen-Consumer 
In spite of the conceptual and definitional ambiguities surrounding the term, the concept 
of the 'citizen-consumer' has proved useful in several ways. It provided a construct 
through which the Commission's actions in raising the profile of consumer policy could 
be understood. The concept helped not only to facilitate the establishment of connections 
between the issues of enforcement, legitimacy and citizenship, but also contributed to an 
understanding of the political strategies adopted by the Commission. 
The concept of the citizen-consumer also shed light on the broader implications of the 
developing notions of EU citizenship. Because the EU is not an established state, but a 
developing political entity providing governance, EU "citizenship" is itself an incomplete 
concept. The academic literature has suggested different approaches to understanding 
and interpreting citizenship and this body of debate broadly falls into two camps: the first 
focuses on creating emotional or psychological attachments to the EU, the second focuses 
on a more pragmatic interpretation of citizenship based on the accessibility of rights. The 
concept of the citizen-consumer, itself falling into the second category, provided a useful 
vehicle for exploring the relevance of these two approaches. 
P-S-A Model 
The P-S-A model provided a generic framework of delegation within which to locate the 
different roles played by the principal actors in the EU system of governance. Its 
particular value was that it did, as Tallberg (1999) claimed, expose the complexities and 
ambiguities inherent in the EU system. The evidence compiled in the empirical chapters 
fits well with this model of the system, encapsulating as it does a definition of one of the 
key problems EU policy actors face, namely the constraints imposed upon the 
Commission's ability to directly supervise and monitor EU policy outputs at ground level 
in the member states. The study has attempted to establish relationships between the 
citizen-consumer and the P-S-A model in the field of consumer protection and to use 
them in collaboration to elucidate the processes at work there. 
These processes are illustrated in the diagram below. 
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Diagram: 
Prevention and Redress in the EU Approaches to Consumer Protection 
The above model illustrates two different approaches to enforcement - prevention and 
redress. The redress loop refers to those areas of policy where citizens are protected by 
the provision of access to legal remedies for detriment suffered. This represents post hoc 
protection. The prevention loop, in the EU context, refers to regulations and directives 
across the policy areas which are intended to anticipate detriment and to prevent it. 
However, prevention at EU level does not simply consist of creating legal constraints and 
frameworks but involves the effective monitoring and policing of these. At the EU level, 
the 'prevention loop' also extends to a limited number of policy areas (competition, 
agriculture, fisheries) where member-states have delegated power to the Commission to 
undertake supervisory/monitoring activities directly across national borders. Much of the 
work of the Competition DG, for example, consists of policing and monitoring the 
activities of market actors to ensure that they do not flout existing regulations. The 
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Competition DG does not, however, provide redress in its own right; it can only stop mal- 
practices by threat of court action or by reference to the ECJ. In spite of the fact that the 
Competition DG is able to engage in direct supervision of market activity in the member- 
states, its scope for action in this respect is circumscribed by the criteria which must be 
satisfied in order to undertake either preventive action, or referral to the ECJ. The criteria 
are namely the anti-competitive practices outlined in the Rome Treaty involving abuse of 
dominant position, cartelisation or anti-competitive mergers. 
In the field of consumer policy, on the other hand, the Commission is very constrained in 
its capacity to supervise and monitor policy at ground level and is therefore obliged to 
work through the agency of the member-states. In principle, where market abuses are 
intra-state, national enforcement agencies are free to adopt both prevention and redress 
strategies. Where cross-border abuses occur, there is no international agency within the 
EU charged with prevention. Cross border redress is possible through private legal and 
mediatory mechanisms and now, at the institutional level, through co-operation between 
member states, by means of the Injunctions Directive. However, evidence arising from 
the interviews undertaken at the OFT and the DTI suggests that preventive action seems 
to be hampered by a need to allocate limited resources to addressing consumer 
complaints. Officials confirm that the enforcement process is complaints driven and 
readily confess that they are 'not looking for work'. In the future, the proposed Directive 
on Unfair Commercial Practices and the Regulation on Consumer Protection 
Enforcement should strengthen the administrative framework for cross-border consumer 
protection enforcement. 
Whereas on the redress side the P-S-A/Citizen-consumer model indicates limited support 
for consumers seeking to address problems in exercising their economic rights, on the 
prevention side, no such trans-national system of monitoring or support has been put in 
place. On this side of the model, preventive monitoring and enforcement depend on 
inter-state action. The success of such an approach therefore relies on the individual 
enforcement agencies in each member-state taking a pro-active stance. The evidence in 
this study suggests that this may be an over-optimistic expectation. 
239 
Summary of Main Findings 
Review of Research Ouestions 
The key research questions were constructed in the course of the initial exploration of the 
field and since that time have consistently steered the direction of study. They proved 
particularly useful in directing attention towards the motivation of the Commission in this 
policy area, in structuring an examination of Commission strategies, and in promoting an 
assessment of the efficacy of policy outcomes. Whilst the original research proposal had 
set out these intentions in broad terms, the research questions were particularly useful in 
sharpening the focus of the research effort. The inter-dependencies between the research 
questions helped to promote the perceptions and development of connections between the 
difference aspects and phases of the research process. 
The findings in relation to each of the research questions are examined below. 
1. First, the study asked whether the Commission's increased attention to the ability 
of citizen-consumers in the EU to exercise their economic rights across borders in 
the Single Market was used as a means of legitimising the Single Market in the eyes 
of the citizen. 
The study shows that during the 1990s the Commission, in its policy documents and in 
the statements of policy actors, began increasingly to associate improvement in citizen 
perception of the EU with evidence of increasingly benificent economic outcomes for 
consumers, arising from the inception of the Single Market. The creation of a culture of 
citizenship and citizens' rights was used strategically to develop the relationship between 
the citizen and the Union, by widening and deepening the effectiveness of rights and by 
targeting areas of specific interest to citizens, particularly social, environmental and 
consumer policy-areas. The study shows that the Commission consciously adopted this 
strategy in response to evidence of citizen alienation and apathy towards the Single 
Market and towards EU integration generally. The documentary evidence demonstrates 
that EU policy actors feared that lack of citizen support for the Single Market, a key stage 
of the integration process, would undermine the legitimacy of EU integration. 
This change of focus was specifically detected in a greater emphasis on the need to 
protect the citizen as consumer. The shift in the status of consumer protection policy, 
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evidenced in its explicit Treaty status (TEU 1992), its elevated institutional status as a 
DG in its own right and in the marked increase in policy initiatives and outputs, 
represents a facet of a more general policy. The two main features of this process - 
improved health and safety and improved ability to exercise economic rights - largely 
proceeded in tandem. However, the timing and co-incidence of a series of major food 
scandals in the mid-1990s prompted a shift of emphasis towards health and safety issues. 
Nevertheless, as evidence from policy outputs and policy documents showed, strategies 
to enhance consumers' ability to exercise their economic rights continued and accelerated 
towards the end of the decade. The full participation of citizen-consumers was also seen 
as essential to the proper functioning of the Single Market, because if citizen-consumers 
were not able to maximise their market benefits, then neither would the supply-side. It 
was thought that loss of consumer confidence would have a negative effect on business, 
leading to a sub-optimal level of economic growth. 
2. Second, the study analysed the extent to which, as part of this strategy, the 
Commission used the rhetoric of the 'citizen consumer' as a device to court citizen 
support for the single market project. 
The secondary literature on the legitimacy bases for the EU strongly points to the notion 
that its legitimacy is best predicated on policy performance, identity and democracy both 
being relatively weak at this level. The Commission's rhetoric in speeches and policy 
documents (for example, Action Plans, Green and White Papers) demonstrates a 
particular understanding of this dilemma with regard to citizen perceptions of the Single 
Market. The documents clearly and repeatedly refer to the need to equip citizens with 
accessible rights. The policy documents related this argument specifically to the 
experience of consumers in the Single Market. It is clear from official documents and 
speeches that the Commission consciously set out to raise the profile of consumer policy 
within the wider context of a general objective to close the gap between the citizen and 
the EU, concentrating on deepening consumers' economic rights across borders and 
focussing on enforcement and access to redress. The analyses in Chapters Four and Five 
show that many of the documents use the notion of the citizen-consumer to justify these 
policy strategies. The documents repeatedly cite the need to enhance consumer 
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confidence by improving the effectiveness of cross-border enforcement and redress 
mechanisms. Although intended as the ultimate beneficiaries of this policy, citizens 
themselves may not have been intended as the primary recipients of the rhetoric. How 
many ordinary citizens read EU policy documents? On the basis of the available 
evidence, it is reasonable to suggest that the member states were the primary targets, as 
part of a strategy to encourage them to support this policy line. As Principals they were 
central to the decisional stage and as Agents they were crucial policy actors in the 
implementation and enforcement stages. 
3a. Third, given the institutional constraints imposed upon the Commission's 
capacity to supervise proper enforcement at member state level, how has the 
Commission attempted to compensate for these constraints in the domain of 
consumers' economic rights? 
The Commission has suffered from several institutional constraints in the field of 
consumer policy. There is a general constraint on direct enforcement or supervision of 
enforcement at ground level, which may be said to be true of most EU policy areas 
excluding competition, agriculture and fisheries. The constraint is based on restrictions 
in the treaty provisions, on the principle of subsidiarity, and also on the lack of resources 
available to the Commission. The Consumer DG in particular has suffered from low 
institutional status and a lack of financial resources as is evidenced over the years by 
poor budgetary allocations. The Commission's scope for action in the early days was 
also constrained by the lack of explicit reference to consumer protection in the treaty 
provisions which effectively limited the available policy approach to one based primarily 
on competition policy and the management of market structures. 
The development of EU consumer protection has involved a developing interaction and 
overlap between the two different approaches of competition policy on the one hand and 
consumer protection policy on the other. There exists a fundamental philosophical 
difference between these two approaches. Competition policy is predicated on the notion 
that consumers are best protected by safeguarding the competitive structure of the 
market, which will, when operating normally, automatically accord them optimum choice 
and value. Consumer protection policy on the other hand is predicated on the 
242 
assumptions that markets are never perfect and frequently significantly flawed; in these 
circumstances, consumers require specific legislative and administrative support in order 
to optimise their market position. In the early stages, the EU depended largely on 
competition policy to shape the market so that the consumer would reap the economic 
benefits of the Union. The 1980s and 1990s witnessed a growing recognition that the 
market revealed an in-built bias in favour of the supply side. Competition policy, by 
itself, was insufficient to guarantee appropriate economic benefits to consumers; 
therefore, this policy came to be increasingly supplemented by more direct intervention 
in the market place to support consumers by means of specific consumer protection 
measures. The study has therefore included some analysis of the overlap between 
competition policy and consumer protection policy in the case-studies. 
However, with particular reference to consumer protection policy, there are also specific 
problems that restrict the capacity of the Commission to supervise enforcement in the 
field of consumers' economic rights, particularly across borders. Numerous Commission 
studies and reports have commented on the absence of an effective legal framework for 
the pursuit of these rights and the lack of portability of legal instruments. The survey of 
this material in this research project has also shown that consumers have, in particular, 
suffered from practical barriers to legal processes because of the cost, time and 
complexity of accessing redress across borders through the national court systems. 
Moreover, these findings have been clearly confirmed in the secondary literature, much 
of it by legal specialists. 
One way in which the EU has developed strategies for dealing with the general problem 
is by decentralising EC rights to EU citizens. For example, as Chapter Four illustrated, 
the ECJ during the 1980s and 1990s, began to devolve EC rights to EU citizens that they 
could directly enforce before their national law courts through a number of important 
case rulings. This strategy of decentralising enforceable rights to citizens was further 
developed by the Commission during the 1990s, as Chapter Five demonstrates, when it 
began to develop a number of initiatives aimed at helping citizens to access their rights in 
the Single Market. Until the late 1990s initiatives designed specifically to assist 
consumers (e. g. the European Consumer Centres) were largely non-legislative. They 
focused on providing consumers with advice and information pertaining to their rights, 
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although they also provided consumers with low level legal advice and assistance. The 
Commission also attempted to promote the development of low-cost small claims 
procedures within the domestic settings of the member states. Towards the late 1990s 
and into the 21st century, official documents clearly demonstrated that the Commission 
adopted a more proactive stance and began to develop low-cost procedures which 
consumers could use to gain redress across borders. Some of these procedures were non- 
legislative, such as the EEJ-Net and the European Complaints Form, although 
increasingly the output of initiatives demonstrates that the Commission has come to rely 
on legislative measures such as the Injunctions Directive (1998), the proposed Unfair 
Commercial Practices Directive (2003), and the proposed Regulation on Consumer 
Protection Enforcement (2003). Whilst the non-legislative initiatives largely relied on the 
ability of the individual consumer to self-protect, the legislative initiatives attempted to 
develop legal instruments and administrative frameworks to promote co-operation and 
co-ordination between national enforcement agencies, thus lightening the burden of 
enforcement on the ordinary citizen. 
3b. To what extent has it been successful? 
The case-studies in Chapters Six and Seven have emphasised a number of the limitations 
of competition policy as a vehicle for delivering consumer protection. First, they have 
demonstrated the ability of companies to exercise political pressure at the highest level in 
order to mitigate changes in the regulatory framework, as the campaign to modify the 
revised block exemption for cars has shown. They highlight the weakness of the criteria 
applied in the assessment of market structures, for instance the looseness of concepts 
such as'dominant market position' or 'public interest'. Third, they raise questions 
regarding the public accountability of agencies for the advice they offer and the 
judgements they routinely exercise in the performance of their duties; for instance, in 
their choices of priorities or in their interpretation of policy guidelines (setting conditions, 
which circumvent the 'public interest' test). They have revealed the inconsistent and low- 
level surveillance of the market even by agencies charged with such duties and their 
dependence on a complaints-driven approach. 
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Probably the most serious weaknesses in the use of competition policy to deliver 
consumer protection is that it does not deal with manifest abuses unless they stem from a 
flawed market structure. Firms remain outside its purview so long as the market in which 
they operate is deemed to be 'competitive', no matter how unsatisfactory the criteria of 
competition may be. 
Whilst evidence from the Commission's indirect competition policy approach to 
consumer protection presents, at best, a mixed picture, the Commission's direct approach 
based on decentralising measures also shows significant limitations. Evidence gathered 
from interviews, Commission evaluations, progress reports, and conferences demonstrate 
that the non-legislative approach has suffered from a number of general and specific 
problems. For example, as the analysis in Chapter Five showed, many of the initiatives 
(ECCs, EEJ-Net and European Complaints Form) suffered from poor publicity - the 
public were largely unaware of their existence. There was also some evidence that some 
initiatives suffered from weak management, ineffective monitoring and poor co- 
ordination. Evidence from interviews and reports indicated that, in part, this failure 
appeared to be the result of a lack of commitment to the initiatives on the part of certain 
member states. The inconsistent and sometimes disappointing performance was 
attributable to the dislocation in the management of the initiatives between the different 
levels of governance (local, national and EU) and to the low priority given to the task of 
monitoring by the Commission. Moreover, the Commission was hampered in its ability 
to oblige those directly responsible for managing the initiatives to comply with 
Commission requests because of the lack of sanctions at its disposal. Interviews with 
Commission officials revealed that the only real sanction available to the Commission 
was the withdrawal of funding from the projects. Officials were reluctant to take this step 
for fear of souring relations with the member- states in question. Specific problems that 
related to the EEJ-Net centred on the incompleteness of the ADR network across the 
market sectors of the participating member states. In the context of the case studies, it is 
interesting that the car sector was noted as being particularly poorly served. Other 
problems were associated with the difficulty of monitoring the quality of recommended 
ADR bodies. These findings were unanimously supported during interviews with DTI 
officials, with an official of the BEUC and from verbal and documentary evidence given 
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during a conference on the EEJ-NET 10th-11th June 2003 ("Review of the European 
Extra-Judicial Network and Future Perspectives for Improved EU Consumer 
Assistance"). Although the above criticisms demonstrate the limitations of these 
initiatives, some of the measures have not been operational for very long and in principle 
they do have the potential to be useful in the long term providing that some of the 
teething problems are ironed out. 
The success of some of the legislative initiatives also presents a mixed picture. For 
example, the Directive on the Sale of Consumer Goods and Associated Guarantees 
(1999) does not create a pan-European Guarantee, as the notes attached to the directive 
would appear to suggest. Similarly, as the case study on cross-channel travel has shown, 
the Directive on the Indication of Prices (1998) has so many possible derogations 
attached to it that it can be watered down to the extent that whole categories of products 
may be exempted as well as the entire service sector. Moreover, it is perfectly possible 
for different states to pick and choose from the available exemptions - thus making the 
practical application of this directive quite uneven. The Injunctions Directive (1998) has 
the potential to provide a useful instrument for the pursuit of unscrupulous traders 
operating across borders, although the evidence so far (2003) suggests that, in general 
(the UK aside), member-states' enforcement agencies have not been sufficiently proactive 
in applying it. The Directive on Unfair Commercial Practices and the Regulation on 
Consumer Protection Enforcement Cooperation are as yet only proposals; it is therefore 
not possible accurately to predict their likely impact. However, the Injunctions Directive, 
the Unfair Commercial Practices Directive and the Regulation represent a marked break 
with previous Commission strategies in that they attempt to create an institutionalised 
framework for the enforcement of consumers' economic rights across-borders. The 
success of these frameworks will depend, to a large extent, on the pro-activeness of the 
agencies operating them. Once again, in the absence of direct monitoring/supervisory 
capacities the Commission will have to rely upon the willingness of the member states 
acting as agents to comply with the legislation. 
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4. The final question invited an exploration of the argument that, in this context, 
the issues of enforcement, citizenship and legitimacy are interdependent and have 
been consciously interwoven by EU policy actors, seeking to re-invigorate citizen 
support for the process of EU integration. 
The logic underpinning the Commission's broad policy strategy can be summarised in 
simple terms. Enforcement facilitates good policy performance. Good policy 
performance improves citizen perceptions of the EU. Improved perception translates into 
citizen support. Improved support creates a climate of positive participation. Positive 
participation promotes political legitimacy. The secondary literature generally support 
the assumptions underlying this logic. The evidence in this study demonstrates that the 
Commission has consciously emphasised improved enforcement of consumers' economic 
rights, so that, by improved policy outcomes in this field, the benefits of the Single 
Market may become more evident to consumers and improve consumer confidence. 
Since the Single Market represents a critical stage in the integration process, consumer 
confidence, based on access to the economic benefits of the market, is seen as a direct 
route to the enhancement of more general citizen confidence. Confidence is an important 
factor in both economic and political climates. If enforcement improves policy 
outcomes, it may be argued that these have the capacity for positive effects in both 
political and economic contexts. These two contexts are interdependent. EU policy 
seems to be predicated on the belief that improvements in economic performance 
promote a 'feel-good' factor, which enhances satisfaction, not just with a particular party 
or government, but with the whole system of governance. 
Implications of the Findings 
The benefits of the Single Market are intended to flow through to citizen-consumers in a 
variety of ways, including improved goods and services at increasingly competitive 
prices. The progressive dismantling of inter-state boundaries has been the means to this 
goal. However, although the effect of EU governance has been to weaken the inter-state 
boundaries, it has nonetheless left elements of boundary control in place. Some of these 
elements might be considered 'natural', such as linguistic or cultural differences, others 
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however, are the result of remaining institutional barriers, in particular legal and 
enforcement frameworks. With regard to the protection of consumers' economic interests 
across borders these remaining barriers have generated particular problems at both the 
market level and at the institutional level. 
With regard to the Single Market, the barriers have created conditions enabling the 
supply-side to segment the market. Market segmentation, i. e. the capacity of a supplier to 
discriminate in terms of the price and conditions of service offered to different 
consumers, depends on the presence in the market environment of several related factors. 
First, there must be a basis for market segmentation, for example, legal, technical or 
cultural differences which provide a platform for discriminatory practices. Second, 
suppliers must be able to maintain the boundaries between the segments and have the 
power to enforce differential prices and conditions. Third, they need a motive for doing 
so, in this case, the existence of market conditions which will support greater 
profitability, greater control over consumer choice and/or a greater market share. It is 
possible for the supply-side to maintain segmentation because of the difficulties caused 
by cross-border legal differences that both national enforcement agencies and individual 
consumers experience when attempting to operate across borders in order to police the 
market or to gain redress. In many respects, this illustrates the problem of a continued 
dependence on an intergovernmental model in order to create a cross-border framework 
for monitoring and enforcement in EU consumer protection policy. 
There seems to be a structural problem at the heart of the enforcement of policy in 
general and of consumer policy in particular. It may be summarised as follows. In the 
existing political climate, there is insufficient political support or political will to transfer 
additional power and resources to the centre in order to create institutions or agencies at 
the European level which could monitor and enforce consumer policy in the trans- 
national domain. Therefore, to a large extent, the EU depends on market forces to 
discipline producer behaviour. Where this fails, the monitoring and enforcement of EU 
regulations depend largely on non-governmental mechanisms to monitor and address 
non-competitive behaviour - consumer complaints, publicity, cases brought forward for 
alternative dispute resolution, and private legal actions. The problem with this strategy is 
that the balance of resources, between the supply and demand side of the market, are 
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weighted heavily in favour of the supply side. Thus, the context in which the market 
operates may be characterised, from the outset, as an uneven field. 
In other words, not only is the market an uneven playing field, but the regulatory context, 
which has been created in an attempt to iron out the unevenness, is itself markedly 
uneven and for much the same reasons as the market itself is biased. That is to say, 
although the economic and financial resources on the demand and the supply side of the 
market are, in aggregate, similar, on the demand side they are thinly distributed and on 
the supply side they are clustered. Resources on the supply side are in the hands of the 
few, thus they are able to concentrate them in order to defend their specific interests, 
whereas on the demand side, they are so widely distributed that their force is dissipated. 
Thus, both in terms of bargaining-power inside the market framework and outside of it 
(say in the legal or political arenas), consumers and the consumer-lobby are always 
operating at a severe disadvantage in comparison with producers and the producer-lobby. 
This distribution of resources is reinforced by the close commercial-political nexus, 
which a command of large resources helps to create. 
The paucity of direct action to support consumer economic interests in trans-national 
matters at EU level may be explained by two phenomena. First, in a situation where the 
resources delegated by member states to the centre are inadequate to support a large 
independent operation, politicians and the officials at EU level are heavily dependent on 
business co-operation and generosity in the supply of expert technical support for policy 
formulation and implementation. The second phenomenon is the dependence of 
politicians on business support, both in seeking power and in exercising it. 
The P-S-A model throws direct light on the structural problems outlined above and 
illustrates the difficulties encountered by the Commission in three senses. First, the 
enforcement problem stems partly from an inability to enforce regulations by means of 
existing institutional channels. This may be partly due to late or incomplete 
transposition, slow or reluctant implementation and weak enforcement by the Agents. 
Second, in the case in particular of cross-border transactions, the problem stems less from 
a failure to use existing channels, as a failure to create an effective framework of 
enforcement at EU level in the first place. Third, because it focuses on unwillingness of 
member-states to delegate, it also explains the inability of the Commission, itself to 
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create central mechanisms for the effective enforcement of consumer economic rights 
across borders. 
The overlap between competition policy and consumer protection policy reveals a 
peculiar regulatory anomaly. Many of the direct initiatives are designed to deal with 
matters which require redress, arising after purchase, as a result of terms of contracts, 
failure to deliver, faulty products, unsatisfactory after-sales service, inadequate 
guarantees or fraud, whereas many consumer problems, as the case studies showed, 
stemmed from problems arising prior to purchase. These included, refusal to supply, 
unclear price information, unclear product data, refusal to supply after-sales services, 
pricing based on irrelevant reference-points, and restrictions on access to deals on the 
basis of nationality, residence, point of departure, point or means of payment. In 
principle, competition policy is intended to deal with the pre-sales environment in which 
the consumer is obliged to operate. However, this policy approach is severely limited by 
the narrow definitions of market failure, which bound the scope of its application. The 
two specific case-studies have shown that, on the one hand, competition policy provides 
for intervention at a level too remote to afford consumers protection from many specific 
problems experienced in the field, and on the other hand, the scope of consumer 
protection policy has so far been too narrow. Thus the picture of EU consumer protection 
policy that has emerged in this study suggests a policy area which is incomplete in its 
own right, yet not sufficiently compensated for by either EU competition policy or 
domestic consumer protection regimes. 
Implications for Future Research 
This study has suggested a number of possibilities for research directions in the future. 
One of the limitations deliberately imposed on this study at the outset was to limit its 
remit to the EU. However, it might be profitable to build on this initial study by adding a 
trans-Atlantic comparative dimension, comparing the situation regarding the enforcement 
of consumers' economic rights across state borders in the EU with the situation in the 
USA. Here, the main interest would be to compare the application of consumer 
protection policies across state borders in a fully federated political system with a system 
such as the EU, which is part supranational, part intergovernmental. Another line of 
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enquiry might be to explore more deeply the connections between policy outputs and 
policy outcomes in this field as the initiatives examined in Chapter Five develop and as 
the Commission's consumer protection strategies mature. A strategy similar to the one 
adopted in this study might also be applied to other policy fields such as environmental or 
social policy in order to construct a broader picture of the problems posed by breaks in 
the EU regulatory framework. 
The Study's Contribution to the Further Understanding of the Subject Field 
By focussing specifically on consumer economic interests across borders, the study 
highlights the uneasy relationship between the direct and indirect approach to consumer 
protection inherent in the policy approaches adopted by the Competition DG and the DG 
for Health and Consumer Protection. Although some material in this field already 
recognises this dual approach, the use of case-studies to illuminate the tension inherent in 
these two approaches suggests some distinctive insights into the limitations of the EU's 
approach to consumer protection. 
Another innovative element in this study is the explicit linking of policy outcomes to 
outputs by tracing implementation and enforcement measures at `ground level' in this 
fields and attempting to assess their effectiveness by reference to these specific case- 
studies. The approach also sheds some new light on the effectiveness of a `soft-law' 
approach to policy-making in this field. Whilst previous consumer studies have 
examined the output of such initiatives, this study provides some assessment of their 
practical impact for consumers. Because the study checks outputs against outcomes it 
also provides useful insights by comparing the rhetoric emanating from key policymakers 
with the reality experiences by the target audience - the citizen-consumer - at ground 
level. In the realm of theoretical modelling, the study opens up a number of possibilities 
for combining the P-S-A model with the concept of the citizen-consumer. The study also 
seeks to further understanding of the concepts of legitimacy and citizenship and the 
factors underpinning them with particular reference to the role of citizen as consumer - 
thus building on conceptual frameworks already established in the field. 
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APPENDIX 1 
PRICE DISCRIMINATION BASED ON POINT OF DEPARTURE: 
SAMPLE INTERNET BOOKINGS 
Example 1. 
SeaFrance reservations on the Dover-Calais route reveal a clear pattern of price 
differentiation based on point of departure/location of reservation. Two sample 
bookings, one made in English, the other in French, for a standard saloon car + two adults 
September 2003, one made for a point of departure in Dover, the other for a point of 
departure in Calais reveals the discrimination: 
Search dated 28.03.2003 for travel 1-7 September, 2003. 
Dover - Calais Dep. I st Sept. 09.00 hrs 
Calais - Dover Dep. 7th Sept. 14.30 hrs Super Apex Standard Fare: £254.00 
Calais - Douvres Dep. 1 Sept. 0.900 hrs 
Douvres - Calais Dep. 7. Sept. 14.00 hrs Std. Apex: 295 Euros 
Source: https: //reservation. seafrance. net/cgi-bin/bookingcgi? cl=sfr (consulted 
28.3.2003) 
The appropriate currency converter for the £: Euro on that day was £1 = 1.40000 Euro. 
Source: http: //www. moneyworld. co. uk/rates/currency/converter (consulted 28.3.2003) 
Therefore £254 = 355.6 Euros. 
This represents a difference of 60.6 Euros (£43.28). 
Travellers from France would pay 20.5% less than the sum payable by travellers from the 
UK. 
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Example 2 
Eurostar 
This example provides data relating to a number of potential journeys in each direction. 
Search dated 27.03.2003 for travel on 29.03.2003. 
Search based on lowest available fare for each journey: 
Paris (Gare du Nord) - London (Waterloo) 
Journey Depart Return Lowest Price 
29.03.2003. 30.03.2003 
Option 1 06.37 17.40 50.00 £GBP 
Option 2 07.16 18.10 50.00 £GBP 
Option 3 08.13 19.10 50.00 £GBP 
Option 4 09.10 19.40 50.00 £GBP 
Option 5 10.19 50.00 £GBP 
London (Waterloo) - Paris (Gare du Nord) 
Journey Depart Return Lowest Price 
29.03.2003. 30.03.2003 
Option 1 06.40 17.43 59.50 £GBP 
Option 2 07.10 18.16 59.50 £GBP 
Option 3 07.40 19.19 59.50 £GBP 
Option 4 08.10 20.13 59.50 £GBP 
Option 5 08.40 21.13 59.50 £GBP 
Source: Internet http: //www. Eurostar. com/dynamic/ SvBoTravelfaresSelectTerm. 
Search dated 28.03.2003 for travel on 29.03.2003. 
Search based on lowest available fare for each journey: 
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Brussels (Midi) - London (Waterloo) 
Journey Depart Return Lowest Price 
29.03.2003 30.03.2003 
Option 1 07.01 16.14 50.00 £GBP 
Option 2 08.01 18.14 50.00 £GBP 
Option 3 09.56 19.14 50.00 £GBP 
London (Waterloo) - Brussels (Midi) 
Journey Depart Return Lowest Price 
29.03.2003. 30.03.2003 
Option 1 06.00 17.01 59.50 £GBP 
Option 2 08.14 17.56 59.50 £GBP 
Option 3 10.14 19.57 59.50 £GBP 
In each of these potential journey bookings, the difference between an outward journey 
from Paris and from London and from Brussels and from London amounts to 19%. 
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APPENDIX 2 
In their evidence to the 1997 Monopolies and Mergers Commission investigation into 
their proposed joint venture on Short Sea Channel crossings, P&0 and Stena European 
Ferries were at pains to point out the unique position of rail services via the tunnel 
(Monopoly and Mergers Commission: 1997: 161-2). 
"The parties commented that Eurotunnel's competitive strength in the Short French 
Sea passenger market was based upon a unique mix of economic and commercial 
factors that also established a fundamental asymmetry between Eurotunnel and its 
competitors. First, Eurotunnel operated from a radically different platform in terms 
of capital employed (£12 billion compared with £410 million in the case of the joint 
venture). Secondly, it was removed from ordinary commercial and financial 
constraints. Applying normal commercial standards, it was an insolvent business. 
However, the exceptional size of the Eurotunnel debt and the exposure of lenders to 
such debt had produced a unique situation where lenders were unwilling to, and 
arguably incapable of, abandoning the project....... but the date when, if ever, 
dividends would begin to be paid remained entirely uncertain. Eurotunnel's 
aggregate losses dwarfed any further loss that it might need to incur in order to gain 
further market share from the ferries; the parties feared that the normal commercial 
considerations that would otherwise constrain Eurotunnel's behaviour would, 
therefore be negated. " 
Despite this claim by P&0 and Stena, the Commission found that their operating costs 
per unit were in fact lower than that of the Tunnel. The comparative costs are reproduced 
below. 
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1996 operating costs per unit of capacity, assuming 50% capacity utilisation (in L's) 
P&O Stena Le Shuttle 
Variable costs* 9.10 11.20 1.13 
Semi-variable 14.05 16.61 22.77 
costs** 23.15 27.81 23.90 
Overheads*** 8.86 9.31 14.74 
32.01 37.12 38.64 
Depreciation**** 2.58 2.62 8.10 
34.59 39.74 46.74 
*Variable costs consist of travel agents' commission and, in the case of P&0 and Stena, 
port transit costs. 
**Semi-variable costs include payroll costs, fuel and maintenance in all cases. In 
addition Stena's figures include charter hire and Le Shutle's figures include a share of the 
Tunnel operating costs. 
***Overheads include administration and marketing costs. 
****Le Shuttle depreciation relates only to rolling stock and does not include a 
depreciation charge for the tunnel. 
(MMC: 1997: 21, Table 2.4) 
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APPENDIX 3 
NOTE ON EXCHANGE RATE CALCULATIONS 
The Effect of a Currency Devaluation 
As this chapter has indicated, between December 2002 and March 2003, the Pound 
Sterling suffered a fall against the Euro of about 9%. The effect of this on an operator 
may be summarised by a simple illustration. 
If an operator had all of its costs in Euros and all of its revenue in Pounds, then the full 
effect of the devaluation would fall on the operator, since it would need to exchange all 
the revenue (all in Pounds) into Euros in order pay out necessary expenditures (all in 
Euros). With about 9% fewer Euros to the Pound, the operator would find, in effect that 
costs had risen by exactly that degree. 
Thus, the greater an operator's cost commitment in Euros and the greater the dependence 
on revenue in Sterling, the greater the impact of a devaluation in the value of the Pound 
against the Euro. The converse is, of course, also true. 
The effect on an operator based on the continent, such as SeaFrance, might be greater 
than that on an operator based in the UK However, it must also be remembered that, 
prior to 2003, the Pound Sterling experienced a period of appreciation against the Euro 
since the inception of the single currency. Therefore, between 2001 and 2003, the 
balance of advantage moved in the converse direction. 
For price differentiation to be explained in terms of currency movements, the pattern of 
differentiation would need to be consistently in favour of one currency. In this case, in 
the circumstances of 2003, the prices expressed on Pound sterling would be expected to 
be consistently higher than in Euros. However, at the time when Eurostar and Seafrance 
were offering lower prices in Euros for similar reservations, P&0 Ferries were 
discriminating in the other direction on the Rotterdam-Hull route. In other words, the 
differential prices shown in the examples in this chapter cannot be explained away in 
terms of currency movements. The operation of market segmentation is a more 
convincing explanation of the differences. 
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